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The reminiscence effect, in which people aged 40 and over remember more 
autobiographical memories from between ages 10 to 30 than from adjacent periods, 
producing a “bump” in lifespan distributions, is a highly robust effect.  When it was 
discovered to occur for highly positive emotional memories, but not negative ones, the 
cultural life script account of reminiscence was proposed.  The cultural life script account 
asserts that individuals possess scripts for important events in the normative life that 
structure autobiographical recall.  The reminiscence effect is explained by the fact that in 
life scripts, positive events have highly prescribed timings and cluster between ages 10 
and 30, while negative events, which do not have prescribed timings, are more evenly 
distributed across the lifespan.  The life story account outlines additional properties of 
bump memories.  The life story account attributes reminiscence to the differential recall 
of life story events, i.e., events that provide coherence to one’s life story.  Four studies 
are reported testing these accounts.  Chapter 2 reports a test of the life script with African 
Americans.  Research suggests that life scripts are highly stable, varying little across 
cultures.  The findings indicate that, overall, the properties of the life script were 
replicated.  However, minor cross-cultural differences similar to those observed in prior 
research were exacerbated with a minority sample.  In Chapter 3, the effect of minority 
  
status on the recall of emotionally negative memories is examined.  Contrary to 
expectations, the findings failed to contradict the predictions of either account of 
reminiscence.  In Chapter 4, the typicality effect is tested with life scripts in an attempt to 
present an additional class of evidence for their existence.  Finally, in Chapter 5, the life 
story account is tested.  The findings support the life story account by showing that the 
bump occurs for life story, but not non-life story, events.  These studies add to our 
understanding of the cultural life script and life story accounts and the reminiscence 
effect in autobiographical memory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
 While the study of personal, or autobiographical, memories has a history going 
back more than 100 years, some of the most substantial contributions to the field have 
only come as recently as the beginning of the twenty-first century.  These developments 
in reminiscence effect research have resulted in a new, currently burgeoning line of 
inquiry.  The reminiscence effect, originally observed by Rubin, Wetzler, and Nebes 
(1986), is the tendency for adults age 40 and over to recall disproportionately more 
memories from between ages 10 and 30, resulting in a “bump” in the lifespan 
distributions of recalled autobiographical memories.  Over the years following this 
discovery, several accounts of this effect were proposed, with the most prominent current 
ones being the cultural life scripts (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) and life story (Glück & 
Bluck, 2007) accounts.  In 2002, the results of a study by Berntsen and Rubin 
substantially altered reminiscence effect research.  In their study, respondents reported 
personal memories for several emotionally positive and negative events.  Surprisingly, 
the reminiscence effect only occurred for emotionally positive, but not emotionally 
negative, events.  A subsequent study soliciting requests for other forms of highly 
positive and negative emotional events confirmed this effect (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  
Based on these findings, Berntsen and Rubin (2003) developed the cultural life script 
account of the reminiscence effect, synthesizing the concept of scripts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1997) with sociological evidence that cultures have expectations for the timing 
of major events in the normative life.  In the cultural life script account, life scripts 
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delineate the timing and order of important events structure the recall of personal 
emotional memories.  Rubin and Berntsen hypothesized that cultural life scripts cluster 
emotionally positive events, which are mostly of a transitional nature, between ages 10 
and 30, mirroring the placement of the bump for emotionally positive events in the 
lifespan in autobiographical recall distributions.  To test this claim, Berntsen and Rubin 
(2004) conducted a study in which the existence of a shared script matching this pattern 
was demonstrated.  Several subsequent studies have gone on to replicate this finding.  
Since its discovery, investigations dealing with, or based on, the dissociation between 
distributions of autobiographical memories of opposing valences have become among the 
key focuses of autobiographical memory and reminiscence effect research, with the 
cultural life script account being one of the most prominent theoretical perspectives 
through which they are investigated. 
 Along with the cultural life script account, one other account has emerged as one 
of the most prominent explanations of the reminiscence effect and the fact that it occurs 
for highly positive, but not highly negative, emotional memories.  The life story account 
of reminiscence (Glück & Bluck, 2007), an account complementary to, and compatible 
with, the cultural life script account, attributes the bump to the differential retrieval of life 
story events.  Life story events are highly consequential, important, emotionally positive 
life events that provide coherence to one’s life story.  Whereas the cultural life script 
account predicts that the bump will be observed primarily for emotionally positive 
events, the life story account further predicts that it will only occur for life story events, 
but not non-life story events, even when they are highly emotionally positive.  Though 
limited, a growing body of research is emerging supporting the predictions of the life 
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story account and, as with the cultural life script account, it currently stands of one of the 
main focuses of autobiographical memory and reminiscence effect research.  In fact, the 
two are so inextricably tied that investigating one requires addressing the other. 
 As tests of the cultural life scripts and life story accounts of the reminiscence 
effect are still in relatively nascent stages, there remain many unanswered questions 
about them.  Moreover, many tests of these accounts have yet to be extended into and 
confirmed in other situations.  The goal of the current dissertation is to address a range of 
unanswered questions in both accounts and present novel tests of each that will contribute 
substantially to the fields of autobiographical memory and reminiscence effect research.  
To that end, four separate, original studies are presented, preceded by a general 
introduction consisting of a review of autobiographical memory and reminiscence effect 
research, and followed by a general discussion that assesses the implications of the 
current studies on the state of these accounts. 
Chapter 2 presents the first test of the properties of the life script with a 
historically unfairly treated minority population.  A key component of the life script 
account is the claim that they invariably represent idealized lives regardless of culture, a 
property that, in part, contributes to the occurrence of the reminiscence effect only for 
emotionally positive memories. However, it is quite likely that the stability of this 
property has not been tested in enough situations (e.g., with different populations) that 
represent differences on dimensions relevant to the expression of this effect.  One such 
factor might be the minority status of the population being investigated.  Thus far, the 
populations examined in tests of the life script have all been of majority cultures, many of 
which come from highly homogenous societies, which also tend to have relatively low 
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income disparities.  It may be the case that a test of the life script with a minority 
population, especially one that has been historically unfairly treated and experiences 
higher rates of adverse living conditions, experiences a higher lifetime prevalence of 
emotionally negative events than previously investigated populations.  The result may be 
increases in the amount of negative life events they expect, and a less idealized, or even 
negative, life script.   
Chapter 3 presents a test of the reminiscence effect with African Americans’ 
autobiographical memories of unfair treatment, an emotionally negative memory.  One of 
the main predictions of both the cultural life script and life story accounts is that the 
reminiscence effect primarily occurs for emotionally positive memories (except in cases 
of history-graded events, which do not require the structuring of recall by life scripts to 
produce a bump and may not meet all the criteria for life story events).  Evidence that the 
reminiscence effect occurs for an emotionally negative event such as unfair treatment 
would likely necessitate a reformulation of the cultural life script and life story accounts 
to explain it.  While the data examined are not directly comparable to most reminiscence 
effect research because of differences in methodology, they provide a useful platform for 
discussing the potential implications of minority status on autobiographical recall and the 
cultural life scripts and life story accounts of reminiscence, as well as the effects of using 
alternative autobiographical cues.  Importantly, the current study represents the sole 
examination of the reminiscence effect with an unfairly treated minority population and a 
U.S. minority.   
Chapter 4 presents an investigation of the typicality effect with life script 
information.  Thus far, no evidence for the existence of life scripts independent of the 
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reminiscence bump has been obtained.  Ostensibly, classical effects observed with other 
forms of scripted information, such as the typicality effect, should occur with cultural life 
script information, if they are indeed scripts that individuals possess.  The typicality 
effect is the tendency for individuals to have superior memory for atypical events in 
scripted information and to be more likely to recall falsely typical, rather than atypical, 
events.  The findings of Chapter 4 provide modest support of the cultural life script 
account of reminiscence in that, while the findings from Experiment 1 provide evidence 
that life scripts are represented in memory, Experiment 2, which was conducted to 
address potential confounds in Experiment 1, produced mixed results.  The findings from 
Experiment 2 suggest the possibility of an alternative form of knowledge that may be 
driving typicality effects when dealing with the relationship between emotional valence 
and lifetime periods.   
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a test of the life story account of reminiscence.  Life 
story memories are characterized by several different qualities.  Prior research has 
demonstrated that a dissociation occurs between distributions of life story and non-life 
story memories when they are identified based on some of their qualities, such as 
perceived control.  However, this effect has not yet been demonstrated with other life 
story event qualities, such as importance to identity development and importance.  In 
addition to extending findings to novel variables, the current study presents for the first 
time a test of the life story account in an American sample in a procedure synthesizing 
elements of a previous test of the life story and cultural life script accounts in a novel 
procedure. 
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The format of the current dissertation is as follows:  First, a general introduction 
consisting of a literature review is presented, followed by the four studies, and ending 
with a general discussion section.  Each of the four studies is presented as a standalone 
article conforming to the American Psychological Association (APA) style manual 
guidelines for research manuscripts, consisting of an abstract, and introduction, method, 
results, and discussion sections.  As such, some overlap may exist between the general 
introduction and the introduction sections of each individual study.  As a general rule, the 
literature review in the general introduction provides more in depth coverage and 
analyses of the extant literature than is possible in the introduction section of a journal 
article. 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF AM 
1. EARLY RESEARCH ON TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF AM 
The reminiscence effect was discovered relatively early in the evolution of the 
field of autobiographical memory research, which can trace its roots to the earliest 
chapters of experimental psychology with studies by Ebbinghaus and Galton.  However, 
the study of autobiographical, or episodic (Tulving, 1972), memories for one’s personal 
past only reemerged and began anew in earnest in the mid 1970’s.   One of the main 
catalysts for this renewed interested was the work of Crovitz and Schiffman (1974), who 
employed Galton’s word cue methodology to elicit autobiographical memories.  They 
obtained 1,745 reports of autobiographical memories and the ages at which they occurred 
from 98 undergraduate participants, with the goal of examining the retention function 
(i.e., the curve of the distribution of recalled memories).   They concluded that the 
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frequency of autobiographical memories decreases as a function of the retention interval 
(i.e., their age since occurrence).  However, they were unable to draw any conclusions 
about the retention function for memories across the lifespan, because of the limitations 
of their sample, which was comprised entirely of undergraduate students.  Robinson 
(1976) also encountered the same limitation in his study examining the word-cued 
memories of 24 undergraduate students ranging in age from 18 to 21 years.  In a 
“modified free-association” procedure, word cues for common objects, common 
activities and various affective states were utilized.  Participants produced 1,101 reported 
memories.  Among his main findings were that there was a clear indication of gender 
differences, in that the distribution of reported memories by females had a greater number 
of recent events, compared with greater variability that was evident in the distributions 
produced by the male participants.  Moreover, object- and activity-cued memories were 
reported from more recent periods for females than males.  However, there was no 
significant difference in median age for affective cue memories between males and 
females, which skewed toward being more recent for both.  Robinson also assessed 
response latency, temporal specificity, and experience type.    Females tended to have 
shorter response latencies than males, but significant differences were only observed for 
activity terms and object terms, but not for affect terms.  An interesting finding was that 
response times were greatest for memories from the middle lifetime period, with those 
from the most remote and recent periods being equal, demonstrating a curvilinear 
relationship between response latency and memory age.  With regard to experience type, 
the most frequently reported memories were accidents and injuries, romantic episodes, 
and first time experiences. The findings show that contrary to predictions, object and 
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activity words did not produce affectively neutral responses.  Rather, they often were of 
some type of emotional significance. The findings of his study led Robinson to three 
main conclusions: (1) there were clear differences between affective and activity and 
object prompts, (2) there was a reliable gender difference, and (3) there was a clear 
curvilinear relationship between response latency and age of memory.  While influential, 
the studies by Crovitz and Schiffman, and Robinson were limited in their ability to 
contribute significantly to the understanding of autobiographical memory across the 
lifespan by the restricted age ranges of their samples.  Subsequent AM research would 
overcome this limitation. 
Several prominent AM studies were carried out after those by Crovitz and 
Schiffman and Robinson that extended their findings to older samples.  One such study 
was that by Franklin and Holding (1977).  Franklin and Holding tested 100 subjects 
between 25 and 75 years of age who reported memories cued by 50 randomly chosen 
words.  In comparing the average age of memories between five age groups with a range 
of ten years each, they found that memory age (time since the event) increases as 
participant age increases, rather than being recalled from a uniform interval across age 
groups.  In addition, response latencies (time from cue to producing a reported memory) 
did not differ significantly between age groups.  Also using a word cue paradigm, 
Fitzgerald and Lawrence (1984) examined the dates of elicited memories, response 
latencies, measures of imagery, and of meaningfulness, in four age groups.  The results 
indicated that response latencies and the rate of memory decline over time are stable 
across age groups.  From their findings, Fitzgerald and Lawrence concluded that patterns 
of remembering are relatively stable across the adolescent and adult age ranges.  
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Whereas the previous studies examined autobiographical recall in healthy 
populations, Zola-Morgan, Cohen, and Squire (1983) assessed the remote 
autobiographical memories of patients with various forms of amnesia, including amnesia 
due to Korsakoff’s syndrome, traumatic brain injury, and electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT), which were compared to alcoholic control subjects.  In Zola-Morgan et al.’s 
procedure, participants were read cue words to which they would recall a specific 
memory from their lives, and estimate the timing of its occurrence.  The findings showed 
that, despite the subjects’ impairment on other memory tasks, these amnesiac patients 
were surprisingly adept at recalling episodic memories, even performing as well as 
healthy control subjects at several of the tasks.   In fact, Korsakoff’s patients reported 
more remote memories as a percentage of total memories reported than alcoholic 
controls. In comparing episodic and semantic memory deficits, it was found that 
amnesiac patients had performed as well on the test of remote episodic memory as on 
tests of remote semantic memory.   
While research such as the examples described above utilized samples of varying 
sizes representing several distinct populations, a few prominent researchers conducted 
influential studies using themselves as the sole participant.  The most noteworthy are the 
diary studies by Linton (1986) and Wagenaar (1986).  Linton recorded her memories on a 
daily basis for over a decade.  Once a month, she would test herself on the recognition 
and cued recall of randomly selected memories.  The measure of recognition was whether 
she recognized the event as a unique event.  The cued recall entailed dating the timing of 
the event based on three cues describing the event, recorded on the day of its occurrence.  
Linton also performed an additional task in which on a yearly basis, she would attempt 
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via free recall to recall as many memories from the prior year as possible.  At one point, 
she also added a task in which she attempted to remember via free recall as many 
memories as possible from randomly chosen months. Finally, in 1983, she completed a 
free-recall of as many memories as possible per year from the years 1972 to 1982, with 
the to-be-recalled years presented in random order.  Content analysis of memories 
demonstrated some interesting findings.  Notably, relatively few memories were 
emotionally negative, and search method had no effect on emotional valence of recalled 
events.  Linton concludes that negative memories “do not appear in temporally cued 
recall (p. 60).”   This was not the case however, for recognition-cued recall findings, 
which indicated no difference in the rate at which negative memories were lost, compared 
to positive ones.  With regard to the recall of recent memories, Linton found that they 
were recalled with great accuracy and required fewer cues to be accessed.  In Wagenaar’s 
(1986) study, conducted over a six-year span, he collected reports of 2400 events, for 
each of which four cues were recorded: what the event was (what); who was involved 
(who); and where and when it occurred.  Wagenaar compared the probability of recall 
depending on various cue combinations and found that the probability of recall depended 
on the number of cues utilized as well as on the cue type and particular combination.  
Similar to Linton, Wagenaar found that there was an effect of emotional valence in which 
emotionally positive (pleasant) events were better recalled than emotionally negative 
(unpleasant) events.  
2. THE DISCOVERY OF THE REMINISCENCE EFFECT 
As AM research progressed, several studies were conducted investigating the  
temporal organization of autobiographical memories, like that by Rubin (1982), which 
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investigated the retention function.   Along those lines, Rubin, Wetzler, and Nebes (1986) 
made one of the most significant and influential contributions to the AM literature.  In 
their paper, Rubin et al. presented one of the earliest descriptions of the reminiscence 
effect.  In examining the prior findings by Franklin and Holding, Fitzgerald and 
Lawrence, and Zola-Morgan, Cohen, and Squire, they demonstrated, contrary to 
expectations of monotonic forgetting with the passage of time, a reoccurring, 
disproportionate recall of remote or early memories compared with ones that are more 
recent.  When summing the results of the above-mentioned studies together, the effect 
was even more pronounced.  Rubin et al. called this observation the reminiscence effect.  
The data indicated that adults aged 40 and older produced a nonmonotonically decreasing 
distribution of memories across the lifespan where subjects recalled an increased number 
of memories from the lifetime period of approximately 10 to 30 years of age.  These 
findings provided one of the earliest indications of reminiscence in memory and the 
potential that the retention function for autobiographical memories does not conform to 
that for normal forgetting in laboratory research.  From these results, Rubin et al. 
proposed a model of autobiographical memory consisting of three components: (1) 
Childhood amnesia; (2) a retention component to account for the recency effect; and (3) a 
reminiscence component to account for memories from adolescence and young 
adulthood.  Thus, only a decade after the reemergence of autobiographical memory 
research, the reminiscence effect was introduced.  Subsequently, the reminiscence effect 
has come to be considered one of the most robust findings in AM literature (Conway & 
Rubin, 1993; Glück & Bluck, 2007).   
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REVIEW OF REMINISCENCE EFFECT RESEARCH 
1. EARLY ACCOUNTS OF THE REMINISCENCE EFFECT 
In the 10 years following the discovery of the reminiscence effect by Rubin, 
Wetzler, and Nebes (1986), some initial attempts at accounting for the phenomenon were 
made. However, as should later be made relatively clear, the nature of these accounts 
differed greatly from those that would dominate in the early Twenty-First Century.  
Shortly after Rubin et al. introduced the concept of the reminiscence effect, Fitzgerald 
(1988), whose data were among those analyzed by Rubin, et al., posited some likely 
accounts of its occurrence.  Fitzgerald considered three possible explanations: (1) Event 
interpretations; (2) cognitive interpretations; and (3) noncognitive interpretations.  The 
event interpretation revolves around a simple premise, that an increased number of 
memorable events occur in the period of the reminiscence effect, adolescence through 
young adulthood.  While acknowledging that “life events” such as marriages and births 
occur more often in this period, Fitzgerald discounts this hypothesis because, with the 
data he was examining, there apparently were not enough of these events to account for 
the large number of memories observed.  The cognitive interpretation takes into account 
several characteristics of autobiographical memories reported by participants in 
Fitzgerald’s study.   Reported memories tended to possess several key characteristics:  
They were vivid, personally important, frequently rehearsed and were often novel and 
surprising events experienced with high levels of emotion.  While substantially different 
in several key characteristics, the accounts of the reminiscence effect by Fromholt and 
Larsen (1991), shared some components of the accounts Fitzgerald proposed, but more 
closely presaged the later prominent theories that dominate the field currently.   
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In their study examining the autobiographical recall of persons between 71 to 89 
years of age, Fromholt and Larsen examined the episodic memories of both normal and 
demented patients.  However, their procedure differed from many prior studies by not 
using the word cue methodology.  Instead, they asked participants to report important life 
events.  This divergence from prior procedure would immensely affect and guide future 
research in the field.  Findings for both normal and demented patients clearly 
demonstrated the classic reminiscence effect pattern: (1) A relative dearth of early 
childhood memories reflecting the period of childhood amnesia; (2) a bump of increased 
memory recall between 10 to 30 years of age; (3) relatively few memories in the 
following period; and (4) a recency effect.  However, the effect was more pronounced in 
the normal control subjects. To explain their findings, Fromholt and Larsen suggested 
that the observed patterns might be explained by sociocultural influences.  They pointed 
to the prevalence of important transitional life events that cluster in the bump period, and 
the relative lack of those events in the subsequent adjacent period as a potential source of 
the pattern in the observed distributions.  Whereas Fitzgerald’s study indicated that only 
14% of the bump memories were such events, leading him to dismiss this idea, Fromholt 
and Larsen considered their findings, which showed that 29% of dated memories from 
the bump period were of such events, and only 21% were from other types of events, was 
a sufficient indication that this was a reasonable hypothesis.  One point on which 
Fromholt and Larsen, and Fitzgerald did agree was the potential effect of self-narrative.  
They conjectured that the rehearsal and maintenance associated with such salient self-
defining events could cause them to be sampled with greater frequency.  While early 
accounts proposed by theorists like Fromholt and Larsen and Fitzgerald were beginning 
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to converge on key points, the volume of research in the area would begin to expand 
tremendously and cover a wider range of methodologies and theories. 
In an example of what could be described as another event-based interpretation 
(such as that described by Fitzgerald), Jansari and Parkin (1996) offered their account of 
the bump based on findings they obtained using cue words from Robinson’s (1976) 
study, in which they observed a reminiscence effect in adults between the ages 56 and 60.  
They suggested that the excess of first experiences in early life might account for the 
reminiscence effect. Additionally, they found that when constrained in their responses to 
avoid reporting any recent memories, a reminiscence effect was also observed in 
participants aged 36 to 40 years old.  Jansari and Parkin stated that participants in this age 
group typically report an excess of recent events, but that by instructing subjects to 
follow constraints that ameliorate this tendency, they too display reminiscence effects.  In 
a comparison of word-cued and important autobiographical memories, Rubin and 
Schulkind (1997a) found that for adults aged 70, many more important memories, rather 
than word-cued memories, were concentrated in the lifetime period of 20 to 29.  In a 
separate study utilizing only word-cues, Rubin and Schulkind (1997b) found that the 
bump occurred for older (aged 73), but not younger (aged 20) participants. In an 
examination of recollective accuracy, a different class of evidence was obtained 
regarding the nature of bump-period memories.  Belli, Schuman, and Jackson (1997) 
found that when occurring in the transition period (i.e., 10 to 30 years of age), memory 
for public events (e.g., the Tet Offensive, Woodstock, Watergate) and figures (e.g., Joe 
McCarthy, Rosa Parks, and John Dean), while still susceptible to error, is better than that 
from other life phases.  Like Jansari and Parkin, Belli, et al. supported the first experience 
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hypothesis as a potential cognitive account of superior memory accuracy for transition 
period events. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the reminiscence effect is a 
robust effect that can be elicited with a variety of cues and that bump period (aka 
transitional phase) events are not only recalled more, but are recalled also more 
accurately.  Despite the growing abundance of evidence regarding the special properties 
of the bump period, there was still no broad consensus on the cause of the bump. 
2. TOWARDS CURRENT PROMINENT ACCOUNTS OF REMINISCENCE 
By the late 1990’s, several accounts of the bump had been expounded.  Rubin, 
Rahhal, and Poon (1998) presented one of the most comprehensive reviews of these 
accounts up to that time, describing four mutually compatible accounts of the 
reminiscence effect.  These were the cognitive, biological, identity formation, and genetic 
fitness accounts.  Due to its status as the account with the most tenuous support and lack 
of influence on later reminiscence bump theorizing, discussion of the genetic fitness 
account, which mostly pertains to several possible effects derived from the importance of 
the bump period in procreation, will be omitted.  Below I review each of the remaining 
three accounts separately, while considering not only that presented by Rubin et al. 
(1998), but also theorizing on these accounts subsequently developed by others. 
The cognitive account draws upon mechanisms well established as affecting 
memory and greatly emphasizes the effects associated with the encoding of novel, 
distinctive events, many of which occur in the bump period, and the transition from a 
lifetime period of rapid change corresponding with the bump period, to one of relative 
stability corresponding to the time after the bump period.  There are several aspects of a 
novel experience that engage cognitive processes that augment memory.  Novel events 
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are subject to more elaborate cognitive processing, i.e., greater depth-of-processing.  This 
is because such experiences may require extra effort to analyze or comprehend them, 
something not necessary with already experienced situations.  Deeper processing, 
according to Craik and Lockhart (1972), leads to superior encoding and retrieval than less 
effortful, or “shallow,” processing, and may lead to more easily accessible cues. 
Additionally, novel experiences would benefit from minimal proactive interference (PI), 
the interference of previously learned information, which is minimal to non-existent for 
novel experiences.  Additionally, the “release” of PI augments memory for novel 
experiences following similar, successive occurrences.  Another quality of novel 
experiences relevant to memory is distinctiveness.  Highly distinctive events elicit 
significant levels of encoding that are not present when experiencing previously 
encountered situations. For one reason, they may be affected by a script (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977), a generic cognitive representation of a common event sequence.  
Individuals develop scripts from the aggregation of multiple experiences with an event 
sequence.  An effect of script knowledge is that—in contrast with the substantial 
encoding that occurs in novel situations previously mentioned—commonly experienced 
events (that are therefore highly scripted) elicit less encoding.  Consequently, there is 
little memory discrimination for actions that are very typical (Graesser, Gordon, & 
Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981), 
making individual examples of a commonly occurring activity virtually indistinct from 
one another.  In this manner, one may be highly likely to recall one’s first dinner date 
with his or her spouse, but without the occurrence of a significantly atypical event during 
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later instances of dining out, many of those situations will be unremarkable, and 
therefore, not likely remembered as distinct examples of times one went out to dinner.   
The cognitive account attributes some of the enhanced memorability of events 
occurring in adolescence and young adulthood, a period Rubin et al. refer to as a period 
of relative instability because of the preponderance of novel and distinctive events, to the 
fact that it is followed by a period of relative stability.  The period of stability, the 
beginning of which corresponds with the end of the bump period, is marked by a general 
lack of novel and distinctive events and imparts several memory enhancing effects.  
These include opportunities for spaced rehearsal, a cognitive factor known to strengthen 
memory retention, and bolstering the stability of retrieval cues.  When a period of 
stability persists until retrieval, recalled events may still be novel, but are more likely to 
be retrieved again.  Ultimately, they benefit from the memory-enhancing effects of both 
periods, the stable and unstable.  These events will be better encoded and integrated into 
stable cognitive structures, as well as retrieved more often.  Further memory-enhancing 
effects derived from the beginning of stable periods include the fact that many initial 
experiences with situations regularly encountered throughout adult life occur during this 
period, thus serving as the earliest examples of routine behaviors that affect how they are 
performed later.  Looking back to primary behavioral templates serves to reinforce long-
term retention through periodic, spaced retrieval.  The stable period also helps to ensure 
that utilized cues will persist and will therefore more likely be available at retrieval.  
Overall, the cognitive account outlines several effects likely occurring 
contemporaneously in the critical lifetime period of adolescence to young adulthood.  
Consequently, these effects make events from this period, especially those that are highly 
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novel and distinctive, remembered better, thus producing the reminiscence bump.  
However, as pointed out by Berntsen and Rubin (2002), this account, which was initially 
described in 1998, does not predict differences in the recall of memories as a function of 
emotional valence that they observed in their 2002 study. 
Though somewhat less well grounded in clearly identified phenomena, the 
biological account is not without its merits. This account, which was presented under this 
name by Berntsen and Rubin (2002), was presented in an earlier iteration by Rubin et al. 
(1998).  This account addresses the biologically based developmental trajectory of 
cognitive abilities.  The basic premise is that the functioning of relevant cognitive 
abilities increases until early adulthood, where they reach their inflection point, 
whereupon they begin gradually to decline (Craik & Bialystok, 2006).  These include 
processing speed (Salthouse, 1996; Salthouse, 2003), which has been shown to increase 
from infancy to young adulthood then decline from approximately the twenties into old 
age, as well as memory and intelligence (Rubin et al., 1998).  
Comparatively speaking, the identity formation account has better withstood, and 
been more influential upon, recent developments in theorizing on the reminiscence bump 
than either the cognitive or the biological accounts.  The influence of identity formation 
effects, touched upon by Fitzgerald (1988) and Fromholt and Larsen (1991), and covered 
by Rubin et al. (1998), has ultimately been greater than that of all other competing early 
accounts, and its successors have come to dominate current theorizing on the 
reminiscence bump.  The bump period is the time in one’s life when their identity is 
formed.  Beginning in adolescence, individuals start to develop a sense of who they are.  
In most circumstances, this is a process that lasts until early adulthood, at which time 
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one’s sense of self is developed and from then on remains relatively stable.  If one’s 
identity is reflected in a narrative, that is to say the events that one experienced serve an 
explanatory function and provide causal coherence as to who one has become, then since 
much of that identity is formed in adolescence and young adulthood, there will be more 
events from that period in the narrative than from other lifetime periods.  Identity-
developing processes were also pinpointed as the source of reminiscence effects by 
Conway and Haque (1999).  According to Conway and Haque, experiences occurring 
during the processes of identity formation and the development of a stable sense of self 
are subject to privileged encoding.  These events might constitute “self-defining” 
memories, serving to explain who one is in a similar manner as described in Rubin et al.’s 
(1998) identity formation account.  A modified narrative identity account was later 
presented by Berntsen and Rubin (2002), based on findings in which a dissociation was 
observed in the distributions of recalled memories as a function of emotional valence 
(positive versus negative).  When participants were asked to recall their happiest, saddest, 
most traumatic, most important, and a recent involuntary memory, the reminiscence 
effect occurred only for the happiest and most important memories.  Based on this 
observation, they considered the potential contributions of dissociation and repression, as 
described in psychoanalytic theory, which block memories from consciousness.  In 
addition, they also considered the possible effect of nostalgia.  Nostalgia is characterized 
by positive feelings about the past coinciding with negative feelings about the present and 
future.  While Berntsen and Rubin presented an exhaustive review of the strongest 
accounts of the reminiscence effect to date in their article, it was the findings from that 
20 
 
paper, and two subsequent collaborations that led to the development of what is currently 
considered among the best supported accounts of reminiscence. 
3. THE RECALL OF HIGHLY EMOTIONAL MEMORIES 
 An important development in the evolution of autobiographical memory and 
reminiscence effect research came with the increased use of affective cues in eliciting 
personal memories, especially after findings by Fromholt and Larsen (1991) 
demonstrated an extremely pronounced reminiscence bump for individuals’ important 
memories.  One example of this approach is the study reported by Berntsen and Rubin in 
2002.  In a national survey, Berntsen and Rubin asked 1241 Danish participants between 
the ages of 20 and 93 to report their memories of when they were happiest and saddest, 
and when they had highly important and traumatic experiences.  The findings 
demonstrated that reminiscence effects clearly occurred in the lifespan distributions of 
recalled happiest and most important memories, which, ostensibly were biased towards 
being emotionally positive, rather than negative.  However, there were no bumps in the 
lifespan distributions of saddest and most traumatic memories.  In order to confirm this 
dissociation between distributions of memories of opposing emotional valences, Rubin 
and Berntsen (2003) conducted a follow up study with a national sample of 1307 Danish 
adults between the ages of 20 and 94, soliciting requests for memories for other types of 
highly positive and negative emotional events.  This time, participants were asked to 
report emotionally positive memories such as when they were most proud, most in love, 
and their most important, positive memory, and emotionally negative memories such as 
when they were most jealous, most angry, most afraid, and their most important, negative 
memory.  Once again, the reminiscence effect occurred for highly positive, but not highly 
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negative, emotional memories, with the sole exception of jealously, for which there was a 
slight bump in adolescence and young adulthood, a finding Rubin and Berntsen attributed 
to the confounding of times when one is jealous and times when one is in love.  Based on 
these findings, Rubin and Berntsen developed an account of the reminiscence effect that 
was able to explain the dissociation between the recall distributions of highly positive and 
negative emotional memories, which they called the cultural life script account. 
4. THE CULTURAL LIFE SCRIPT ACCOUNT 
The cultural life script account is highly effective and parsimonious in explaining 
the observed dissociation between the lifespan distributions of highly positive and highly 
negative emotional memories, and in turn, the reminiscence effect.  The account utilizes 
the concept of scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), which are generic cognitive structures 
that delineate the timing and order of events that make up an event sequence, and applies 
it to the processing of the memories of one’s personal past.  However, they not only guide 
retrieval.  Scripts provide readily available search descriptions for both encoding and 
retrieval, thereby exerting an effect at the time at which an event occurs and in 
remembering it.  A cultural life script, by extension, is a temporally and ordinally 
prescriptive, generic cognitive structure (i.e., a form of semantic memory), delineating 
the occurrences of important life events in a culture.  They can be described in terms of 
slots and their requirements concerning culturally normative important life events. They 
are nonpersonal and represent shared public knowledge, not one’s own experiences.  
Moreover, they do not represent an average life.  Instead, they represent an idealized life 
and are distorted from actual lives to favor positive life events, which in turn may make 
one’s own deviations from their culture’s script an especially salient feature of how 
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people perceive themselves as individuals. They are derived from experience and apply 
normatively to all members of a culture.  Life scripts produce a bump in autobiographical 
memory recall because: 1) most positive transitional life events in life scripts occur 
during adolescence/young adulthood (getting a first job, falling in love, getting married, 
entering parenthood), and 2) they provide readily available search descriptions.  Life 
scripts guide memory retrieval towards when one is most likely to have experienced 
highly positive events, but not heavily negative ones.  In autobiographical memory recall 
structured by cultural life scripts, memories for negative events should be either 
distributed randomly across the lifespan or conform to a monotonically decreasing 
retention function, as life scripts do not prescribe the timing or order of their occurrence. 
The cultural life script account has obtained robust support through a number of studies 
and several types of evidence have accumulated in its support via several different testing 
paradigms. 
Initially, empirical evidence in support of cultural-life scripts came in the form of 
robust findings of the dissociation of distributions of highly positive and negative 
emotional memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003)  Additional 
evidence in support of the cultural life script account was presented by Collins, Pillemer, 
Ivcevic, and Gooze (2007).   In their study, participants were asked to remember when 
they felt “especially good” or “especially bad” about themselves.  In addition, they 
reported an incident that precipitated feeling especially good or bad about themselves.  
The findings showed that for both younger (college students) and older (university 
alumni from the classes of 1978 and 1979, Mage = 46.8 and 45.8, respectively) 
participants, there was a peak at ages 17 and 18 in the distribution of positive memories 
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in the period of 8 to 18.  Negative memories were distributed relatively evenly 
throughout the same period.  Additional analyses revealed that a substantial proportion of 
the positive memories that were reported reflected culturally prescribed transitional 
events, such as the transition from high school to college, i.e., graduating high school or 
the first day of college.  Furthermore, when participants reported memories from the 
lifetime period of 10 to 15 years of age, a period within the commonly observed 
reminiscence bump, but one not including many transitional events, the distributions of 
positive emotional memories were flat as well, as would be predicted by the cultural life 
script account of the reminiscence bump. 
 A separate class of evidence supporting a life script account of the reminiscence 
bump has been produced through script generation studies.  Two such studies conducted 
with Danish participants were those by Berntsen and Rubin (2003) and Rubin and 
Berntsen (2004). In the former, 87 undergraduate students reported the ages at which they 
estimated a hypothetical 70-year person would have experienced the memories of when 
they were most afraid, most proud, most jealous, most in love, and most angry.  The 
resulting distribution placed most positive memories in the reminiscence bump period 
and negative memories were distributed randomly across the lifespan.  Additionally, the 
timings of positive memories were given higher confidence than of negative ones, thus 
indicating the presence of a culturally shared life script for positive and not negative 
emotional memories.  These findings were replicated with a sample of 1,485 Danes who 
estimated the ages of the times at which a hypothetical centenarian would have been their 
happiest, saddest, most afraid, most in love, and when they would have experienced their 
most important and most traumatic memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  Once again, it 
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was found that there was only a bump for positive events, and that it occurred between 15 
and 30 years of age.  In a slightly different procedure, Danish undergraduate students 
generated lists of the seven most important events likely to occur in the prospective life 
of a hypothetical newborn.  More events that are positive were predicted and they were 
more likely to occur between the ages of 15 to 30.  Script generation was also employed 
by Erdoğan, Baran, Avlar, Taş, and Teckan (2008) to determine if there was evidence of 
a shared cultural life script among a sample of Turkish participants.  Similar to the 
procedure utilized by Berntsen and Rubin (2004), Erdoğan et al.’s participants generated 
lists of the seven most important events likely to occur in the prospective life of a 
hypothetical newborn and elderly person.  Their findings, which were remarkably similar 
to those produced by Danish participants, showing once again that there were more 
positive, than negative, events, and that the timing of positive events were reported with 
higher confidence ratings.  However, they did observe some differences between the 
scripts of the hypothetical newborn and elderly person. For instance, the occurrence of 
war as a life event was prevalent in the life scripts for hypothetical elderly, but not 
newborn, individuals.  Erdoğan et al. also determined that based on their findings, the 
makeup of the cultural life script was relatively stable across genders.  Another 
replication of this procedure, but with the addition of measures of depression, 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and centrality of negative events, was conducted by 
Rubin, Berntsen, and Hutson (2009) with both Danish and American samples.  Their 
findings indicated that there was significant overlap between the life scripts produced by 
the American and previous Danish samples and that once again, more positive, than 
negative, events were generated, with most in the bump range, and their timings were 
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estimated with higher confidence than those for negative events.  Some differences were 
evident, but further examination reveals that these differences likely reflect actual cultural 
differences, such as differences in the timing of landmark events in educational 
attainment that reflect differences in the structure of educational systems between the two 
countries. Despite these relatively minor differences, the authors concluded that overall, 
the findings support the notion that there is a similar underlying cognitive structure in the 
form of a cultural life script present in the American, current, and previous Danish, 
samples, and the Turkish sample reported on by Erdoğan  et al. (2008).  Soon researchers 
endeavored to uncover other potential sources of variability in cultural life scripts. 
To determine whether life scripts are stable across age groups, Bohn (2009) 
conducted a study comparing the life scripts produced by younger and older participants.  
Participants generated lists of the seven most important expected life events and the age 
at which they would occur for a hypothetical person.  The findings indicated that for both 
groups there was a bump for positive events between the periods of adolescence and 
young adulthood, thereby demonstrating that cultural-life script structure is relatively 
stable across generations.  However, some variation was evident.  On the one hand, older 
adults produced a less idealized life script, which tended to contain more events that are 
negative.  On the other hand, the younger group’s life scripts tended to reflect a more 
idealized life.  Importantly, with regard to the events included, their timings and order, 
the differences in the makeup of the cultural life scripts produced were minimal, and not 
substantial enough to lead the authors to conclude that cultural life scripts vary as a 
function of age. Overall, the scripts of the two cohort groups shared more similarities 
than differences and the authors concluded that there were no cross-generational 
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differences in cultural life scripts. Another study looking at age-related differences in 
cultural life scripts (or the lack thereof) was that by Janssen and Rubin (2010).  In their 
study, participants from three age groups completed the script generation procedure used 
by Berntsen and Rubin (2004) with the goal of determining if life scripts were indeed a 
form of semantic memory, a claim of cultural-life script theory that, up to that point had 
been assumed, but not tested directly.  As a form of semantic memory, life scripts are 
nonpersonal, and simply entail prescribed timings, rather than reflecting the occurrence 
of events in one’s own life.  An actual life may deviate from the cultural life script, which 
potentially can have the effect of making events that are script violations even more 
salient to one’s identity, self-narrative, or life story.  Participants were divided into three 
groups, those between ages 16 and 35, between 36 and 55, and between 56 and 75.  As 
predicted, the majority of chosen events were positive and mostly occurred in childhood 
and early adulthood, with more than half (55.4%) occurring in the period of adolescence 
to early adulthood.  Furthermore, extremely few positive events were estimated to occur 
outside of the bump range, and the events estimated to occur before the age of 36 were, 
on average, positive, while the events expected to occur after age 35 were, on average, 
negative.  Additionally, negative events were more evenly distributed across the life span.  
With regard to the age group comparison, the findings demonstrated that there was very 
high agreement on cultural-life script events between the three age groups, with no 
difference in expected age of occurrence, prevalence, importance, and valence of events 
between groups.  Also supporting the claim that life scripts are a form of semantic 
memory, Janssen and Rubin also found that there was little difference in the makeup (i.e., 
the events included, their timing, and order) of cultural life scripts between levels of 
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educational attainment when the participants were divided into 4 groups, based on the 
amount of schooling received.  Because of the lack of variability in the content and 
structure of cultural life scripts in terms of their events, timing, and order of occurrence 
across age groups and educational levels, Janssen and Rubin concluded that this prevalent 
cognitive structure is indeed a form of semantic memory.  As such, it is unaffected by 
personal experiences, from which differences would probably arise between generations 
and varying levels of educational attainment. 
Overall, the cultural-life script account, originally proposed by Berntsen and 
Rubin (2002), has accumulated ample evidence in its support from several classes of 
evidence and across replications.  The dissociation between the distributions of positive 
and negative emotional memories in both autobiographical-memory-recall and script-
generation studies have both been replicated several times.  However, only the script 
generation task has been replicated across several distinct cultures, such as Danish (Rubin 
& Berntsen, 2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Bohn, 2009), Turkish (Erdoğan et al., 2008), 
Dutch (Janssen & Rubin, 2010) and American (Rubin et al., 2009) samples.  
Autobiographical-memory recall studies with elderly subjects have only been conducted 
with a Danish sample (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002), while the only autobiographical recall 
study with an American sample consisted of college students and adults under 50 (Collins 
et al., 2007).  This disproportionate amount of script generation, as opposed to 
autobiographical recall research ostensibly is simply a reflection of the practical 
challenges of conducting large-scale, survey data collection procedures, which are 
typically required for autobiographical recall studies.  While autobiographical memory 
studies require older adult samples, which are less easily accessed, script generation 
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studies can be carried out with relatively small sample sizes and conveniently accessible 
undergraduate samples, as life scripts can be tested with young adults.  The lack of an 
autobiographical recall study with diverse populations is currently a limitation of the 
cultural life scripts literature.  Moreover, the extant research in script generation is also 
limited in the same regard.  While several cultures have been investigated, they have been 
relatively homogenous.  To this point, no cultural life script research has been conducted 
with samples varying in substantive ways, such as minority status.  Historically, minority 
populations, especially those in the United States, have faced substantial adversity.  If 
populations that experience more emotionally negative life events produce more negative 
life scripts, such a finding would call into question the premise that they are culturally 
transmitted semantic knowledge.  Instead, such a finding would indicate that participants 
are basing the life script on their own lives. 
While the cultural life script account has demonstrated its ability to explain 
effectively and parsimoniously the dissociation between the distributions of recalled 
positive and negative emotional memories, it is not alone in being able to do so.  Another 
prominent account exists, which has been supported through empirical findings from 
autobiographical recall studies. 
5. THE LIFE STORY ACCOUNT 
 Another account of the reminiscence bump and the dissociation between the 
distributions of positive and negative emotional memories is the life-story account (Glück 
& Bluck, 2007).  The life-story account has its basis in life span developmental theory 
(Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980; Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999).  The primary 
concern of life span development theory is developmental processes across the entire 
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human life course.  Based on this, Bluck and Habbermas (2000) presented a theoretical 
treatment about what they at the time referred to as the life-story approach, and later as 
the life span perspective (Bluck & Habbermas, 2001).  The life story account is 
complementary to the life script account and extends it by sharing key predictions, such 
as the structuring of highly positive, but not highly negative emotional memories, and 
additionally identifying further the qualities of memories that are included in the bump.  
Many of these qualities or characteristics revolve around their importance in conveying 
one’s autobiography and are based upon cultural, emotional, and motivational influences 
that govern the organization of one’s life story.   
 By incorporating a more holistic, rather than purely cognitive approach to 
memory, Bluck and Habbermas (2000) sought to move even further ahead Neisser’s 
(1978) call to increase the ecological validity of autobiographical memory research. 
The product of this effort was the life story schema. The life story schema is a mental 
organization used to produce life narratives.  This schema is activated when one engages 
in autobiographical reasoning.  The types of coherence delineated by Bluck and 
Habbermas are temporal, thematic, and causal coherence, and the cultural concept of 
biography.  Temporal coherence and the cultural concept of biography provide both a 
temporal script for the ordering of life events, as well as and an indication of what events 
should be selected or included in the life story.   The cultural concept of biography refers 
to the internalized norms instilled in the individual about what is appropriate content for 
inclusion in the life story, and provides direction towards meaningful and important, 
culturally-sanctioned life events.  Additionally, it conveys information about the 
normative timing of life events, such that one may judge if the timing of her or his 
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experience is on target or off target relative to the norms of her or his culture.  Thematic 
and causal coherence are, as previously stated, forms of “meaning-making (Bluck & 
Habbermas, 2000, p. 124)” that provide explanations and themes for understanding the 
life story.  Causal coherence, Bluck and Habbermas suggest, may actually be the most 
significant form of coherence in the life story.  As will be seen later, many of the 
variables that are included in life story research involve judgments about causality as 
predictors of their inclusion in the reminiscence bump.  Overall, the life story, according 
to Bluck and Habbermas, provides a more integrated representation of the events that 
make up our lives, as opposed to a mere collection of isolated memories for (important) 
events.  The four forms of coherence coalesce to provide summaries of life periods and 
their connections, and may also be important in motivating future actions and 
perceptions. 
 Based on life story theorizing outlined by Bluck and Habbermas (2000; Bluck & 
Habbermas, 2001), Glück and Bluck (2007) proposed the life story account of the 
reminiscence bump and the dissociation between the distributions of highly positive and 
negative memories.  Like the cultural life script account, the life story account predicts 
that highly positive, but not highly negative, life events will form a reminiscence bump.  
However, the life story account makes further predictions about which events will be 
included in the bump.  Bump events are not only emotionally positive, but they are also 
more likely to be developmentally influential and consequential to later life outcomes and 
reflect instances of exerting control over one’s life.  Moreover, they enable causal 
coherence supporting one’s life story and serve an explanatory function toward 
understanding one’s life trajectory.  Positive memories that do not meet the above criteria 
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do not rise to the threshold to be included in the reminiscence bump.  Instead, the life 
story account predicts that these positive memories will produce a relatively flat 
distribution, much as negative life events do.  In their study testing the life story account, 
Glück and Bluck examined 3,541 memories reported by 659 participants between 50 to 
90 years of age.  Each participant reported her or his 15 most important memories and 
then estimated time of occurrence and ratings of each memory on several qualities 
predictive of inclusion in the bump.  These included ratings of: (1) Emotional valence; 
(2) valence of later consequences; (3) perceived control; and (4) how influential on one’s 
personal development.  Their findings indicated that while the distribution of positive 
events demonstrated a reminiscence bump, all negative events were relatively flat.  
However, when positive memories were separated into those that were rated high on 
perceived control and low perceived control, only the high-perceived control memories 
produced a reminiscence bump.  Moreover, these memories were rated as significantly 
more influential on who one became in life than positive, low-perceived control events 
and negative events.  Finally, only those life events that were emotionally positive and 
high-perceived control formed a bump.  Emotionally positive, low-perceived control, and 
emotionally negative high- and low-perceived control events did not form reminiscence 
bumps.  These results were explained by Glück and Bluck as being because there are few 
opportunities to exercise perceived control during childhood, but the number of such 
opportunities increases in adolescence, then stabilizes in adulthood.   They contend that 
adolescence is not simply a time of positive events, but one composed of positive 
instances of exerting control.  Overall, Glück and Bluck’s findings supported the life 
story account.  In doing so, they also support the cultural-life script accounts, as the two 
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accounts are compatible.  Many of the observed effects from the life story account can be 
explained by the cultural life script account.  This is mainly because of the fact that the 
events that comprise the cultural life script inherently share the qualities of life story 
events, despite the fact that the cultural life script account does not make specific 
predictions about the same variables used to test the life story account.  Since Glück and 
Bluck’s study, further support for the life story account has been obtained. 
 Demiray, Gülgöz, and Bluck (2009) conducted a study replicating that of Glück 
and Bluck with the intention of (a) testing the life story account, and (b) replicating the 
reminiscence bump with a Turkish sample.  Up to this point, studies of autobiographical 
recall replicating the dissociation between the distributions of positive and negative 
emotional memories have been conducted mostly in Anglo-Saxon countries and too 
limited a range of other cultures to state definitively whether the bump can be replicated 
in all non-Western cultures.  Like Glück and Bluck, Demiray et al. had participants report 
autobiographical memories and the age at which they occurred, as well as ratings of 
various factors predictive of whether an event would be included in the reminiscence 
bump.  However, they used an alternative set of variables.  Participants rated events on 
novelty and importance to identity development. In addition, participants provided 
answers to two questions pertaining to distinctiveness, whether they had ever experienced 
an event similar to that one before (i.e., it was a first-time experience) and whether they 
experienced events similar to that one later in life (i.e., it was not a one-time experience).  
Events were also coded by the researchers as to whether they were transitional events, as 
most bump events have been described to be in script generation studies.  Their coding 
was based upon a combination of events most commonly reported by Danish (Bertnsen & 
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Rubin, 2004) and Turkish (Erdoğan  et al., 2008) samples.  Finally, events were rated on 
importance, as in “How important was this event for you back then?” and vividness, as in 
“How vivid is this memory in your mind right now?” on 5-point Likert scales.  Their 
findings demonstrated that: (1) The reminiscence bump was replicated with a Turkish 
sample; (2) there was a bump for distinctive, one-time events; (3) there was a bump for 
transitional events; and (4) bump memories were rated more important for identity 
development.  Overall, Demiray et al.’s findings supported the main goals of their study.  
They obtained empirical evidence in support of the life story account as well as for the 
generalizability of the reminiscence effect across cultures.  The findings demonstrated for 
the first time with a non-western culture that the occurrence of the reminiscence effect for 
emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative, events is generalizable across 
cultures.   
 While sharing many similarities, the tests of the life story account by Glück and 
Bluck and Demiray et al. deviate from one another in key methodological aspects.  
Specifically, Glück and Bluck used as their autobiographical cue a request for the 15 
most important memories from one’s life, whereas Demiray et al. made no prescriptions 
regarding importance, but instead made it a measured variable, by having participants 
report any life events that they chose, then rating their importance.   Consequently, 
Demiray et al. observed that bump events were rated significantly more important that 
non-bump events.  Also notable is the discrepancy in sample size between the two 
studies.  Using 659 participants, Glück and Bluck collected reports of 3,541 memories (M 
= 5.37).  Demiray et al. were able to collect 6,373 memories from just 72 participants (M 
= 88.5), meaning that Demiray et al. were able to collect 1.8 times as many memories as 
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Glück and Bluck with a sample only 11% of the size.   This is clearly due to the 
procedural differences between the two studies. Glück and Bluck requested participants 
to report their 15 most important memories, while Demiray et al. gave participants 7 
minutes to write down as many memories as possible for every 5-year period in their 
lives.    
6. CROSS-CULTURAL REMINISCENCE EFFECT RESEARCH 
The extant literature on the reminiscence effect includes research conducted in 
several different countries.  However, as Demiray et al. indicated, most were from 
countries that were either European or of European descent, such as  Denmark (Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2002; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Bertnsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin et al., 2010), 
the Netherlands (Janssen & Rubin, 2010), Austria (Glück & Bluck, 2007), England 
(Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque,2005) and the United States (Conway et al., 2005; 
Collins et al., 2007; Rubin et al., 2010).  One study by Schrauf and Rubin (1998) utilized 
a sample of participants from various Spanish speaking countries including, Argentina, 
Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, and Spain.  Research in non-western cultures includes 
investigations conducted in Turkey (Erdoğan  et al., 2008; Demiray et al., 2009), 
Bangladesh (Conway & Haque, 1999; Conway et al., 2005), Japan (Conway et al., 2005; 
Kawasaki, Janssen, & Inoue, 2011), and China (Conway et al., 2005).  Among all of the 
above-mentioned countries, Denmark, Turkey and the United States have the distinction 
of being the only ones from which multiple classes of evidence for the existence of 
cultural life scripts have been obtained.   Studies have been conducted in these countries 
testing both the reminiscence effect in autobiographical recall and the life script.  
However, in the case of the United States, evidence of the bump in retrospective reports 
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has not been tested in a manner directly comparable to the studies of Berntsen and Rubin 
(2002), Glück and Bluck, and Demiray et al., in that the one study conducted did not 
include the elderly (Collins et al., 2007).   Singularly unique to the study by Demiray et 
al. is that while it did replicate the reminiscence bump with a non-western culture, as had 
previously been shown with Japanese, Bangladeshi, and Chinese samples by Conway et 
al. (2005), it is the only study which has observed the dissociation between the 
distributions of highly positive and negative events in a non-western culture.  Conway et 
al. did not compare memories as a function of emotional valence.  With regard to the life 
story account, it has only been tested in Austria (Glück & Bluck, 2007) and Turkey 
(Demiray et al., 2009).  Among these studies utilizing various procedures carried out 
within a variety of countries and (a more limited) variety of cultures, some differences 
have been observed between their findings. 
Differences in the manifestation of the reminiscence effect between cultures have 
been observed both within cultures (i.e., within macro culture designations such as 
Western culture, but between countries which comprise it), and between cultures (i.e., 
Eastern versus Western).  These differences range in significance from the relatively 
minor to major.  For instance, Conway and Haque (1999) found that, while both younger 
and older Bangladeshi participants produced lifespan distributions of autobiographical 
memories with bumps in adolescence and young adulthood, the older group produced 
another bump in the distribution, i.e., it was bimodal.  This other bump reflected the 
period during which Bangladesh fought a struggle for independence against Pakistan.  In 
their study, Schrauf and Rubin (1998) observed a bump for the period when individuals 
originating from Spanish speaking countries immigrated to the U.S. Similarly, Conway et 
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al. (2005) observed differences in reported memories between their U.S. and Chinese 
participants.  While all of the groups in their study produced similar reminiscence effects, 
leading Conway et al. to conclude that there are no cross-cultural differences in the 
distributions of autobiographical memories across the lifespan, content analyses revealed 
differences in the types of memories recalled between the groups.   For example, Chinese 
participants had an interdependent focus, reflecting the collectivist focus of their culture, 
whereas the memories of U.S. participants had a more independent self-focus, reflecting 
the individualist focus of Western and U.S. culture.  Conway et al. concluded that overall, 
their findings indicate that the reminiscence bump in the period of adolescence and young 
adulthood is produced by processes that operate independent of culture that mediate the 
emergence of these periods in the life-span retrieval curve.  Culture influences memory 
content in a way that produces cross-cultural variation in what is remembered, but not 
from what lifetime period is involved.  While this one example is from a study of 
retrospective reports, differences have been observed in script generation studies as well. 
Script generation studies conducted in various countries and cultures, including 
Northern European countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands (Bertnsen & Rubin, 
2004; Rubin et al, 2009; Janssen et al., 2010), the U.S. (Rubin et al., 2009), and Turkey 
(Erdoğan  et al., 2008),  have produced discrepancies that seem to indicate some true 
differences in expectations of the events in the normative life between them.  The 
convergent findings include those that more positive than negative events are produced, 
that there are more positive events than negative ones in the bump period (10 to 30), and 
agreement on the timing of positive events is higher than agreement for the timing of 
negative events.  Because of these findings, leading proponents of the cultural life script 
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account such as Rubin and Berntsen conclude that the main characteristics of cultural life 
scripts are invariant across cultures (See Rubin et al., 2009 for a review of the 
characteristics of cultural life scripts).  Discrepant findings among existing tests of the 
life script mainly fall into two categories: (1) greater numbers of negative events in the 
life script; and (2) the presence of some unique events.  One example of the latter is 
circumcision in the study by Erdoğan  et al. While circumcision at approximately 5 years 
of age is listed as an important life event by the Turkish sample, this event is not listed 
among important life events at any age in the American and European samples.  
Additionally, military service is listed among important life events by the Turkish and not 
by Americans or Europeans, due to compulsory military service in that country for all 
male citizens.  Therefore, the presence of military service in the Turkish life script 
reflects a genuine cultural difference.  Another event nominated for inclusion in the life 
script by Turkish participants that was not included in the scripts generated by the 
Western samples was “traffic accident,” a negative event.  In addition, while “accident” 
was listed as a common life event for both the Dutch and Turkish samples, it did not 
make the list of life events in the American sample.  There also have been differences 
observed as a result of an experimental manipulation.  In the study by Erdoğan  et al., 
Turkish college undergraduates were placed in two conditions.  In one, participants 
nominated events likely to happen in the prospective life of a hypothetical newborn.  In 
the other, participants nominated events likely to have happened in the life of a 
hypothetical elderly person.  War was listed as a common life event by the Turkish 
sample for the elderly person, but not for the newborn, the implication being that when 
cued to generate events for an elderly person, answers more closely reflected actual 
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historical information, whereas events nominated for the newborn reflected a more 
idealized life.  However, these differences have been considered relatively minor.  
Overall, none of the studies ever had more than a couple unique events and the number of 
extra negative events in any given study was never substantial.  However, it may be the 
case that the differences between the heretofore-examined cultures have not been 
substantial enough.  One similarity that all previously examined cultures share is majority 
status.  Ostensibly, a majority culture would have less experience with negative life 
events than would a minority culture, especially when it has been subjected to oppressive 
and discriminatory treatment.  Potentially, some of these heretofore observed small 
differences in the number of unique events and the proportion of negative events in the 
life script may be more pronounced when examining the cultural life script of an 
historically unfairly treated minority. 
How, and due to what influences, can the  reminiscence effect and the 
dissociation between the distributions of emotionally positive and negative memories be 
different for minorities  compared to those majority cultures already investigated?  In 
considering factors that may contribute to differences in the recall of negative emotional 
events, one must take into account the real lifetime prevalence of negative emotional 
events.  Ostensibly, greater amounts of emotionally negative events occur for 
racial/ethnic groups that experience  disproportionately high levels of low socioeconomic 
status (SES), i.e., poverty, and incarceration, low levels of educational attainment, and 
greater levels of discrimination.  Discrimination, for instance, has been found to have 
numerous, profound, long-lasting effects psychological effects on individuals.  In a study 
by Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams (1999), it was shown that the most common reason 
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for perceived discrimination is in fact race, at 37.1%, and that lifetime prevalence rates of 
perceived discrimination are substantially higher for African Americans (48.9%) than for 
Whites (30.9%).  In their study, Kessler et al. found that, compared to Whites, African 
Americans experienced higher rates of discrimination in all domains examined except 
being forced to leave a neighborhood.  These include:  Not being hired for a job (24.4% 
vs. 14.8%); not being given a promotion (27.8% vs. 10.6%); denial of service or 
reception of poor service  (15.2% vs. 8.0%); discouragement in education (14.0% vs. 
6.9%); denial of bank loans (19.8% vs. 4.9%); harassment by police (19.3% vs. 4.2%); 
being fired from a job (10.5% vs. 5.0%); being prevented from renting or buying a home 
(15.7% vs. 2.0%); and denied or received inferior medical care (6.8% vs. 2.5%).  Clearly, 
there are a substantial number of experiences of perceived discrimination among African 
Americans, and therefore an indication that the actual occurrence of negative life events 
among African Americans may be higher relative to the dominant White culture.  With 
regard to poverty, evidence overwhelmingly indicates that African Americans, both 
currently and historically, experience poverty at rates much higher than White 
Americans.  The U.S. Census Bureau indicates that between 2004 and 2006, African 
Americans adults aged 18 to 64 experienced higher rates of chronic poverty (8.4%) than 
Whites (1.4%) and Hispanics (4.5%).  Numerous hardships are associated with living in 
poverty which may form the basis for memories of negative emotional events, such as 
deprivation, lack of safety, increased health risk from lack of adequate healthcare, 
emotional stress within the family, among possible others.  There are several implications 
for memory based on these facts.  Utilizing cultural life script and life story theory, 
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several conclusions may be drawn about how they might lead to reminiscence effects for 
memories of discrimination. 
There are several ways that the high prevalence of actually experienced perceived 
prejudice may affect memory.  First, let us consider how this may occur within a cultural-
life script account of autobiographical memory recall.  Cultural-life scripts are a type of 
script, as described by Schank and Abelson (1977), regarding the timing and order of life 
events, and are culturally transmitted to the individual.  Ultimately, they reflect societal 
norms, the standard patterns of behavior considered normal in a society.  That said, one 
might ask if exposure to unfair treatment is standard in a culture and what the effect of 
that exposure is.  If it is considered a normative part of life in a culture, unfair treatment 
might be an expected occurrence in life.  However, a script requires that there be an 
expected timing or order of the occurrence of events.  It is unlikely that expectations of 
unfair treatment are anticipated to occur at precise times.  Unfair treatment cannot be 
predicted with the precision that one may predict high school graduation or the age at 
which people get married. Unfair treatment may be expected to happen, and may even be 
considered quite prevalent, but there are no prescribed slots for the timing of its 
occurrence in a script.  This type of expectation may constitute a theme in life.  In 
conclusion, the cultural-life script account does not lend itself well to the accounting for 
recalled memories of unfair treatment, in light of the lack of prescribed, specific timings, 
a property of scripted events.  Instead, the life story account may be better suited to 
explain not only a bump for memories of unfair treatment, but for emotionally negative 
memories in general.  
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The primary manner in which the life story account may better explain increased 
recall of memories of unfair treatment in early lifetime periods is because of the fact that 
the life story account attributes differential sampling to the importance (i.e., 
consequences, etc…) of actually experienced events.  People tend to sample at a greater 
rate those memories that explain later life outcomes.  The memories facilitate 
autobiographical and causal coherence in one’s life story.  In this manner, early life 
experiences of discrimination that may be pinpointed as the origin of a negative life 
course trajectory may serve an explanatory function.  Because adolescence and young 
adulthood is the most developmentally influential lifetime period, numerous events occur 
within it that are recalled as being consequential and influential on whom one has 
become.  If any of the developmental experiences have negative outcomes, i.e., are 
unfulfilled, they may be looked back upon as highly influential negative events.  By 
combining importance and consequentiality, which the life story account asserts predict 
an event’s inclusion in the bump, with negative emotion, the life story account can be 
revised with a change to only one of its criteria to predict reminiscence for emotionally 
negative memories.  Additionally, evidence suggests that attributing negative outcomes to 
external sources such as discrimination by others may actually be adaptive, in that it has 
an ego-protective effect.   
Research has shown that when individuals experience negative outcomes, the 
possibility of being the victim of discrimination can buffer against harmful effects on 
self-esteem, because the availability of prejudice as a plausible external cause of negative 
outcomes allows the victim to discount personal responsibility in the situation (Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Dion, 1975; Dion & Earn, 1975; 
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Major & Crocker, 1993).  In these cases, the judgment or treatment was based on social 
identity or group membership, and the individual believes that the judgment rendered was 
unjust or undeserved (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002).  Findings by Major, Kaiser, and 
McCoy (2003) show that females rejected because of sexism made internal attributions of 
blame significantly less than those rejected based on lack of intelligence.  Moreover, 
rejection based on prejudice resulted in rating sources of rejection significantly less to 
internal causes.  It was shown in another study that discrimination based on overt sexism 
resulted in less injurious effects on self-esteem than rejection based on reasons other than 
prejudice (Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003).  Overall, the empirical evidence 
presented suggests the adaptive nature of external, as opposed to internal, attributions of 
negative outcomes.  Inasmuch as this is an adaptive function, one may intuitively 
speculate that it is a reinforcing behavior and that its use would beget its future use.  
Related to this is also the potential that once an external source has been identified as the 
cause of negative outcomes, individuals may seek out affirmation of their beliefs from 
others by sharing their grievances with them, thus contradicting the assertions of both the 
cultural life script and life story accounts that social censure proscribes the discussion of 
negative life events.   
Another potential source of evidence indicating that memories for experiences of 
discrimination are held as long-term sources of stress are the numerous findings 
associating experiences of racial discrimination with adverse health outcomes such as 
increases in the rates of depression, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, as well as other 
mental and physical health problems (Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003; Brondolo, 
Rieppi, Kelly, & Gerin, 2003).  Ostensibly, for these experiences to be influential, they 
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must be retained in one’s autobiographical memory, and potentially, it is their differential 
recall that is the source of their powerful, pernicious influence.  Potentially, replaying 
these events in one mind and assessing their deleterious effects on one’s life, thereby 
acknowledging their developmental importance and the extent of their consequentiality, 
may be the source of stress that contributes to these illnesses.   
Because of its emphasis on retrospective assessments of importance and 
consequentiality in guiding retrieval, the life story account is better suited to  explain how 
negative emotional memories such as experiencing discrimination may potentially be 
differentially sampled.  The examples provided explain, using evidence from racial and 
ethnic minority psychology, an area presumably overlooked by, or not well known to, 
prominent life story theorists (the majority of whom are European and not likely familiar 
with the field of ethnic minority psychology in the United States).  It may therefore be 
possible that experiences of discrimination can become life story events, thus resulting in 
their differential sampling and possibly producing a bump in the lifespan distribution of 
recalled autobiographical memories. 
7. REVIEW ON THE RECALL OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL MEMORIES 
 Current evidence suggests that when individuals are cued to recall highly 
emotional events from their lives, the reminiscence effect does not occur for negative 
emotional memories.  One exception to this however, were findings regarding the recall 
of memories of when one was most jealous.  When Rubin and Berntsen (2003) asked 
participants to report memories of the times that they felt the most jealous, there were 
clear bumps in early adulthood for five of the six age groups (from 20 to 70, broken up 
by decade).  The authors suggest that this result may be due to memory search guided by 
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expectations when one was in love, and possibly, the times during that period when love 
may have its most “ups and downs.”  The lifespan distributions of memories for when 
one was most in love had clear bumps in adolescence and young adulthood for all six age 
groups, thus supporting this account of the bump for jealously.  The observed bump for 
memories of when one was most jealous provides a rare example of a reminiscence effect 
for negative memories guided by cultural life scripts.  However, evidence exists 
indicating that reminiscence bumps may occur for negative emotional memories when 
other cueing techniques are employed and that they may be caused by some mechanism 
other than cultural life scripts or life story schemas.  
 Several studies have shown that the use of a word-cue technique can result in 
reminiscence effects for negative emotional memories, including that by Conway and 
Haque (1999) examining Bangladeshi participants and studies by Janssen and Murre 
(2008) and Janssen, Gralak, and Murre (in Press) using the Galton-Crovitz test.   Conway 
and Haque (1999) found that when Bangladeshi participants provided autobiographical 
memories in response to word-cues, an unexpected result was observed: Older 
participants displayed a second bump in their distribution of memories across the lifespan 
that occurred between the approximate ages of 45 to 55.  Furthermore, substantial 
portions of the memories in this unexpected bump were emotionally negative.  
Interestingly, the period covered by this bump corresponded to the period during which 
Bangladesh fought for independence from Pakistan, indicating that the effect was more 
likely caused by actually occurring events affecting an entire cohort equally, rather than 
cognitive mechanisms such as scripts or schemas guiding differential sampling.  Less 
easily explained, however, are the bumps for negative emotional memories observed in 
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the studies by Janssen et al. (in Press) and Janssen and Murre (2008). While the authors 
observed bumps for negative emotional memories, they actually observed that overall, 
most events recalled from the bump period were regular, unemotional, neutral, and 
unimportant.  Moreover,  there were no substantial differences in the bumps observed 
between emotional (positive and negative) and emotionally neutral events, or 
unemotional, moderately emotional, and very emotional events.  Because of these results, 
the authors concluded that none of the examined qualities (novelty, emotionality, 
emotional valence, and importance) fully explains the reminiscence effect.   
The finding that word-cues produce a bump for emotionally negative events but 
cues to life events do not suggests that activation of a mechanism that guides retrieval of 
only positive emotional memories, such as a cultural life script, is dependent on the 
autobiographical cues employed.  In all likelihood, cultural life scripts are activated by 
cues such as those prompting one to recall their happiest or most important memory, 
while word-cues do not activate such scripts.  Therefore, cultural life scripts are not an 
always-present mechanism structuring all autobiographical recall, but rather, only 
structure recall when activated.  In addition to findings from word-cue studies, other 
studies have produced findings indicating possible alternative mechanisms through which 
reminiscence for negative emotional memories can occur. 
  Evidence from reminiscence bump research has shown that one possible source 
of reminiscence for negative emotional memories is history-graded events.   History-
graded events are those that occur at the same historical time, but in different age periods 
for different cohorts of individuals.  In other words, actually occurring, large-scale 
negative events affecting countries or regions, such as war, may produce bumps for 
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negative events that are shared at the same time for people of different ages.  One 
example is that presented by Rubin and Berntsen (2003) in which Danish respondents 
reported their memories of when they were most afraid or of their most traumatic 
memories.  This observed bump was clear evidence of a cohort effect for World War II 
and the time that Denmark was occupied by Germany.  Similar findings were obtained by 
Glück and Bluck (2007), where they found that Austrian participants had reminiscence 
bumps coinciding with World War II regardless of their age during that period.  One can 
reasonably expect that history-graded effects may be evident in the autobiographical 
recall of U.S. minority populations.  However, if this turns out to be the case, they may 
not be the only potential source of structuring effects for the recall of negative emotional 
memories. 
 There are several potential sources of cohort effects in the autobiographical recall 
of U.S. minorities.  The primary cause of discrimination is race.  That being said, in the 
current societal context of much of the United States, one’s race is immutable, thereby 
making the potential for discrimination based on race a lifelong possibility.  Therefore, if 
one were to recall memories of exposure to racial discrimination, one may potentially 
sample from any time in one’s life, and this would be the same across the entire 
population.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be a possible history-graded event 
affecting the prevalence of experiences of unfair treatment for African Americans.  The 
bill, which made illegal government sanctioned discrimination, may have led to a 
decrease in acts of overt racism and possibly, changes in the type of racism younger 
generations experience compared to older generations.  It may indeed be the case that 
there can be higher rates of reported memories of unfair treatment that correspond to 
47 
 
times in the United States when overt racism was more prevalent.  However, as a result of 
the persistent nature of racism (perhaps now existing at high rates, but in more subtle 
forms) it is likely that younger cohorts will still report high rates of discriminations based 
on race, but that they are more likely to report incidents of “aversive racism (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2004).”  The term aversive racism refers to negative attitudes toward minorities 
by Whites, resulting in covert and non-confrontational forms of racial discrimination such 
as rejection in hiring, promotion, access to loans, etc.  Such incidents may occur despite, 
or be concealed by, Whites explicitly endorsing egalitarian views.   
THE CURRENT STUDIES 
As evidenced by the literature review, research on the cultural life scripts and life 
story accounts of the reminiscence effect is relatively limited, having only begun within 
the last decade, starting with Berntsen and Rubin’s (2002) work.   Accordingly, there is 
still ample room to provide additional evidence in support of these accounts and further 
test the generality of their theoretical claims, especially through the completion of studies 
examining their effects in untested populations.  To that end, four empirical research 
articles are presented.  First, a test of the cultural life script with an African American 
sample is presented, followed by a test of the reminiscence effect in which African 
Americans’ memories of unfair treatment across the lifespan are examined.  Thus far, 
very few differences have been observed cross-culturally in tests of the cultural life script 
and studies of autobiographical recall demonstrating the tendency for the reminiscence 
effect to occur for emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative, memories.  On the 
one hand, the observed lack of variability may indicate that these are highly stable effects 
that do not vary regardless of culture.  On the other hand, that lack of variability may 
48 
 
suggest instead that the populations examined so far have not varied enough on 
dimensions relevant to the expression of the life script and reminiscence effect.  One such 
dimension might be whether or not a population is or is not a minority, or more 
specifically, a historically unfairly treated (i.e., oppressed) minority.  No sample 
examined in prior tests of these effects has been from such a population.  Several factors 
common to the experience of unfairly treated minorities may lead to a higher lifetime 
prevalence of negative emotional events relative to majority populations.  These may 
include disproportionately lower socioeconomic status (SES), lower levels of educational 
attainment, higher rates of incarceration, and higher rates of experiencing racial 
discrimination, a traumatic experience with well-documented, long-lasting effects on 
one’s psychological, as well as physical, well-being.  To test the possibility that the 
makeup of life scripts or the tendency of the reminiscence effect to only occur for 
emotionally positive memories varies as a function of minority status, Chapters 2 and 3 
present the first tests of the life script and the reminiscence effect with a U.S. minority 
sample, African Americans.  These studies represent both the most likely opportunity to 
observe cross-cultural variability in these effects as well as the best opportunity to 
support the stability of these effects cross-culturally.  If no differences are observed in the 
current studies, then the cross-cultural stability of these effects would be strongly 
supported.  Therefore, the results of the current studies will be a valuable contribution to 
our understanding of the cultural life script account and the reminiscence effect either 
way. 
Chapter 4 presents a test of the typicality effect with cultural life scripts.  Thus 
far, evidence for the existence of cultural life scripts independent of the reminiscence 
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effect has been fairly limited.  Mostly, it has consisted of demonstrations of the 
reminiscence effect in autobiographical recall, the script generation study by Berntsen 
and Rubin (2004), and a series of studies replicating that procedure (Erdoğan et al,  2008; 
Rubin et al., 2009; Bohn, 2010; Janssen & Rubin, 2011).  If cultural life scripts are in fact 
represented in memory, then classical effects observed with other forms of scripted 
information, such as the typicality effect, should occur with life script information.  In 
Chapter 4, two experiments are presented which attempt, for the first time, to extend prior 
findings with other forms of scripted information to cultural life scripts.   
Finally, in Chapter 5 a test of the life story account of reminiscence is reported, 
which extends prior findings on the life story account to include demonstrations that the 
dissociation between life story and non-life story events occurs when the life story event 
status of autobiographical memories is determined based on other qualities of life story 
events not previously tested.  Prior findings supporting the life story account of the 
reminiscence effect have shown the bump occurs for life story events but not non-life 
story events when identified based on their level of perceived control: Memories rated 
high in perceived control produced a bump while those rated low on perceived control do 
not.  Furthermore, emotionally positive events did not produce a bump when rated low on 
perceived control.  However, a high level of perceived control is just one characteristic of 
life story events.  Among other things, they are also highly important to identity 
development.  The research reported in Chapter 5 demonstrates that, in accord with the 
expectation of the life story account, the reminiscence bump, or at least the upward 
sloping component, is composed of memories for events rated high in importance to 
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personality development.  As expected, memories for events rated low in importance to 
identity development, i.e., non-life story events, do not form a reminiscence bump. 
Together, the four research articles reported in the following chapters contribute 
to autobiographical memory research by increasing our understanding of the cultural life 
script and life story accounts by providing additional evidence by which one can assess 
their claims and predictions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CROSS-CULTURAL EFFECTS IN EXPECTATIONS OF THE NORMATIVE 
LIFE: EXAMINING THE LIFE SCRIPT OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
1
 
ABSTRACT 
Life scripts are expectations of the timings of important events in the normative life.  
They are considered to represent an idealized lifecourse, as research has consistently 
shown they are dominated by emotionally positive events upon whose timings are 
strongly agreed.  However, whether life scripts always represent an idealized lifecourse 
may not have yet been tested across enough cultures varying in dimensions relevant to 
their expression, such as increased prevalence of negative emotional events.  Unfairly 
treated minorities, such as African Americans, who have historically faced adverse 
conditions, such as low SES and racial discrimination, may expect a greater number of 
negative events to occur in the lifecourse than majority cultures.  In the present study, 
African American adults completed a life script generation task.  In order to examine the 
possible existence of a unique African American life script, half nominated the most 
important events to happen in the prospective life of a typical infant while half nominated 
those events for a prototypical infant of their race.  The findings show that, while most 
nominated events were positive and that positive events clustered between ages 10 and 
30, conforming to prior tests of the life script, events specifically relevant to African 
Americans were frequently mentioned, many of which reflected adverse conditions they 
                                                 
1
 Coleman, J. T. (2012). Cross-cultural differences in expectations of the normative life: 
An examination of the life script.  Manuscript in preparation. 
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have faced historically, with more of these mentioned in response to the same race 
prompt. 
INTRODUCTION 
One prominent account of the reminiscence effect in autobiographical memory, 
the disproportionate recall of memories from between ages 10 and 30 for adults over age 
40 (Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986), is the cultural life script account.  The cultural life 
script account was developed by Rubin and Berntsen (2003) to explain their findings that 
the reminiscence effect occurs for highly positive, but not highly negative, emotional 
memories.  Early findings demonstrated that the reminiscence effect was a highly robust 
effect that occurred across a variety of situations (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997a; Rubin & 
Schulkind, 1997b; Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998; Jansari & Parkin, 1996).  However, it 
was not until 2002 that evidence was obtained demonstrating that its expression varied as 
a function of emotional valence.   In their study, Berntsen and Rubin (2002) observed that 
the reminiscence effect occurred for participants’ happiest and most important memories, 
but not for participants most traumatic and saddest memories.  In a follow-up study 
(Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), they found that the reminiscence effect occurs for 
participants’ memories of the instances when they were most proud and most in love, but 
not for their memories of the times they were most angry and most afraid.  These findings 
were confirmed by subsequent research in which it was repeatedly found that dissociation 
occurs between distributions of memories of opposing valences.  It was observed when 
participants recalled memories of an instance of when they felt especially good or bad 
about themselves (Collins, Pillemer, Ivcevic, & Gooze, 2007), when participants recalled 
their 15 most important memories (Glück & Bluck, 2007), and when participants recalled 
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as many memories as possible in seven minutes per each five-year lifetime period 
(Demiray et al., 2009).  By demonstrating that this dissociation between remembering 
positive and negative events occurs across a variety of situations (e.g., populations, 
cueing techniques), these studies, when taken together, indicate that the finding that the 
reminiscence effect occurs for emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative, events 
is a highly robust effect.  While several accounts of the reminiscence effect were 
proposed prior to the observation of this dissociation, the cultural life script account is 
currently one of the most prominent, because of the growing body of strong evidence in 
its support, suggesting that cultural life scripts are the mechanism structuring the recall of 
highly emotional memories leading to this dissociation. 
The cultural life script account, which was proposed by Berntsen and Rubin 
(2004), applies the concept of scripts, as described by Schank and Abelson (1977), to 
expectations of important events in the normative life.  Scripts are generic, cognitive 
structures that are part of semantic memory which outline the timing and order of events 
in an event sequence.  Based on the premise that the occurrence of important events are 
prescribed to occur at certain times in life, as discussed by Neugarten, Moore, and Lowe 
(1965), Berntsen and Rubin proposed the cultural life script, which delineates the timing 
and order of important life events.  However, whereas most scripts individuals possess 
are the aggregate of numerous personal experiences, the cultural life script is learned 
vicariously, and is culturally instilled.  It is generic and nonpersonal, and not based on the 
actually lived life, which may deviate from the cultural life script.  In order to ascertain 
the existence of a culturally shared life script, Berntsen and Rubin had Danish 
undergraduates nominate the seven most important events likely to happen in the 
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prospective life of a hypothetical newborn baby, estimate the age of occurrence for each 
event, give a rating of their confidence in their age estimate, and rate the prevalence, 
emotional valence, and importance of each event.  The findings supported their 
predictions.  They demonstrated that the cultural life script was composed mainly of 
emotionally positive events with strongly agreed upon timings, while emotionally 
negative events were less frequently mentioned and had poorly agreed upon timings.  
Moreover, scripted, emotionally positive events occurred mostly in early life, with many 
clustering in the same 16 to 30 years of age lifetime period covered by the reminiscence 
bump in autobiographical recall distributions.  Events clustering in this lifetime period 
consisted of major life events, such as having children, marriage, attending college, and 
falling in love.  The ages of occurrence for negative emotional events, on the other hand, 
were estimated with very poor agreement.  Even emotionally negative events that were 
considered highly likely to occur in life based on their prevalence ratings such as one’s 
own death, the death of one’s parents, or other’s death had very poor agreement on the 
timings of their occurrences.  Because the distributions of emotional memories in cultural 
life scripts mapped so well onto those from the autobiographical recall data, Rubin and 
Berntsen (2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004) concluded that cultural life scripts structure 
autobiographical recall. 
Berntsen and Rubin’s findings have been replicated in a variety of situations by 
several studies.  Cross-culturally, only negligible differences have been observed between 
such distinct samples such as Danish (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin, Berntsen, & 
Hutson, 2009), American (Rubin et al., 2009) and Turkish (Erdoğan, Baran, Avlar, Taş, 
& Tekcan, 2008) undergraduates, and Dutch adults (Janssen & Rubin, 2011).  In each 
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case, the results obtained were consistently mostly positive, with positive events 
estimated to occur in adolescence and young adulthood with strong agreement, and the 
ages of occurrence for emotionally negative events estimated with poor agreement.  
Moreover, there was substantial overlap in the most frequently mentioned events between 
these studies, with major, emotionally positive life events, such as marriage and having 
children, consistently being among the most common responses.  Very few differences 
have been observed cross-generationally as well.  Studies with Dutch (Janssen & Rubin, 
2011) and Danish (Bohn, 2010) samples have compared the cultural life scripts of 
younger and older adults.  While findings show that the older participants produced 
slightly less idealized life scripts than the younger cohort, overall, there were no major 
differences in the makeup of their cultural life scripts—they displayed the same 
properties observed by Berntsen and Rubin (2004).  Based on their findings that there 
were no substantial differences between the cultural life scripts of younger and older 
participants, Janssen and Rubin concluded that life scripts are indeed a form of semantic 
memory and not reflective of the personal life as initially claimed by Berntsen and Rubin 
(2004).  Later findings by Bohn and Berntsen (2010) added further support to this claim, 
when they observed that young children’s prospective life stories conformed to the 
expectations of the cultural life script, even though they were too young to have 
personally experienced most cultural life script events.  
As evidenced by the above-mentioned studies, the body of extant literature has 
consistently demonstrated that, across cultures and age groups, cultural life scripts 
invariably possess a stable set of properties (see Rubin et al., 2009 for a review), with 
potentially the most significant being the manner in which they distribute life events of 
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opposing emotional valences across the lifespan.  However, based on the relatively small 
number of studies that have tested the properties of cultural life scripts, it may be that the 
lack of variance observed thus far is because of the failure to test cultural life scripts in 
enough populations differing in dimensions relevant to their expression.  For instance, a 
likely source of variance in relative rates of expectations of emotionally positive and 
negative events would be in a population that may experience a higher prevalence of 
emotionally negative events compared to those previously examined, who ostensibly, 
vary little on this dimension.  The cultural life scripts of such a population may not 
represent an idealized, emotionally positive life, as has been concluded based on findings 
thus far.  Historically unfairly treated minority groups, such as African Americans, which 
have not been included in previous tests of the life script, are a likely candidate 
population to produce variable results, which may contradict the properties of the life 
script as currently conceived.  
While the challenges that African Americans have faced (and continue to face) 
are well known to Americans, their extent and effects cannot be overstated.  Even after 
enduring centuries of de jure oppression, they still face extensive de facto discrimination 
and adverse conditions, especially economically.  For instance, in 2009, African 
Americans made up 25.8% of persons in the United States living below the poverty level, 
compared to 12.3% for Whites (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  African Americans are also 
burdened by lower levels of educational attainment.  In 2009, 13.1% of Blacks had no 
high school diploma, compared to 7.4% of Whites (U. S. Census Bureau, 2010).  
Additionally, per capita, African Americans are overly represented in the criminal justice 
system compared to Whites.   As of 2010, 4,347 per 100,000 African American U.S. 
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residents were in state and federal prisons.  In comparison, that number was 678 per 
100,000 for Whites (Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).  All of 
these factors point overwhelmingly to the prospect that African Americans experience 
disproportionately higher rates of emotionally negative life events than the majority 
populations examined in previous tests of the cultural life script, which have been limited 
to Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, and U.S. undergraduates at an elite, private 
university.  This differential rate in emotionally negative events may lead to differences 
in the expectations of emotionally negative events in the normative life, and possibly, a 
non-idealized life script.  In order to examine this possibility, the current study presents 
findings from a life script generation procedure similar to that previously employed with 
majority populations, with African American adults. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
 A national sample of 270 African American adults completed  the study.  
Participants were enrolled panelists with the company, Survey Monkey, recruited through 
that company’s Survey Monkey Audience service based on meeting the race eligibility 
criteria.  Only data from participants providing responses to all questions are included in 
the analyses.  Data from 15 (5.56%) participants who nominated six or more events 
occurring under age six were omitted, as this likely indicated a failure to understand the 
instructions.   Therefore, the final data sample consisted of 255 participants.  Participants 
contacted for recruitment were not aware of the reason why they were contacted.  A 
race/ethnicity question on the demographics questionnaire was used to filter out non-
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African American participants, who were blocked from completing the study.  There 
were 132 (51.8%) females and 123 (48.2%) males (Mage = 46.13, SD = 14.45, range = 
16 to 77).  There were 75 (29.4%) participants aged 16 to 37, 117 (45.9%) aged 38 to 57, 
and 63 (24.7%) aged 58 to 77.  Of the 255 participants, 240 (94.1%) were born and raised 
in the U.S. and 15 (5.9%) responded ‘other’ for their nationality.  Most participants had at 
least some college education, with 175 (68.63%) either having graduated or attended 
some college, 46 (18.04%) either graduated from or attended some graduate or 
professional school, and 34 (13.33%) having a high school diploma or less. 
MATERIALS 
 The study included two questionnaires, (1) a brief demographics 
questionnaire, which asked participants to provide their age, gender, ethnicity, 
nationality, and education level, and (2) the life script generation questionnaire.  The 
content of the life script questionnaire was closely modeled after questions used by 
Berntsen and Rubin (2004), as presented in Study 2 of their article.  Participants were 
first asked to nominate the seven most important events highly likely to happen in a 
hypothetical infant’s prospective life.  However, slight alterations were made to 
implement an experimental manipulation.  In order to examine the possibility that there is 
a unique African American cultural life script, separate from the greater, macro American 
culture, half of the participants were prompted to list the events most likely to happen to a 
prototypical infant (Condition 1), while half were prompted to list events most likely to 
happen to a prototypical infant of their race or ethnicity (Condition 2).  After omitting 
invalid responses, the final data sample consisted of 129 (50.6%) receiving the typical 
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prompt and 126 (49.4%) receiving the typical person of your race and/or ethnicity 
prompt.   
The instructions for nominating events for the two experimental conditions were 
as follows (with Condition 2 wording in parentheses): “This study is about the shared 
expectations of an ordinary life course of a typical person (typical person of your race or 
ethnicity). We will ask you questions about a typical life course and what important 
events are expected to take place in it. There are no correct or incorrect answers, as we 
are interested in your opinion. For the first part of the study, imagine a quite ordinary 
infant boy or girl—choose according to your own gender.  It cannot be a specific infant 
that you know, but a prototypical infant (of your race or ethnicity) with a quite ordinary 
life course ahead. Your task is to enter the seven most important events that you imagine 
are highly likely to take place in this prototypical infant’s future life. Type each event 
into one of the seven spaces provided in the same order as they come to your mind. Give 
each event a short name or title that specifies its content. After this is done, you will 
begin part two of the study.”  After nominating the seven events, all participants 
answered the following five questions in relation to each: 
(1) Age: At what age is the event expected to take place? (Estimated in years). 
(2) Confidence: How confident are you that your age estimate is the most likely 
age at which this event occurs in an individual’s life? (1 = I have absolutely 
no confidence; 7 = I am totally confident) 
(3) Prevalence: How common is this event?  Out of 100 people, how many will 
experience this event at least once during their lives? (Pick a number between 
1 and 100). 
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(4) Emotional valence: Is the event emotionally positive or negative? (-3 = very 
negative; 0 = neither positive nor negative; +3  very positive) 
(5) Importance: How important is this event? (1 = unimportant; 7 = of greatest 
importance) 
PROCEDURE 
 Participants were contacted via e-mail with an invitation to participate in the 
study.  Prior to beginning the study, participants were presented with an informed consent 
form.  Upon beginning the study, the first task to be completed was the demographics 
questionnaire.  After reporting their demographic information, participants were then 
presented the instructions for the event-nominating task, in which they nominate the 
seven events most likely to happen in a hypothetical infant’s prospective life.  Half of the 
participants received instructions to nominate these events for a prototypical infant, while 
half received instructions to nominate these events for a prototypical infant of their 
race/ethnicity.  After nominating the seven events, the instructions for the rating task 
were presented, in which it was explained how to answer the five questions that would be 
asked in relation to each nominated event.  In the rating task, each event was presented 
back to the participant on a single page containing the five questions.  The order in which 
the events were presented back to participants was randomized.  After answering the 35 
questions in relation to the seven nominated events, the study was completed. 
RESULTS 
As previously mentioned, the script generation questionnaire required participants 
to nominate the seven most important events highly likely to happen in the prospective 
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life of either a prototypical infant or a prototypical infant of the participant’s same race 
and/or ethnicity, then provide an estimate of the likely age of occurrence for each event, a 
rating of their confidence in their age estimation, and ratings of the prevalence, emotional 
valence, and importance of each event.  In addition to the prompt type comparison 
groups, results were also examined across age groups.  The results include 1785 events (7 
each for the 255 participants providing complete data).   
 Emotional valence was rated on a seven-point scale from -3 to +3.  For the 
purposes of the current analyses, emotional valence was recoded into a 3-group 
qualitative variable.  Events receiving ratings from -3 to -2 were recoded as emotionally 
negative and those receiving ratings from +2 to +3 were recoded as emotionally positive.  
Events rated -1 to +1 were recoded as emotionally neutral.  Additionally, in order to 
examine the lifespan distributions of events as a function of emotional valence, as well as 
mean valence as a function of lifetime period, the lifespan was divided in 19 age bins.  
Each bin covers a five-year period with the exception of the last, which includes all 
events estimated to occur at age 91 or older.  Figure 1 shows the proportions of 
emotionally positive and negative events out of all reported events as a function of 
lifetime period.  Conforming to prior tests of the life script, the majority of nominated 
events were emotionally positive (64.31%).  Negative events made up 9.86% of mentions  
and neutral events made up 25.83%.  Further replicating prior findings, the vast majority 
of emotionally positive events were expected to occur before age 30 (83.80%) and more 
than half (55.23%) occurred during the bump period of 16 to 30 years of age.  Relatively 
few emotionally positive events were expected to occur after the age of 30 (16.20%).  
Overall, the distribution of emotionally positive events closely mirrors findings from  
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prior tests of the life script.  The distribution of emotionally negative events shows that 
more than half (53.98%) were expected to occur before age 30, and that participants 
expected 27.27% of negative events to occur in the bump range of 16 to 30 years of age, 
and 46.02% to occur after age 30.  When combined, 58.87% of emotionally negative and 
neutral events occurred before age 30. 
 To further test the life script, mean valence as a function of lifetime period was 
examined (Figure 2).  Because emotionally positive events cluster in early life in the life  
script, it is expected that the mean valence of the period of childhood to young adulthood 
(0 to 30) will be significantly higher than that for the remainder of the lifespan.  
Confirming this expectation, the mean valence of events expected to occur before age 30 
(M = 1.78, SD = 1.62) is significantly greater (i.e., more positive) than that for the 
lifetime period of age 31 and up (M = .78, SD = 2.12), t(1783) = 9.96, p < .001.   
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However, in a surprising finding, relatively few lifetime periods possessed negative mean 
valences.  Whereas prior research, such as that by Janssen and Rubin (2011) observed 
that 9 out of 10 of the five-year lifetime periods after age 35 had negative mean valences, 
only four five-year lifetime periods in the current study had negative mean valences.  The 
three consecutive five-year bins making up the period of 71 to 85 had negative mean 
valences, as did the last five-year bin in the distribution, 106 to 110.  However, the 
implications for this finding on the life script and the manner in which it structures recall 
are limited when considering the paucity of events expected to occur in the 31 years and 
older period relative to the bump period. 
 Event categories.  As previously mentioned, participants nominated seven 
important events highly likely to happen in the prospective life of a typical newborn.  In 
order to detect the presence of a life script unique to African Americans, participants 
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generated the events themselves, i.e., they were not constrained to selecting or 
categorizing their answers from a list of possible events.  While a large proportion of 
mentioned events fit into existing life event categories used in prior tests of the life script, 
the results show that participants in the current study mentioned some not previously 
seen, unique events, ostensibly reflecting actual differences in the shared expectations of 
important events in the normative African American life.  Moreover, many more 
infrequently mentioned events were observed than found in earlier studies.   Compared to 
studies with  Danish (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), Turkish (Erdoğan  et al., 2008), Dutch 
(Janssen & Rubin, 2011), and American (Rubin et al., 2009) participants, there were 
substantially more event categories mentioned 5 times or more.  Furthermore, in the 
current study, the proportion of infrequently mentioned events (those mentioned less than 
five times) is larger relative to the number of overall mentioned events than observed in 
those  studies.  The classification procedure in the current study entailed first identifying 
events belonging to event categories used by Berntsen and Rubin (2004), Rubin et al. 
(2009), and Janssen and Rubin (2011), then creating novel categories for the remaining 
events.  Some categories that were created which received more than five mentions were 
not included in the life script, as they could not be considered events per se.  There were 
33 mentions of activities, such as walking or running, seven mentions of experiencing 
some form of psychological distress such as anxiety of stress, seven mentions of positive 
affective states, and seven mentions of negative affective states.  In addition, there were 5 
mentions of being born into or living in a single parent home, which had a negative mean 
valence, and quite notably, were all mentioned by participants in Condition 2, those 
nominating events for a person of their race or ethnicity.  The mentioning of a pervasive 
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social problem that disproportionately affects the African American community for this 
condition suggests, at least to some extent, the efficacy of this prompt in eliciting a 
specifically African American life script. 
Table 1 presents the most frequently mentioned event categories, their number of 
mentions, the percentage of participants mentioning them, mean age, standard deviations 
of age, mean confidence, mean prevalence, mean valence, and mean importance.  Using 
the criteria established in prior research of events mentioned by 4% or more of the 
sample, there are 29 events that may be considered life script events, or constituting the 
life script.  Additionally, 18 other categories were created which participants reported 
five times or more, for a total of forty-seven separate event categories mentioned five or 
more times, with 355 mentions of events categories occurring four times or less.  As one 
would expect based on the wording of the prompt, which asks for the most important 
events likely to happen in a person’s life, the events listed almost uniformly have 
relatively high ratings of importance, with the exception of a single event.  With the sole 
exception of the anomaly of “first date,” which was mentioned 9 times and received a 
mean importance rating of 1.05, the minimum mean importance rating for events was 
4.12 on a seven-point scale.  Of the 47 most frequently mentioned events, 36 (67.92%) 
had emotionally positive mean valences.  There was substantial overlap between the most 
frequently mentioned events in the current study and prior research.  The two most 
frequently mentioned events--marriage and having children--were among the top three 
most frequently mentioned events for Danes (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), Turks (Erdoğan  
et al., 2008), U.S. undergrads (Rubin et al., 2009), and Dutch participants (Janssen & 
Rubin, 2011) and several of the top ten most mentioned events, including, high school, 
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college, first job, begin school, and one’s own death were among the most frequently 
mentioned events in those studies as well.  In accord with prior findings and the 
expectations of cultural life scripts, the standard deviations for age  
estimates were significantly greater for emotionally negative (M = 13.71, SD = 8.79), 
than emotionally positive (M = 5.72, SD = 5.36), events, t(45) = 3.69, p < .005, 
demonstrating that while the ages of occurrence for emotionally positive events are 
expected, those for emotionally negative events are not.  Furthermore, and in accord with 
the expectations of cultural life scripts, for the most frequently mentioned events, there 
was a significant negative correlation between the mean confidence ratings (M = 4.94, SD 
= 1.00) and the standard deviations of the age estimates (M = 29.02, SD = 7.59), r(1) = -
.33, p < .05.  As confidence ratings increased, the standard deviations for the age 
estimates decreased.   Among the most frequently mentioned event categories, novel 
categories include: purchasing and/or obtaining a car, having financial problems and/or 
experiencing poverty, attending church and/or having a religious experience, losing one’s 
job and/or unemployment, facing discrimination, owning or starting a business, doing 
poorly academically, playing sports, saving money and/or making investments, and 
attending graduate or professional school.  
Cross-cultural differences.  The two main goals of the present study are (1) to 
examine the cultural life script of African Americans, and to (2) determine if they differ 
in any significant way from previously examined populations.  In order to investigate the 
second question, the data from the present study were compared to results from four 
previous studies: (1) Berntsen and Rubin’s (2004) study with Danish undergraduates; (2) 
Erdoğan  et al.’s (2008) study with Turkish undergraduates; (3) Rubin et al.’s (2009)  
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Table 1.  
Event Categories, Number of Mentions, Number and Percent of Participants Mentioning Each Event, 
Mean Age Estimates, Standard Deviation of Age Estimates, Mean Confidence, Mean Prevalence, Mean 
Valence, and Mean Importance 
Event Category 
# of 
Mentions 
# (%) of 
PPs 
Mentioning 
Mean 
Age SD Age 
Mean 
Confidence 
Mean 
Prevalence 
Mean 
Valence 
Mean 
Importance 
Marriage 160 159 (62.35) 26.91 5.26 4.38 58.65 1.70 5.58 
Having Children 140 132 (51.76) 26.51 6.20 4.29 64.09 1.88 5.81 
High School 124 113 (44.31) 17.77 5.42 6.21 77.13 2.64 6.59 
College 117 106 (41.57) 21.51 7.01 5.54 57.54 2.63 6.48 
First Job 105 103 (40.39) 19.18 3.01 5.05 74.14 2.09 6.36 
Begin School 92 92 (36.08) 4.78 1.00 6.05 90.34 2.12 6.63 
Own Death 64 64 (25.10) 77.11 15.32 4.00 94.59 -0.69 5.66 
Buy House 44 44 (17.25) 31.75 5.50 4.68 48.93 2.25 5.89 
Retirement 38 37 (14.51) 64.68 4.04 4.79 73.00 1.45 5.89 
Own Birth 34 34 (13.33) 1.00 0.00 5.97 94.44 2.53 6.94 
Begin Walking 31 31 (12.16) 1.55 0.77 5.97 85.42 2.94 6.74 
Illness/Hospitalization 30 29 (11.37) 40.43 24.28 4.90 71.23 -1.50 5.30 
Travel 29 25 (9.80) 39.72 19.02 5.48 60.69 2.17 5.72 
Go to school 27 21 (8.24) 10.81 7.05 5.96 86.26 2.15 6.33 
Other's Death 25 24 (9.41) 41.36 29.02 4.04 77.24 -1.76 4.96 
Purchase/Obtain Car 25 25 (9.80) 26.60 15.69 5.48 57.56 1.96 5.68 
Settle on career 23 23 (9.02) 26.17 4.27 4.57 53.74 2.43 6.43 
Financial 
Problems/Poverty 
21 14 (5.49) 26.76 21.17 3.52 61.62 -1.19 5.19 
Begin Talking 19 19 (7.45) 2.05 0.71 5.47 87.63 2.74 6.63 
Begin Driving 18 17 (6.67) 16.33 1.19 6.11 68.94 2.39 5.94 
Divorce 17 17 (6.67) 42.24 18.53 3.65 61.06 -2.12 4.12 
Fall in Love 16 16 (6.27) 17.88 4.44 4.56 69.56 1.75 6.06 
Grandchildren 16 16 (6.27) 49.50 9.63 4.25 66.25 2.25 6.25 
First sex 16 16 (6.27) 16.13 5.57 4.94 86.00 0.75 5.56 
Make/Have Friends 16 16 (6.27) 9.13 6.65 5.94 87.31 2.44 6.38 
Attend 
Church/Religion 
16 15 (5.88) 19.75 18.83 5.19 61.25 2.38 6.50 
Lose 
Job/Unemployment 
13 13 (5.10) 38.62 12.49 2.92 59.00 -2.23 4.69 
Independence 13 13 (5.10) 22.54 5.85 4.54 70.38 1.77 6.08 
First 
Boyfriend/Girlfriend 
13 13 (5.10) 16.85 4.04 3.23 57.92 1.23 4.85 
First Birthday 10 10 (3.92) 1.00 0.00 6.60 86.00 2.70 6.50 
Puberty 9 9 (3.53) 11.67 3.57 5.33 88.67 1.22 6.11 
First Date 9 9 (3.53) 16.33 1.22 5.44 71.44 1.89 1.05 
First Crush 8 8 (3.14) 10.88 2.80 5.13 79.38 0.50 4.25 
Face Discrimination 8 4 (1.57) 18.25 2.31 5.50 68.75 -2.75 5.88 
Promotion/Pay Raise 8 7 (2.75) 34.00 8.49 5.38 55.63 2.25 6.38 
(Have a) Family 8 8 (3.14) 17.88 21.07 5.63 74.88 2.38 6.50 
Own/Start Business 8 6 (2.35) 33.75 9.30 6.38 40.38 2.25 6.38 
Heartbreak/Romantic 
Breakup 
7 6 (2.35) 19.14 3.34 3.57 84.00 -0.57 5.29 
Poor Academics 7 6 (2.35) 14.29 5.62 4.14 52.14 -2.00 5.57 
Learn to read and write 7 6 (2.35) 4.29 0.95 5.86 81.86 2.86 7.00 
Parent's Death 6 6 (2.35) 56.50 10.46 2.00 87.00 -1.67 4.67 
First Kiss 6 6 (2.35) 14.33 1.63 4.17 83.33 2.33 5.67 
Crawling 6 6 (2.35) 1.17 0.41 6.67 98.33 3.00 6.67 
Accident or Injury 6 6 (2.35) 17.50 8.26 4.67 44.17 -1.00 5.33 
Play Sports 5 5 (1.96) 11.20 3.90 4.80 64.60 2.40 5.40 
Save /Investment 5 4 (1.57) 26.60 6.50 4.40 53.40 0.60 6.80 
Grad/professional 
school 
5 5 (1.96) 27.20 4.92 5.00 40.20 2.00 6.40 
Other  355 156 (61.18) 23.66 21.20 5.25 61.95 1.26 5.82 
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study with American undergraduates; and (4) Janssen and Rubin’s (2011) study with 
Dutch adults.  Each utilized the same procedure in which participants nominated the 
seven most important events highly likely to take place in the life of a typical person. 
First, the distribution of frequently mentioned events is compared between this and the 
prior studies.  Figure 3 presents the distribution of the proportion of participants 
mentioning an event plotted by rank order of the frequency of response.   The findings 
show that the most frequently mentioned event in the current study, marriage, was 
mentioned by substantially less (approximately 63%) of the participants than in prior 
studies, including that with Turkish subjects, whose most frequently mentioned event was 
mentioned by roughly 77% of participants.  However, by the third or fourth most 
frequently mentioned event, the proportions of participants mentioning the events 
become more similar for all studies with the exception of that with a Danish sample, 
which has slightly higher proportions of subjects mentioning the fourth and fifth most 
frequently mentioned events.  However, overall, the differences in the distributions are 
mostly negligible, and other than the discrepancy with the proportion of participants 
mentioning the first most frequently mentioned event in the current study, the lack of  
substantial differences suggest a similar underlying cognitive structure across each of the 
investigated samples.   
One of the clearest differences between the results of the current, and previous, 
studies, is the substantially large number of infrequently nominated events.  Potentially, 
this is due to the use of open-ended responses.  The study by Janssen and Rubin (2011), 
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which was the only to include more participants than the current study and to also use 
internet-based data collection, did not use open-ended responses.  Events nominated 4  
 
times or less, which made up 19.89% of nominated events, were classified as other, 
making the number of very infrequently mentioned events in the current study 
substantially higher than in prior research.  Rubin et al. (2009) attributed higher numbers 
of event categories to less homogeneity in a sample.  The fact that the most categories 
were created for the Dutch sample in Janssen and Rubin's study makes sense then, as it 
was not restricted to college students, it had the largest participants age range, and had 
the most participants (n = 595).  The sample from the current study shares two of those 
characteristics, in that it is not restricted to college students and has a large age range.  An 
additional factor that may increase the heterogeneity of sample is the fact that it was a 
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national sample, which, ostensibly, in the United States could be substantially more 
heterogeneous in than a national sample from the Netherlands.   
Effect of prompt type.  In order to examine the possible existence of a unique 
African American life script separate from the overall macro, American culture, 
participants were split into two groups.  Half of the participants received instructions to 
nominate the seven most important events highly likely to happen in the prospective life 
of a prototypical infant, and half received instructions to nominate the seven most 
important events highly likely to happen in the prospective life of a prototypical infant of 
the participant’s race or ethnicity.  Among the 255 participants included in the analyses, 
129 (50.6%) received the typical prompt and 126 (49.4%) received the typical person of 
your race and/or ethnicity prompt.   
 Overall, the distributions of emotional events across the lifespan were highly 
similar between the two prompt groups.  The majority of nominated events for both 
groups were emotionally positive, with 75.9% of events nominated by the prototypical 
infant group and 73.4% of the events nominated by the “prototypical infant of your race” 
group being emotionally positive.  The findings show that the distribution of emotionally 
positive events was heavily skewed toward early life for both conditions, with the 
prototypical prompt group estimating 86.1% of emotionally positive events to occur 
before age 30 and the “prototypical infant of your race” prompt group estimating 81.0% 
of emotionally positive events to occur before age 30.  Those in the typical group 
estimated 55.3% of emotionally positive events to occur in the bump range of 16 to 30 
years of age, while those in the typical infant of your race group estimated 56.1% of 
emotionally positive events to occur in that lifetime period.  Both the “prototypical” 
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prompt group and the “prototypical infant of your race” prompt group estimated the 
majority of emotionally negative events to occur before age 30 (62.4% and 62.6%, 
respectively).  The prototypical infant prompt group estimated 39.4% of emotionally 
negative events to occur in the reminiscence bump range of 13 to 30 years of age, while 
the prototypical infant of your race prompt group estimated 31.5% of nominated 
emotionally negative events in the that range.  Overall, the findings show that the 
distributions of emotionally positive and negative events for the two comparison groups 
do not differ substantially from one another or the total sample.  Furthermore, there is no 
significant difference in mean valence of nominated events between the typical person (M 
= 1.61, SD = 1.76) and typical person of your race (M = 1.51, SD = 1.82) groups, t(1783) 
= 1.14, p > .05.   
 In order to examine further differences between the two prompt groups, the 
distribution of frequently mentioned life events was compared between the two.  Figure 4 
presents the distributions of proportions of participants mentioning each event plotted by 
the rank order of mentions from most to least mentioned for the typical person and 
typical person or your race prompt groups, as well as that for the USA undergrad sample 
from Rubin et al. (2009).  If the first prompt group, typical person, produced a U.S., 
rather than an African American, life script, while the second prompt group produced an 
African American life script, then the distributions for the USA undergrad and typical 
prompt group should be more similar, while that for the second prompt group should be 
most unique.   The findings show that, overall, the distributions for the two prompt types 
are relatively similar, and that neither differs substantially from the total, combined 
sample.  As with African Americans in the previous cross-cultural examination, both 
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groups mentioned the most frequently, and second most frequently, mentioned events 
substantially less than the USA undergrad sample from the study by Rubin et al.  Also  
 
similar to the previous comparison, the distributions are mostly similar after the third or 
fourth most mentioned event.  Once again, the findings, with the exception of the first 
two events, support the premise that there is a similar underlying cognitive structure at 
work between not only both prompt groups, but between both prompt groups and the 
USA undergrad sample. 
 Age effects.  Lastly, to examine the effect of age, mentions of the 29 life script 
events, i.e., those mentioned most frequently, of which there were 1,302, were broken 
into participant age groups containing roughly equal numbers of cases.  Participants in 
the younger group, aged 16 to 40, made 429 (32.9%) mentions of the 29 life script events, 
while those in the middle group, aged 41 to 54, made 418 (32.1%), and those in the older 
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group made 455 (34.9%).  Correlations were conducted between the three age groups for 
the frequency of mentions and each of the five ratings (age estimate, confidence, 
prevalence, valence, and importance) for the 29 life script events (Table 2).  As indicated 
in the table, all but four of the correlations were significant at the p < .001 level. The 
remaining three were  significant at the p < .005 level.  Overall, the results support the 
cross-generational stability of the life script, suggesting that it is a form of semantic 
memory, as opposed to being derived from personal experience. 
Table 2. 
Correlations of Frequency, Age Estimates, Mean Confidence, Mean Prevalence, Mean Valence, and 
Mean Importance Between Young, Middle-Aged, and Older Participants Per Life Script Event Category 
    Frequency Age Confidence Prevalence Valence Importance 
  
Correlations 
Young-
middle 0.949 0.919 0.693 0.717 0.922 0.552* 
Young-older 0.920 0.872 0.730 0.569* 0.894 0.611 
Middle-
older 0.933 0.941 0.728 0.575* 0.956 0.589* 
*p < .005. All other correlations p < .001. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of the current study show that, overall, the life script of African 
Americans did not differ substantially from those of previously investigated populations.  
One aspect  in which it did differ however, was that it included some novel events, which 
likely reflect genuine differences African Americans’ expectations of the events that will 
occur in one’s life. The distribution of emotionally positive events closely matched those 
observed in the life scripts of Danish (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Bohn, 2010), Turkish 
(Erdoğan et al., 2008), U.S. undergraduate (Rubin et al., 2009), and Dutch (Janssen & 
Rubin, 2011) samples.  As with those studies, emotionally positive events in the current 
study, were expected to occur mostly before age 30, and most of those occurring in the 
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period of adolescence and young adulthood, i.e., the bump range.  The distribution of 
emotionally negative events in the current study, however, differed from prior research.  
In their study with Dutch participants, Janssen and Rubin observed 49.3% of emotionally 
negative and neutral events occurring at age 30 or younger, while that percentage in the 
current study is 62.5.  Moreover, when examining emotionally negative and neutral 
events separately, 56.74% of emotionally negative events were expected to occur before 
age 30.  Possibly, these findings are indicative with a tendency for African Americans to 
associate youth with negative emotional events than the majority populations examined 
in prior research.   
The results of the current study also show that, while there was substantial overlap 
in the most frequently mentioned events between African Americans and previously 
investigated populations, the percentage of participants nominating the most frequently 
mentioned events was substantially lower than observed in previous studies.  In the 
current study, the most frequently nominated event, marriage, was only mentioned by 
roughly 63% of participants, compared to 77% for Turks and over 90% for both Danes 
and U.S. undergrads.  However, when examining the distributions of the most frequently 
mentioned events, it is apparent that by the distributions largely overlap by the third or 
fourth most frequently mentioned event, indicating that, for the most part, the results 
support a similar underlying cognitive structure at work across the various cultures.  The 
low proportion of participants mentioning the most frequently mentioned event, in 
conjunction with the findings that there were many more infrequently mentioned event 
categories in the current study than in past ones, suggests a lack of homogeneity in the 
sample.  Whereas previous research with Danish (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), Turkish 
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(Erdoğan  et al., 2008), U.S. undergraduates (Rubin et al., 2009), and Dutch adults 
(Janssen & Rubin, 2011) utilized 35, 27, 24 and 48 (respectively) event categories to 
classify the most frequently mentioned events, the present study established, based on a 
combination of events categories from the above studies and newly designated categories, 
47 events which were mentioned five or more times.  Many infrequent mentions reflected 
issues specifically relevant to African Americans, and many of these were emotionally 
negative, reflecting challenges that African Americans face at disproportionately higher 
rates such as low SES, low levels of educational attainment, and incarceration.  Examples 
of such events nominated by participants include mentions of committing crimes, being 
in jail, and using drugs.  However, more of these were mentioned for the typical person 
of your race group than the typical person group. 
Finally, analyses for the effect of age produced mixed results.  Prior research has 
shown that older participants produce somewhat less idealized scripts than younger ones 
(Bohn, 2010) in that their life scripts had a greater number of negative events.  Contrary 
to findings with a Danish sample in some events were included in the life script of 
younger, but not older, participants, and vice versa, none of the examined age groups in 
the current study failed to include mentions of all of the most frequently mentioned 
events from the total sample.  In the current study, both the younger and older age groups 
had significantly more positive mean valences for their nominated events than the middle 
group, meaning that the comparison between the younger and middle group conforms to 
expectations based on prior research but the middle versus older comparison did not.  
Furthermore, contradicting expectations based on prior research, the older and younger 
groups did not have significantly different mean valences for nominated events.  The 
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reason for this finding is unclear.  One possibility is that older participants, with greater 
context in which to consider life, actually develop a more positive perspective on life, 
while the middle-aged group, currently dealing with the challenges of life, view it more 
negatively.   Research has demonstrated that older adults have a greater bias towards 
positivity in memory and attention than younger adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; 
Carstensen & Mikels, 2005).  However, other results indicate strong agreement on the life 
script between age groups.  Correlations were conducted on frequency of mentions, age 
estimates, confidence, prevalence, valence, and importance ratings for the most 
frequently mentioned life script events between age groups.  Significant positive 
correlations were obtained for all, with many of them being strong. 
One of the goals of the present study was to determine if there was an African 
American cultural life script separate from the overall American culture.  In order to 
examine this possibility, half of the participants nominated events to happen in the 
prospective life of a hypothetical prototypical infant, while the other half did the same for 
a prototypical infant of their race or ethnicity.  There was little difference between the 
groups with regard to the percentage of participants nominating the more frequently 
mentioned events.  The examination of the distribution of the most frequently mentioned 
events revealed that the distributions for both groups were similar and that neither 
differed substantially from the total, combined sample.  With the exception of the first 
few most frequently mentioned events, the distribution of most frequently mentioned 
events did not differ substantially between either of the two prompt groups or the USA 
undergrad sample as well.  Further demonstrating the similarities between the two 
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groups, none of the  47 events mentioned five or more times by the total sample  was 
mentioned in one condition, but not the other.   
One limitation of the current study is the uncertainty of whether the sample is 
highly representative of African Americans in general, therefore limiting the conclusions 
that can be drawn about the existence of a unique, African American life script.  Mostly, 
this is because of the over-representation of participants who had attended college or had 
a college degree or higher relative to the general population.  In the current study,  
86.67% of participants had attended or graduated college, while nationally, only 19.8% of 
African Americans had a college diploma or higher (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  
Moreover, the proportion of participants in the sample with at least some college 
education is higher than for the overall U.S. population.  Potentially, the disproportionate 
rate of high educational attainment is due to the use of internet-based data collection, and 
might indicate a relatively high SES level for the sample as well.  Educational attainment, 
SES level, and computer ownership are likely highly correlated.  It may be that 
differential results could be obtained with a sample with lower average education or SES 
levels, which could potentially lead to an even less idealized life script.  Such an 
investigation would likely have to use a community, rather than an undergrad or internet-
based, sample. 
 Cultural life scripts play an important role in the understanding and processing of 
life story information.  Strong evidence exists that suggests their properties are highly 
stable across a variety of situations.  Investigations of cross-generational and cross-
cultural differences have found only negligible differences in the cultural life scripts 
produced between various groups.  Possibly the most important proposed property of life 
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scripts is that they represent the idealized life and that they favor positive events, as these 
properties are crucial to accounting for the observed dissociations between distributions 
of emotionally positive and negative events in autobiographical recall.  In some cases, 
comparisons have demonstrated that some groups produce less idealized scripts than did 
others, such as with life scripts produced by older and younger participants.  In other 
cases, experimental manipulations, have led to some participants producing less idealized 
scripts than did others.  Such was the case when Erdoğan  et al. had participants generate 
the life scripts of a hypothetical newborn and a hypothetical elderly person, wherein the 
script for the elderly person was less idealized.  In the present study, cultural differences 
between the overall sample and previously examined populations were evident as well as 
differences between the two prompt groups.  For the most part, these came in the form of 
mentions of novel events not present in life scripts produced by previously examined 
majority populations, and more of them being made for the prototypical infant of your 
race prompt group.  Additionally, substantially more emotionally negative and neutral 
events were expected to occur before age 30 in the current study than in prior research 
such as that with Dutch participants (Janssen & Rubin, 2011).  However, this difference 
may not lead to changes in the manner in which the life script structures the distribution 
of emotional autobiographical memories across the lifespan.  The findings of the current 
research demonstrate, that, for the most part, agreement on the timing of emotionally 
negative events was poor, mirroring the findings of prior research.  One exception to this 
rule was the event of experiencing discrimination.  However, the fact that this event was 
only mentioned eight times and those eight mentions were made by only four participants 
limits the interpretability of the results for that event.  Conversely, emotionally positive 
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events in the current study, as with other prior tests of the life script, do have strongly 
agreed timings of occurrence, and because their distribution corresponds well to the 
examples of the reminiscence bump in autobiographical recall distributions, it would 
likely lead to the reminiscence effect occurring for emotionally positive, but not 
emotionally negative, memories, as predicted by the cultural life scripts account of the 
reminiscence effect. 
  
80 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE REMINISCENCE EFFECT AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL MEMORIES: 
AFRICAN AMERICANS’ MEMORIES OF UNFAIR TREATMENT2 
ABSTRACT 
A sample of 606 African American participants between 38 and 65 years of age 
reported 1,434 memories of unfair treatment (i.e., discrimination); a negative emotional 
memory occurring in the domains of employment, housing, resources and money, police 
and courts, the ages at which they occurred, and the reasons to which they attributed 
them.  The lifespan distributions of memories in various domains and attributed to 
various reasons showed that, in accord with the expectations of the cultural life script and 
life story accounts of reminiscence, the classical reminiscence bump  was not evident in 
any of the lifespan distributions of this emotionally negative memory.  While the data 
examined are not directly comparable to most reminiscence effect research because of 
methodological differences, they provide a useful platform for discussing the potential 
implications of minority status on autobiographical recall and the cultural life scripts and 
life story accounts of reminiscence, as well as the effects of using alternative 
autobiographical cues.  Currently, the present study represents the sole examination of the 
reminiscence effect with an unfairly treated minority population and a U.S. minority.   It 
is the authors’ belief that such an investigation is still required as a means of providing 
                                                 
2
 Coleman, J. T., Belli, R. F., & James, S. A. (2012). Structuring the recall of negative 
emotional memories: Life scripts, life stories, and memories of unfair treatment. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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the most stringent test of the robustness of the reminiscence effect and claims of its 
prominent accounts that it is invariant across cultures. 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals have a tendency to recall a 
disproportionately greater number of memories from the period of adolescence to young 
adulthood relative to other periods of life.  This phenomenon, originally discovered in 
1986 by Rubin, Wetzler, and Nebes, became known as the “reminiscence bump.” This 
“bump” of memories from adolescence and early adulthood defies expectations of normal 
forgetting found with other types of memories by not conforming to a monotonically 
decreasing retention function.  The bump has subsequently been observed across a 
variety of cueing methods and memory types, including word cue methods (Fromholt et 
al., 2003; Kawasaki, Janssen, & Inoue, 2011; Janssen, Gralak, & Murre, 2011), memory 
for public events and names (Belli, Schuman, & Jackson, 1997), memory for favorite 
books, movies, and records (Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2007), as well as across several 
distinct cultures (Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 2005; Kawasaki et al., 2011; 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Glück & Bluck, 2007; Demiray, Gülgöz, & Bluck, 2009).  The 
phenomenon is so reliable as to be considered among the most robust findings in the 
autobiographical memory literature (Conway & Rubin, 1993; Glück & Bluck, 2007). 
Early on, several accounts of the bump were developed.   Some emphasized the 
importance of first or new experiences as formative events, which begin the development 
of nascent memory structures known as schemas (Fitzgerald, 1988; Fromholt & Larsen, 
1991; Linton, 1986; Pillemer, Rhinehart, & White, 1986).  Rubin, Rahaal, & Poon (1998) 
offered both a cognitive account and a biological account.  In the former, there is a 
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memory advantage for novel and distinctive events that are followed by a longer period 
of relative stability, while the latter asserts that the bump simply reflects the naturally 
occurring biological mechanisms underlying the development and inevitable subsequent 
decline in cognitive functioning across the lifespan.  Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) 
suggested a narrative account in which memories that reflect personal goals and have a  
central organizing role in autobiographical knowledge are more accessible.  For the most 
part, memories of this type occur between 10 to 30 years of age, thus causing the 
reminiscence effect. 
More recently, findings have led to yet additional accounts of the reminiscence 
effect.  Several studies have shown that memories from the bump period are 
disproportionately emotionally positive in valence, while others show that when events 
are emotionally positive and affect later-life outcomes, they tend to be in the bump.  
Berntsen and Rubin (2002) initially obtained early indications that when participants 
reported emotional memories, the occurrence of the bump varied as a function of the 
emotional valence of recalled memories.  The bump occurred for highly positive, but not 
highly negative, emotional memories.  Autobiographical cues for emotionally positive 
events included requests for memories such as when they were happiest, most proud, 
most in love, and their most important positive memory.  Cues to  emotionally negative 
memories included the times when they were saddest, their most traumatic memory, 
when they were most angry, most afraid, and most jealous (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; 
Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  Highly negative emotional memories were either randomly 
distributed across the lifespan or conformed to a monotonically decreasing retention 
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function. From these results, they concluded that the reminiscence effect occurred for 
highly positive, but not highly negative, emotional memories. 
Based on these findings, Rubin and Berntsen (2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004) 
formulated the cultural life script account of the reminiscence bump as an explanation of 
the dissociation between the lifespan distributions of memories of opposing emotional 
valences.  According to this account, autobiographical memory recall is structured by 
cultural life scripts, which provide readily available search descriptions for major life 
events, most of which are emotionally positive.  In contrast to negative events, positive 
ones reflect the prescribed timings of highly desirable life events of a transitional nature, 
which cluster during the transition between childhood and adulthood.  According to 
Berntsen and Rubin (2004), a request for extremely negative events  would not be  likely 
to activate a life script.  This is because such events typically consist of deviations from 
the timing and sequencing of the life script or nonscripted events. 
Additional evidence supporting the existence of cultural life scripts and their 
structure was later obtained through script-generation studies in which participants placed 
positive emotional memories mostly within the bump range with high confidence, while 
negative emotional memories were distributed similarly to the manner observed in the 
autobiographical recall studies (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; 
Erdoğan , Baran, Avlar, Taş, & Tekcan, 2008; Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 2009; Janssen 
& Rubin, 2011; Bohn, 2010). Notably, the results of Rubin and Berntsen’s (2003) initial 
script-generation task with Danish subjects have been replicated with very little variation.  
Findings with such distinct populations as Danes (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin, 
Berntsen & Hutson, 2009; Bohn, 2010), Turks (Erdoğan  et al., 2008), U.S. undergrads 
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(Rubin et al., 2009), and the Dutch (Janssen & Rubin, 2011) have consistently 
demonstrated that the cultural life script is mostly positive, and therefore, represents the 
idealized life.  It should be noted however that cultural life scripts are devoid of negative 
emotional events.  Findings demonstrate that emotionally negative events are included in 
the life script, and that many of these are rated as being highly prevalent in the normative 
life.  However, the timings of occurrence for these events, which tend to occur mostly 
after age 30, are not strongly agreed upon, as evidenced by high standard deviations for 
their age estimates and lower ratings of confidence in those estimates.  
Variation has been observed in situations, in which some samples produced less 
idealized life scripts than others.  Coleman (2012) found that when African Americans 
are prompted to nominate events to happen to someone of their race, more mentions of 
emotionally negative events are made than when they nominate events to happen to a 
“typical person.”  Cross-generational comparisons (Bohn, 2010; Janssen & Rubin, 2011) 
have demonstrated that the elderly produce a somewhat more negative life script than 
younger participants.  Additionally,  the implementation of an experimental manipulation 
in which some participants nominated events in the prospective life of a hypothetical 
newborn, while some nominate events they expect to have occurred in the life of a 
hypothetical elderly person, resulted in a less idealized script for the latter (Erdoğan , et 
al., 2008).   However, the observed differences between these various life scripts are 
considered relatively negligible—they do not suggest differences in the manner that they 
structure autobiographical recall distributions. 
 More recently, Glück and Bluck (2007) have proposed the life story account of 
the reminiscence bump to explain the dissociation between distributions of positive and 
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negative emotional memories.  Inasmuch as both accounts of the reminiscence effect 
predict that it occurs for highly positive emotional memories, but not for highly negative 
ones, the two accounts are complementary.  However, the life story account, which 
incorporates aspects of life-span developmental theory, predicts that bump events are not 
only emotionally positive, but they are also more likely to be developmentally influential 
and consequential to later life outcomes.  In addition, they reflect instances of exerting 
control over one’s life.  Life story events enable causal coherence supporting one’s life 
story and serve an explanatory function toward understanding one’s life trajectory.   
The life story account is supported by autobiographical recall findings with an 
Austrian sample (Glück & Bluck, 2007) and later further supported in a study utilizing a 
Turkish sample (Demiray, Gülgöz, & Bluck, 2009).  Glück and Bluck had participants 
report their 15 most important memories and rate the level of perceived control they felt 
they had over the event, thereby distinguishing life story from non-life story events since 
life story events are instances of exerting control in one’s life.  The findings demonstrated 
that a bump only occurred in the lifespan distributions of positive, high-perceived-control 
scripted events, whereas the distributions of all other memories (positive low perceived 
control and all negative events) were relatively flat.  Additionally, positive, high-
perceived-control scripted events were considered more influential on life outcomes, such 
as who one has become in comparison to positive low-perceived-control scripted events, 
and that both types of positive events were considered more influential on life outcomes 
than both types of negative life events (low perceived control, high-perceived control).  
Also, in support of the predictions of the life story account, with a Turkish sample, 
Demiray et al. (2009) found that bump memories were rated significantly more important 
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for identity development than non-bump memories and that there were significantly more 
transitional events in the bump, than in the non-bump, ranges of the lifespan.   
  In this paper, we report research that examines the implications of minority 
status for the reminiscence effect and the life script and life story accounts of 
reminiscence.  There are key differences between our methods and those implemented by 
Berntsen and Rubin (2002, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), Glück and Bluck (2007), and 
Demiray et al. (2009).  First, whereas the existing research has been based on results 
derived from non-minority European and Turkish samples, our sample consists of 
African Americans in the US South, who participated in a lifecourse epidemiological 
study of cardiovascular disease risk factors (James et al., 2006). Second, the 
autobiographical cues that we employed differed from those in previous studies.  
Berntsen and Rubin (2002) used as their autobiographical cues more general affective 
states, such when one was most happy, most sad and most traumatized. Glück and Bluck 
(2007) asked respondents to list a specific number of events that they considered as most 
personally important in their lives.  Demiray et al. (2009) requested participants to report 
any type of memory within specified lifetime periods.  Our autobiographical cues 
consisted of specific situations in which a specific type of negative event occurred, 
namely occasions in which our respondents had experienced unfair treatment (i.e. 
discrimination).  After reporting our data and results, we provide a discussion of the 
potential role of culture and racial minority status in autobiographical recall and their 
implications for accounts of the reminiscence effect. 
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METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
The current study presents an analysis of secondary data.  The participants, who 
initially took part in an epidemiological study on cardiovascular disease, were 1,169 
working and middle-class African American residents of Pitt Count, North Carolina.  Of 
those 1,169 participants, 680 reported memories of unfair treatment (Mage = 49.61, SD = 
6.93, range = 38 to 64).  There were 433 (63.7%) females and 247 (36.3%) males.  Of 
these participants, 173 (25.4%) had no high school diploma, 252 (37.1%) had a high 
school diploma, 252 (37.1%) had attended or graduated college.  There was no education 
level data for three participants. 
MATERIALS 
Trained interviewers recorded participant responses on a lap top computer using 
Event History Calendar software.  Interviewers began by stating: “I am interested in the 
times during your life when you have been treated unfairly.  Think of specific events that 
have happened to you.”  Then participants were prompted to report memories separately 
from different domains of life.  For schooling, participants were asked: “Were you ever 
unfairly treated at school? This includes being given a much lower grade than you 
deserved, being denied a scholarship that you deserved, being discouraged by a teacher 
from seeking higher education, or being treated unfairly in some other way.”  For 
employment, participants were asked: “Were you ever unfairly treated concerning work?  
This includes not being hired for a job that you were qualified for, not receiving a 
promotion that you deserved, being fired from a job unfairly, or being treated unfairly in 
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some other way.”  With regard to housing, participants were asked: “Were you ever 
unfairly treated in getting housing or finding a place to live?  This includes being 
prevented from renting or buying a home, or being prevented from staying in a 
neighborhood because neighbors made life too uncomfortable.”  For the domain of 
resources and money, participants were asked: “Were you ever unfairly treated in getting 
resources or money?  This includes being unfairly denied a bank loan, a credit card, or 
some other form of credit.”  With regard to the domain of police or courts, participants 
were asked: “Were you ever unfairly treated by the police or courts?  This includes being 
unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened or abused by police, or 
being unfairly accused of doing something illegal by the authorities.”  For each type of 
event to which participants answered yes, they were asked three follow-up questions: “In 
what year did this happened?” “What do you think was the main reason for being treated 
unfairly?” “Was it because of your race, gender, age, height or weight, your shade of 
color, or some other reason?” It should be noted that shade of skin differs from race: For 
African Americans, the shade of one’s skin is a highly salient issue, as the shade of one’s 
skin may affect the way that Whites treat African Americans and African Americans treat 
one another, depending on whether one is light- or dark-skinned. 
PROCEDURE 
Interviewers collected data, face-to-face, in participants’ homes.  The respondents 
were asked to report memories of their experiences of unfair treatment, in the domains of 
schooling, employment, housing, resources and money, and police and courts.  For each 
reported memory, participants reported the age at which it occurred and attributed it to 
one of six reasons: Race, gender, age, height or weight, shade of skin, or other reasons.  
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Participants could report as many memories as possible.  Respondents also had the option 
of providing explanations or brief descriptions of the incident. 
RESULTS 
Six hundred and eighty participants reported a total of 1,875 memories of unfair 
treatment.  Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage of memories by domain and 
reason.  Memories in the domain of schooling, of which there were 441 (23.52%), are 
omitted from the remaining analyses, due to the temporally constraining/biasing nature of 
that domain/cue.  To detect the presence of a genuine reminiscence effect, it is necessary 
to employ temporally unbiased autobiographical cues.  Cues to when one was in school 
would inherently lead to the recall of memories constrained to a certain lifetime period 
(childhood to approximately 18 to 22), and therefore would not be appropriate for testing 
the reminiscence effect.  The remaining cues do not present this problem.  The removal 
of schooling results in a final data sample consisting of 606 (Mage = 49.48, SD = 6.82, 
range = 38 to 64)  participants who reported 1,434 memories of unfair treatment (M = 
2.37, SD = 3.68, range = 1 to 50).  One 46-year-old participant reported 50 memories, 
almost 13 standard deviations above the mean.  Out of the 606 participants, 588 (97.00%) 
reported between 1 and 10 memories, while the other 18 reported between 11 and 50 
memories.  The domain in which most reported memories of unfair treatment occurred 
was employment, which made up nearly half (54.60%) of all reported memories.  As 
might be expected with a racial minority, the most common reason to which unfair 
treatment was attributed was race, making up roughly half (53.84%) of all reports.  
Reports of unfair treatment in employment attributed to race were the most common 
combination of domain and reason, making up approximately 30% of all reported  
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memories.  Males reported more memories of unfair treatment attributed to race than 
other reasons and more unfair treatment attributed to race than females, while females 
reported more unfair treatment attributed reasons other than race, X
2
(1) = 76.66, p <.001.  
Females reported more incidents of unfair treatment in employment than males, and more 
incidents in employment than in all other domains, X
2
(1) = 7.70, p < .01. 
 The main goal of the current paper is to determine if a reminiscence effect, the 
disproportionate recall of remote, rather than recent, autobiographical memories, is 
present in lifespan distributions of memories of unfair treatment, an emotionally negative 
autobiographical memory.  To that end, five distributions will be examined (with 
schooling omitted from all).  First, all reported memories of unfair treatment will be 
examined, followed by those in employment and those in all other situations, as each of 
these comprised roughly half of all reports, followed by those attributed to race and all 
other reasons, as each of these comprised roughly half of all reports. 
 Because the sample consisted of age groups of unequal sizes, a mathematical 
procedure was applied to control for this fact, resulting in corrected values that represent 
results based on an equal number of participants from every age.  Potentially, a lack of 
equal numbers of participants per age (or age group) could result in the presence of 
bumps at early periods in the lifespan distribution that merely reflect the disproportionate 
recall of late life memories by a younger age group.  Prior research, such as that by 
Berntsen and Rubin (2002)  used mathematical procedures to extrapolate expected 
numbers of memories, which were then reported in the results.  In their procedure, Rubin 
and Berntsen corrected the number of memories to represent the number of memories 
that would have occurred had the participants from each 10-year age group lived through 
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the whole decade instead of only partially through that decade.  The same procedure is 
not appropriate in the current study since age groups are not being looked at separately.  
However,  the similarity between the two procedures is that both extrapolate an expected 
number of memories based on ideal samples from the data to control for the shortcomings 
of actual sample.  To conduct the analyses in the current study, the number of memories 
from each age of occurrence was looked at individually for each participant age.  This 
number was multiplied by the quotient of the number of participants in the total sample 
divided by the number of participants in the sample old enough to have reported 
memories from a given age.  For instance, 606 participants could report memories of 
unfair treatment up to age 38, as that is the age of the youngest participant.  From age 39 
and up, only a portion of the entire sample is able to report a memory from each age.  
Only 601 participants were old enough to report memories from age 39, therefore the 
number of memories at age 39 is multiplied by 1.008 (606/601).  Similarly, as only two 
participants aged 65 were in the sample, then the number of memories from age 65 would 
be multiplied by 303 (606/2).  The result is corrected values that are counts of the number 
of memories from each age that represent the results based on 606 participants old 
enough to report from each age.  In addition, the lifespan distribution is broken into 5-
year bins (e.g., 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, etc…).  The value for each 5-year bin represents the 
mean corrected value for those five years. 
 First, the distribution of all reported memories of unfair treatment is examined.  
Figure 1 shows the average corrected number of reported memories as a function of 
lifetime period with the lifespan divided into 5-year bins.  Notably, a reminiscence effect 
along the lines of that most commonly observed, i.e., occurring between ages 10 and 30,  
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is not present.  Prior research has consistently demonstrated a substantial drop-off in the 
number of reported memories occurring after age 30.  In contrast, the results show that 
substantially more memories were reported from ages 31 to 35 than from 26 to 30, and 
that the number of memories increases over the next 2 successive lifetime periods, 36 to 
40 and 41 to 45.  While a decrease in reported memories occurs after the 41 to 45 lifetime 
period, the presence of more reported memories from the 46 to 50 and 51 to 55 lifetime 
periods than from between ages 10 and 30 further demonstrates the lack of a 
reminiscence effect. 
Next, the distributions of memories in the domain of employment and all other 
domains are examined (Figure 2).  Seven hundred and eighty three (54.60%) memories 
were reported in employment.  The results show that, contrary to expectations, no 
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Figure 1. Lifespan distribution of all 
memories of unfair treatment  
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reminiscence effect was observed.  Rather than a decrease in reported memories after age 
30, as would be expected with the reminiscence effect, there is instead, an increase in 
reported memories in the 31 to 35 lifetime period.  This is followed by a period extending 
up to age 55 from which more memories were reported than from the 10 to 30 year-old 
period, contradicting the expectations of the reminiscence bump.  The distribution of 
memories in domains other than employment, of which there were 651 (45.40%), does 
not demonstrate greater recall of remote memories relative to recent ones either.  The 
observed distribution differs from the commonly observed reminiscence bump in several 
ways.  First, no decrease in the number of reported memories occurs after the 26 to 30 
lifetime period.  Instead, an almost equal number of memories are reported in the 
following lifetime period, 31 to 35.  Second, more memories were reported from the 
period of 36 to 40 than from 31 to 35.  Third, more memories are reported from the 
lifetime periods between ages 41 and 60 than from all early lifetime periods.  Even if the 
most recent lifetime period, 61 to 65, were discounted to account for the recency effect, 
the remainder of the distribution, for the most part, conforms to a monotonically 
decreasing retention function. 
 Figure 3 shows the distributions of all memories of unfair treatment attributed to 
race and those attributed to reasons other than race.  There were 772 (53.84%) memories 
of unfair treatment attributed to race.  The results show that more memories were 
reported from 31 to 35 than from 26 to 30, a roughly equal number of memories were 
reported from 36 to 40 than from 31 to 35, and that more memories were reported from 
41 to 45 than from the preceding period.  As such, the results clearly indicate that a 
reminiscence bump between ages 10 and 30 is not present.  The increase in reported  
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memories between ages 51 and 55 compared to the prior lifetime period of 46 to 50, and 
the occurrence of roughly equal numbers of reported memories among the periods of 21 
to 25, 31 to 35, 36 to 40, and 51 to 55, further demonstrates no tendency for participants 
to recall remote, rather than recent, memories.  In examining the distribution of memories 
attributed to reasons other than race, if the last lifetime period, 61 to 65 were discounted 
to account for the recency effect, the most reported memories are from the lifetime 
periods of 41 to 45 and 46 to 50, from which about roughly equal numbers of memories 
were reported, demonstrating that the classic reminiscence bump occurring between ages 
10 and 30 is not present.  The lack of a classic reminiscence bump is further illustrated by 
the greater number of memories reported from the lifetime periods of 31 to 35 and 36 to  
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40 than from 26 to 30.  Moreover, the number of reported memories increases from the 
period of 31 to 35 to that of 36 to 40. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the current research is to determine if a reminiscence effect would be 
observed in African Americans’ memories of unfair treatment, a negative emotional 
memory, thereby contradicting the predictions of the cultural life script and life story 
accounts of the reminiscence effect and findings from prior research.  Previous studies 
have demonstrated that the reminiscence effect does not occur for highly negative 
emotional memories, with the exception of history-graded events or as in the case of 
memories of when one was most jealous, which was confounded with times when one 
was most in love.  In a somewhat similar manner, the cultural life script account can 
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of unfair treatment attributed to race and all 
other reasons 
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explain reminiscence for emotionally negative events in cases of unfulfilled life script 
events, (e.g., failure to graduate high on time with one’s peers, which would occur at age 
18).   Potentially, many unfulfilled life script events could occur for disadvantaged 
minority groups, such as African Americans.  U.S. Census Bureau data shows that as 
recently as 2009, African Americans made up 25.8% of Americans living below the 
poverty level, compared to 12.3% for Whites (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  With regard 
to education, 13.1% of African Americans had no high school diploma compared to 7.4% 
of Whites (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  African Americans are also overrepresented in 
the U.S. prison population.  The number of African Americans in state and federal 
prisons is 4,347 per 100,000 compared to 678 per 100,000 for Whites.   Several of these 
statistics suggest ways that life script events might go unfulfilled for a larger percentage 
of African Americans compared to Whites.  Failure to obtain a high school diploma is 
one example of failure to fulfill a life script event that would lead to the recall of an 
emotionally negative memory occurring precisely around age 18.   Low SES might 
indicate that one failed to obtain successfully their first job when they wanted, or begin a 
desirable career.  Examples of failing to fulfill life script events such as these could also 
lead to the recall of emotionally negative events with relatively precise timings of 
occurrence, specifically in young adulthood. 
In the current study, the commonly observed reminiscence effect displaying a 
bump between ages 10 and 30 was not observed in any of the examined lifespan 
distributions.   Even in cases in which more memories were reported from remote, as 
opposed to recent, lifetime periods, the distributions failed to conform to the expectations 
of the classical reminiscence bump in that they did not terminate at the appropriate 
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lifetime period, 25 to 30, and the number of reported memories in the last 20 years of life 
was not substantially smaller than that for the bump period.  While no evidence 
contradicting prominent accounts of the reminiscence effect or prior findings was 
obtained, the findings of the current study do not allow for any definitive conclusions 
about the effect of minority status on reminiscence.  As it stands, that effect remains 
uncertain, as the present study was not directly comparable to existing tests of the 
reminiscence effect.   Findings by Coleman (2012) have demonstrated differences in the 
distribution of emotionally negative events in the life script of African Americans relative 
to the findings of prior research with majority populations.  Substantially more negative 
events were estimated to occur before age 30 than in prior studies.  However, because the 
timings of these events were not strongly agreed upon, i.e., prescribed, it would be 
expected that this should not translate into differences in autobiographical recall.  
Nevertheless, until this is empirically demonstrated, that remains an unconfirmed 
expectation/prediction of the cultural life script account. 
Examining the reminiscence effect in the autobiographical recall of African 
Americans remains an important, incomplete test of the cultural life scripts and life story 
accounts.  In the present study, we attempted, by conducting secondary analyses on 
already collected data, to determine if African Americans’ memories of unfair treatment 
produce a reminiscence effect, despite the fact that these data were not collected 
expressly for that purpose.  We were able to analyze autobiographical memories from a 
population that varies from those previously examined on at least one important 
dimension, that, ostensibly, is relevant to the expression of the reminiscence effect, 
minority status.  It is the contention of the authors that, inasmuch as the life script, which 
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is responsible for structuring the recall of highly emotional memories, is an expression of 
expectations of events in the normative life, then differential rates in actually-occurring 
emotional events between populations could translate into variability in the life script.  
That is to say, if a given culture experiences more emotionally negative events compared 
to another, then, potentially, those experiences would, at a minimum, decrease the 
idealized nature of the life script, or, in the most extreme cases, lead to a predominantly 
emotionally negative life script.  A factor well known in the United States to be strongly 
predictive of a variety of adverse life conditions is race and/or ethnicity.  Historically, 
U.S. minority groups have faced substantial adversity, socially and economically.  As 
recently as 2009, African Americans made up 25.8% of persons below the poverty level, 
compared to 12.3% for Whites (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  Additionally, data from the 
same year indicate that 13.1% of blacks had no high school diploma, compared to 7.4% 
for Whites.  African Americans are also disproportionately represented among state and 
federal prisoners in the U.S.  As of 2010, there were 4,347 African Americans in state 
and federal prisons per 100,000 U.S. residents, compared to 678 for Whites (Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).  Another prevalent problem among the 
African American community is the high rate of single-parent homes.  According to U.S. 
Census data, 59% of African American “family groups,” i.e., homes with children under 
18 years of age, were “one-parent family groups,” compared to 26% for White family 
groups (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  From these conditions, emotionally negative events 
may result, such as deprivation, hunger, lack of security, exposure to unsafe situations, 
experiences of discrimination, and health disparities, among others.  Moreover, these 
factors may be exacerbated in samples with even lower levels of socioeconomic status, 
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something unlikely addressed in the current study, which consisted of working and 
middle-class participants.   
The autobiographical cues employed in the current study--requests for memories 
of unfair treatment--are appropriate variables in an examination of cardiovascular disease 
and hypertension among African Americans.  Unfortunately, they are less so for a test of 
the reminiscence effect.  As such, they do not provide a test  of the reminiscence effect 
comparable to existing ones.  No previous study constrained all responses only to 
emotionally negative events, nor has any specified from which domains of life 
participants are to sample memories.  Tests of the reminiscence effect require more 
neutral autobiographical cues for which fewer a priori assumptions can be made about 
the responses to be elicited, thereby demonstrating a more genuine effect, rather than an 
artifact of the cueing method.  Moreover, the limited age range of the sample and the lack 
of equal numbers of participants per age group further diminished the prospects of 
observing a genuine reminiscence effect. 
 With the exception of history-graded events, such as those for memories of World 
War II by Danish participants (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), and memories of jealousy, 
which were confounded with times when participants were most in love (Rubin & 
Berntsen, 2003), no studies have demonstrated reminiscence bumps for emotionally 
negative memories.  As such, both the cultural life scripts and life story accounts of the 
reminiscence effect have withstood a substantial number of tests of what is likely their 
central, and most important, theoretical claim: that the reminiscence effect occurs for 
emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative, memories, an effect that each explains 
effectively.  Based on the research to date, proponents of the cultural life script and life 
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story accounts have a strong claim to the soundness of those accounts.  However, a strong 
claim may also be made that there has not been enough variability in the populations in 
which their accounts have been tested to confirm fully their robustness and that of the 
effects they predict.  A test of the reminiscence effect with an African American sample 
could dispel such uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DOES ITEM TYPICALITY AFFECT MEMORY FOR LIFE SCRIPT EVENTS?
3
 
ABSTRACT 
Recently, a life-scripts account has been utilized to explain the structure of 
autobiographical memory recall.  However, whether life-scripts exist has never been 
directly tested.  If individuals possess scripts for the normative timing and order of life 
events, then ostensibly, the classical effects found in memory experiments for other types 
of scripted information, such as the typicality effect, should generalize to life-scripts.  
The present paper presents two experiments examining this issue.  In Experiment 1, 
participants heard brief biographies in which life events varied in typicality as a function 
of age appropriateness.  Recognition memory for presented and unpresented items was 
tested.  Participants correctly recognized more atypical, than typical, items, and 
recognized falsely more typical, than atypical, ones.  Additionally, participants’ reports of 
the subjective experience of remembering life-script events as a function of typicality 
replicated previous findings.  Experiment 2 was conducted to address potential confounds 
in Experiment 1. Participants listened to brief biographies containing unscripted life 
events varying as a function of emotional valence and occurring at various ages.  It was 
expected that no differences in recognition memory would occur as a function of emotion 
or age, thereby demonstrating that the effects in Experiment 1 were driven by typicality, 
and not these factors.  Surprisingly, the results were mixed.  In some cases, recognition 
was better for events in lifetime periods more commonly associated with the opposite 
emotional valence of the event.  The occurrence of the typicality effect for unscripted 
                                                 
3
 Coleman, J. T., & Belli, R. F. (2012). Does item typicality affect memory for life script 
events? Manuscript invited for resubmission. 
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events suggests that general knowledge associating a particular emotional valence with 
one lifetime period more than another was activated, rather than a script.  The status of 
the life script is discussed in light of these findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, several studies have utilized a life-scripts account to explain the 
structure of autobiographical memory-recall distributions for different classes of 
emotional memories (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Collins, 
Pillemer, Ivcevic, & Gooze, 2007).  The observed pattern for these distributions consists 
of a reminiscence effect, whereby a bump occurs in the period of adolescence to young 
adulthood in which more memories are recalled, and the bump is observed only for 
positive events.  Negative events, on the other hand, are distributed randomly across the 
lifespan.  This pattern was observed when a large samples of Danish participants recalled 
the age of occurrence for their happiest, saddest, most traumatic and most important 
memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002) and memories for the times they were most afraid, 
most proud, most jealous, most in love, and most angry(Berntsen & Rubin, 2003).   
Additionally, it was also observed when U.S. undergrads and middle-aged adults recalled 
times the felt especially good and especially bad about themselves (Collins et al., 2007). 
One possibility that could account for these distributions is a life-script account.  
According to this account, life-scripts, generic cognitive structures constituted of 
culturally prescribed age norms for life events, guide recall by indicating when one is 
most likely to have experienced different classes of emotional events, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of recall for certain events above others.  Cultural life scripts influence the 
encoding and retrieval of these events through emphasizing their importance, which in 
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turn increases rehearsal of those memories.  Rehearsal of these culturally desirable events 
increases the depth of processing and number of spaced-retrievals they undergo, which 
are both memory-enhancing processes. To bolster the life-script notion, several studies 
sought evidence for the existence of shared life-scripts, mostly by having participants 
generate lists of events that would occur in the lives of hypothetical individuals.  Danish 
participants asked to predict the age of occurrence for events in the life of a hypothetical 
elderly person generated more positive than negative life events, and most of the positive 
events were located within the bump range (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  The emotional 
positive events had highly prescribed timings, while the timings of occurrence for 
emotionally negative events were estimated with poor agreement as indicated by the 
standard deviations of the age estimates.  In a separate study, when Danish participants 
predicted the seven most important events to occur in the prospective life of a 
hypothetical newborn, there were also more positive, than negative, events.  Moreover, 
emotionally positive events had highly prescribed timings, while the timings of 
occurrence for emotionally negative events were estimated with poor agreement, as 
indicated by the standard deviations of the age estimates (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  
Similar findings were obtained in a study with a sample of Turkish university students 
(Erdoğan , Baran, Avlar, Taş, & Teckan, 2006), a Dutch national sample of young and 
old participants (Janssen & Rubin, 2011), young and old Danish participants (Bohn, 
2010), and with a U.S. undergraduate sample, (Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 2009).   
Overall, the findings of these studies suggest that the properties of the cultural life 
scripts are highly stable.  Only minor differences were observed across cultures, cross-
generationally (Bohn, 2010; Janssen & Rubin, 2011), and across education levels 
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(Janssen & Rubin, 2010).  In all cases, the life script possessed the same properties: (1) 
they favored youth, with the majority of events occurring between ages 10 and 30; (2) 
emotionally positive events clustered between ages 10 and 30; (3) the timings of 
occurrence for emotionally positive events are highly prescribed, while agreement on the 
timings of occurrence for emotionally negative events is poor.  Because of these 
properties, cultural life scripts are considered to represent idealized lives.   Because the 
manner in which emotional events are distributed and the differences in the agreement of 
the timings of occurrence between emotionally positive and negative events, the cultural 
life-script account has the distinct ability to explain with great parsimony both the 
position of the bump in the lifespan and the dissociation between the distributions of 
positive and negative emotional memories.  Because of this, Berntsen and Rubin (2004) 
concluded that life-scripts structure autobiographical memory recall, but only for highly 
positive, not highly negative, emotional memories.  However, other possible forms of 
evidence supporting the existence of cultural life scripts still remain to be obtained. 
Because a vast body of research pertaining to the existence and implications of 
script knowledge already exists, but little has been done employing these established 
paradigms in the study of life-scripts, more direct testing of the existence of life-scripts is 
possible.   Generalizing the classical effects found for memory for other types of scripted 
information to that for life-scripts would provide an additional class of evidence for their 
existence, independent of findings pertaining to the bump in autobiographical memory 
recall that would greatly bolster assertions that life-scripts are represented in memory, 
and consequently lend greater credence to the possibility that they structure 
autobiographical memory recall.  One possible direction to pursue would be to examine 
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the influence of life scripts on the tendency to confuse foils with previously presented 
events, a phenomenon known as the typicality effect.  If indeed, life-scripts do exist, then 
ostensibly, the typicality effect will be found with life script information.  A substantial 
body of research has demonstrated that the typicality effect has been shown to reliably 
occur with other types of scripts  (Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, 
Kowalski, & Smith, 1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981; Lampinen, Faries, Neuschatz, & 
Toglia, 2000).  The typicality effect is  characterized by superior recognition memory for 
atypical items relative to typical ones in scripted event sequences, and more unpresented 
typical items being falsely recognized than atypical ones.  This effect has been found to 
occur with both adults (Graesser et al., 1979; Bower, Black & Turner, 1979) and young 
children (Hudson, 1988; Adams & Worden, 1986).   
Life-scripts are considered to be culturally shared knowledge structures, or 
schemata that, as with other forms of scripts, are conceptual representations of 
stereotyped event sequences (Abelson, 1981).  They delineate the normative timing and 
order of the events/actions that constitute a larger overall event sequence and are generic, 
representing a prototypical instantiation of that sequence.  Scripts help to guide 
interpretations, inferences, expectations, attention, encoding, and retrieval (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977).  Evidence suggests that children as young as kindergarten age utilize 
scripts representing common routines, such as the events that make up the school day 
(Fivush, 1984).  Superior memory for atypical/aschematic items has been explained in 
several different accounts.  The attention elaboration hypothesis (AEH), a level of 
processing explanation, states that the depth of cognitive processing determines the 
likelihood of future retrieval.  With scripted information, atypical information attracts 
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more attention because it has a low a priori probability of occurring in an activated script, 
therefore requiring greater effort and elaborative processes to reconcile its occurrence in 
its context than with respect to script-typical information.  In this regard, an atypical 
behavior in a biography, such as say, an 80-year-old surfing or a 20 year old who lives in 
a nursing home, would have a low a priori probability of occurring in the script activated 
by this material and therefore engage greater depth of processing enhancing later 
memorability.   
Another account of the typicality effect asserts that memories for event sequences 
are schematically organized around script expectations and therefore, script violations 
maintain a distinct status.  The script pointer + tag (SP+T) hypothesis (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) states that episodic memories for events have a pointer to the appropriate 
underlying script, which contains the constituent typical actions and “tags” for script 
violations, where they are stored as functionally separate units.  In the case of the life of 
an 80 year old, surfing would be explicitly stored as it is not part of the script for what 
elderly people do.  The theory makes two critical predictions: (1) memory 
discriminations will be superior for actions that are atypical, compared to those for 
actions that are typical because they have to be explicitly stored as they are neither  
implied nor inferred by the underlying script, and (2) there should be no memory 
discrimination for actions that are highly typical of the activated script because they are 
interrelated to the underlying script as a whole and are all contained in a single pointer 
toward the appropriate script.  An example of the latter prediction in which typicality is 
determined by age appropriateness would be going to college for a young adult.  Findings 
from prior life script generation procedure indicate that going to college is a common life 
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script event whose timing is highly prescribed.  If cultural life scripts were represented in 
memory in the form observed in these studies, would be part of the activated underlying 
script, and therefore not be stored separately/explicitly.   
The script pointer plus tag hypothesis (SCPT), in addition to having implications 
for the superior recognition of atypical events, further describes the way in which 
unpresented typical items are more likely to be falsely recognized than unpresented 
atypical items.  This hypothesis states that memory representations of script-based 
sequences are made automatically and consist of a copy of the script, including its 
constituent, highly typical actions, regardless of whether or not they are presented.  
Consequently, if a script only contains a subset of the script-typical items, subjects should 
later be unable to distinguish between those items that were presented and those that were 
not.  With regard to the life script, if information that a young person went to college was 
presented but it was not mentioned in that person’s biography that she or he attended high 
school in adolescence, high school would still be activated according to this account, later 
making if indistinguishable from material that was presented.  As before, the atypical 
items that are encountered are stored as “tagged” items, a status facilitating subsequent 
superior memorability.  The script pointer+tag model also makes several predictions 
regarding the effect of retention interval length on memory for script information as 
function of typicality.  As retention interval increases, scripts are increasingly relied upon 
in facilitating inferentially driven retrieval whereas, at shorter intervals, memory is 
retrieved more from the actual memory trace (Smith & Graesser, 1981).  Testing at two-
day, one-week and three-week intervals has shown that, while retention of atypical 
actions was superior to that for typical ones, atypical actions were forgotten at a faster 
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rate.  However, correct recognition and correct rejection are both superior when tested 
immediately, compared to when tested after 24 hours (Lampinen et al., 2000).   
Another aspect of remembering affected by item typicality is the 
phenomenological experience of recalling scripted events. The dynamic memory model 
(DMM) (Schank, 1982) makes several predictions pertaining to the phenomenological 
experience of recalling atypical versus typical script events.  It states that more 
experientially vivid recollections should accompany memories for atypical actions/items 
than for typical ones.  Moreover, they should have more thought and emotion details 
associated with them.  Script violations require extra effort at encoding to reconcile their 
presence.  The reconciliation process would be memorable in and of itself, and the 
details, thoughts, and other aspects associated with one’s reaction when that item was 
encountered would subsequently be stored with its memory.   
To investigate the subjective experience of recalling false memories, Tulving 
(1985) outlined the Remember/Know distinction, which has subsequently been employed 
in recognition memory tests to distinguish true memories from false ones.  Remember 
judgments are for those memories for which subjects can recall details of the encoding 
experience.  On the other hand, know judgments apply to situations in which one has a 
subjective sense that she or he knows a fact, but cannot recall any of the details of the 
actual encoding experience.  Knowing, according to Tulving, lacks consciousness of the 
original event because it is generated internally rather than externally.  Findings show 
that more remember judgments are made for atypical items and more know and infer 
judgments are made for typical items (Lampinen et al., 2000).  Infer judgments are likely 
for activated, non-presented items commonly associated with scripts whose presence are 
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implied, as would be the case with the above-mentioned example of the fact that going to 
high school was omitted from the biography of a young person.   The presence of specific 
details accompanying remember judgments may vary as a function of item typicality and 
also can be used to distinguish between true and false memories.  More memory details 
are reported for remember judgments of atypical than typical items (Lampinen et al., 
2000).  Findings indicate that the phenomenological experience of remembering true 
memories versus false memories varies in that more remember judgments are made for 
true than false memories (Lampinen, et al., 2000), reflecting the externally generated 
nature of true memories versus the internally generated nature of false ones. 
The present research utilizes the abovementioned previous findings regarding the 
typicality effect and the variations in the phenomenological experience of remembering 
scripted information as a function of typicality to determine if these findings hold true for 
life-script information.  Scripts are generic cognitive representations in semantic memory 
that when activated affect attention, encoding, and retrieval.  One demonstration of the 
effect of script knowledge is the typicality effect.  The activated script inherently includes 
items, which if not presented might be falsely remembered, and makes atypical items 
more noticeable.  If a script for a certain event sequence does not exist (i.e., is not 
represented in semantic memory) then effects associated with script knowledge should 
not happen with information about that event sequence.  Conversely, demonstrating that 
effects associated with scripts do occur for with those event sequences should indicate its 
existence.  Replicating the typicality effect with  life-script information will further 
establish that important events in the normative life are indeed organized schematically in 
a script represented in memory, as argued by Rubin and Berntsen (2003).  To examine 
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this issue, the present paper presents two experiments.  In Experiment 1, subjects listened 
to the biographies of fictional characters.  Audio recordings consisting of narratives 
delineating chronologically the events in the lives of two characters were played for 
participants, with one young character, for which the events from birth to approximately 
30 years of age are chronicled, and one old character, for which the events of the period 
from approximately 45 to 75 years of age are presented.   Life-event items varied in 
typicality based on whether they were consistent or inconsistent with the activities of a 
person that age.  After listening to the narratives, participants were given recognition tests 
both 10 minutes and 24 hours later containing items that were either presented in the 
source material or not.  Participants indicated whether the event was presented or not 
presented, whether they remembered, knew or inferred that it was presented, and if they 
marked remember, whether their memory included perceptual, thought, emotion, or 
context details.   
EXPERIMENT 1 
It is predicted that the findings from Experiment 1 will show that biographical 
information is affected similarly by typicality as other types of scripted information due 
to the activation of the cultural life script.  Participants will have significantly greater 
correct recognition for presented atypical, as opposed to presented typical, life-script 
events as well as significantly greater correct rejection for unpresented atypical, than 
unpresented typical, life-script events.  Additionally, for reports of the phenomenological 
experience of remembering typical versus atypical life-script events, it is predicted that 
significantly more remember judgments will be reported for atypical, rather than typical 
items, while conversely, significantly more know and infer judgments will be made for 
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typical, than atypical, events.  In addition, more memory details will be reported for 
atypical than typical events.   
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university participated 
in the experiment in exchange for extra credit in psychology courses.  The sample 
consisted of 27 males (42.2%) and 37 females (57.8%) ranging in age from 18 to 27 (M = 
19.89, SD = 1.77).   
MATERIALS 
The narratives used consisted of the events that occurred in periods of the 
characters’ lives.  The events were presented in chronological order.  The characters were 
a male named Steve and a female named Shelley.  Half of the participants heard stories in 
which Steve was young and Shelley was old, while the other half heard stories in which 
Shelly was young and Steve was old.  The events in the life of the young character 
occurred from birth to young adulthood, and those for the old character occurred from 
age 45 to age 75.   The study was developed with a fully counterbalanced design.  Eight 
versions of original narratives were created in order to account for the counterbalancing 
of three two-level factors: Item typicality (Typical, Atypical), item presentation 
(Presented, Unpresented), and character age and gender (Young Male & Old Female, 
Young Female & Old Male).  Sixteen recognition tests were created to account for the 
counterbalancing of four two-level factors: the above- mentioned factors of typicality, 
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presentation, and character age and gender, as well as the counterbalancing of delay (10 
min, 24 hr). The counterbalancing of delay was accomplished by giving half of the 
participants the recognition tests in one order, and the other half in the opposite order.  
Item typicality was counterbalanced by presenting every item in both young and old 
narratives, thereby using every item as typical and atypical.  The counterbalancing of 
item presentation was accomplished by making items presented to half the participants 
the unpresented items in the recognition tests of the other half of the participants.   
Manipulation Check 
The critical items were chosen from items rated on their typicality of occurring to 
either a young or old person.  Items used were taken from the list of important life events 
generated by participants in Berntsen and Rubin (2004, study 2). However, in some 
cases, events were rephrased to be more specific, such as changing, “serious disease” to 
“got cancer,” or “parent’s death” to “father’s death.” Table 1 lists the critical events and 
their level of typicality as a function of age of occurrence.  As a manipulation check, 40 
participants not in the experiment reported below rated items on a 7-point Likert scale 
with 1 being very atypical, and 7 being very typical.  Half of the items presented were 
predicted to be Typical Young/Atypical Old, and half predicted to be Typical 
Old/Atypical Young.  Subjects were randomly assigned to either a group judging the 
typicality of the events for a young person, or one judging the typicality of the events for 
an old person.    To examine the appropriateness of the items, a within-groups analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed on the judgment for young and judgment for old 
groups separately.  For the judgment for young group, there was a significant difference 
in the rating of expected young (M = 4.91, SD = .64) and expected old (M = 2.53, SD 
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=.69) items, F(1, 19) = 128.29, MSE = .44, p < .05, in which expected young items were 
rated significantly more typical for a young person than an old person .  For the judgment  
Table 1. 
Life Event Critical Items by Age and Typicality 
Event 
Young typical/Old atypical 
 
Get first job 
 
Earn first money 
 
Make first friend 
 
Graduate high school 
 
Go to school 
 
Leave parents' home 
 
First sexual experience 
 
Go to college 
Old typical/Young atypical 
 
Have grandchildren 
 
Significant other dies 
 
Has major surgery 
 
Is retired 
 
Sibling dies 
 
Develop serious/life threatening disease 
 
Parent dies 
  Empty nest 
 
for old group, there was a significant difference in the typicality rating of expected old (M 
= 5.78, SD = .48) and expected young (M = 2.14, SD = .56) items, F(1,19) = 423.52, MSE 
= .31, p < .05, in which expected old items were rated significantly more typical for an 
old person than a young person.   
Design  
 The experiment was implemented in a 2(Typicality: Typical, Atypical) X 
2(Presentation: Presented, Not Presented) X 2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age 
Group: Young, Old) within-subjects design.  The recognition tests contained eight 
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questions in each delay condition, 16 per participant.  All questions adhered to a similar 
general format such as, “was it stated or unstated that Steve fell in love for the first 
time?”  Follow-up questions followed the format of, “did you remember, know or infer 
that it was stated that Steve fell in love for the first time?” and “was your memory that 
Steve fell in love for the first time accompanied by perceptual, thought, emotion, or 
context details?” Question order was randomized for all participants in both delay 
conditions.  The experiment was conducted on personal computers with Microsoft 
Windows operating systems using Media Lab software. 
PROCEDURE 
Participants sat individually at computers with up to three participants per room.  
Participants listened to the narratives on headphones.  Upon completion of the narrative 
presentation, participants completed a distracter task of word search puzzles, after which 
they were informed that they would be tested for their memory of items presented in the 
narratives.  They were read test instructions by the experimenter then took the recognition 
test.  For each event referenced, the participants were asked three separate questions.   
First participants were asked if the event was stated or unstated in the narratives.  If they 
chose stated, they were next asked whether they remembered, knew, or inferred that it 
was stated in the narrative.  Finally, if they indicated remember, they were asked to 
indicate the presence of perception, thought, emotion, or context details with their 
memory.  Block randomization was used to randomize the order of the events being 
asked about, i.e.,  the order of the series of three questions was constant, but the order of 
events they were in reference to was randomized.  After completion of the 8 item 10 
minute delay condition test, participants returned at the same time the next day to 
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compete the 8 item 24 hour delay condition test.  The format of the recognition tests was 
identical in both delay conditions.  After completing the 24-hour delay condition, 
participants were debriefed. 
RESULTS 
The main goal of the current research is to determine if other findings concerning 
the effect of item typicality on memory for scripted information will be replicated using 
life-script information.  To that end, several key issues will be examined.  First, are the 
typicality effect’s two main predictions satisfied?   Is there superior correct recognition of 
age-atypical instead of age-typical, items, and superior correct rejection of atypical, rather 
than typical, items?  Secondly, the effects of item typicality and delay on the subjective 
experience of remembering scripted information will be investigated.  It is predicted that 
the subjective experience of remembering life-script events as a function of typicality will 
be similar to findings previously obtained with other types of scripted information.  To 
examine this question, the reporting of remember, know, and infer judgments as a 
function of item typicality and delay will be analyzed as well as the reporting of memory 
details as a function of typicality and delay.  Finally, analyses will be conducted to 
examine the reporting of remember, know, and infer judgments, as well as memory 
details, as a function of whether memories are true memories or false memories. 
 Correct and false recognition.  The effects of item typicality, delay interval, and 
age on  correct recognition of presented items were examined with a 2(Typicality: 
Typical, Atypical) X 2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) 
within-subjects, repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) (presented and 
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unpresented items are examined separately, so the factor of presentation is not included in 
these analyses).   
Figure 1 depicts mean correct and false recognition by typicality and delay 
interval.  There was a significant main effect of typicality, F(1, 63) = 4.37, MSE = .15, p 
< .05.  Significantly more atypical items (M = .82, SD = .19) were correctly recognized 
than typical items (M = .75, SD = .21), as would be expected with the typicality effect.   
 
There was also a significant main effect of delay interval, F(1, 63) = 11.90, MSE = .24, p 
< .005.  Significantly more items were correctly recognized at the 10 minute (M = .86, 
SD = .17), than at the 24 hour (M = .71, SD = .27), delay interval.  Contrary to 
predictions, the main effect of age group was also significant, F(1, 63) = 9.00, MSE = .17, 
p < .005.  Significantly more items were recognized when presented for the young (M = 
.84, SD = .20), as opposed to the old (M = .73, SD = .22), character.  The two-way 
interactions of typicality and delay, typicality and age group, delay and age group, and 
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Figure 1. Mean correct recognition as a function of typicality and 
delay interval 
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Atypical 
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the three-way interaction of typicality, delay, and age group, were all non-significant, p > 
.05.   
Next, the same analysis is conducted to examine the effects of item typicality, 
delay interval, and age group of the character the item was presented for on false  
recognition of unpresented items.  The 2(Typicality: Typical, Atypical) X 2(Delay 
Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) within-subjects, repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed that were several significant effects.  Figure 2 shows the mean false 
recognition as a function of typicality and delay interval.  First, there was a significant  
main effect of typicality, F(1, 63) = 16.84, MSE = .15, p < .001.  Significantly more 
typical (M = .22, SD = .27), than atypical (M = .08, SD = .15), items were falsely 
recognized, meeting the expectations of the typicality effect.  The main effect of delay  
 
was also significant, F(1, 63) = 6.80, MSE = .09, p < .05, demonstrating that significantly 
more unpresented items were falsely recognized at the 24 hour delay interval (M = .18,  
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Figure 2.  Mean false recognition as a function of typicality and 
delay interval 
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SD = .22), than at the 10 minute delay interval (M = .11, SD = .17).  The main effect of 
age group was not significant (p > .05), fulfilling the hypothesis that age group did not 
have an effect on false recognition.  The two-way interaction of typicality and delay 
approached significance, F(1, 63) = 3.94, MSE = .10, p = .05.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests 
reveal that three of the simple effects were significant.  There was a significant simple  
effect of delay interval for typical items, t(63) = 2.65, p < .05, in which significantly more 
typical unpresented items were falsely recognized at the 24 hour delay interval (M = .28, 
SD = .39) than at the 10 minute delay interval (M = .16, SD = .25).  There was also a 
simple effect of item typicality for unpresented items falsely recognized at the 10 minute 
delay interval, t(63) = 2.64, p < .05.  Significantly more typical (M = .16, SD = .25), than 
atypical (M = .07, SD = .18), unpresented items were falsely recognized, conforming to 
the expectations of the typicality effect.  Finally, there was a significant simple effect of 
item typicality on the falsely recognition of unpresented items at the 24 hour delay 
interval, t(63) = 3.69, p < .001.  Significantly more typical (M = .28, SD = .39), than 
atypical (M = .09, SD = .19), items were falsely recognized, as would be expected in the 
typicality effect.  The two way interaction of typicality by age group was significant, F(1, 
63) = 12.06, MSE = .09, p < .005.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests show that there was a 
significant simple effect of item typicality for events presented for the young character, 
t(63) = 4.71, p < .001.  Significantly more typical (M = .27, SD = .38) unpresented items 
were falsely recognized than atypical (M = .04, SD = .14) items, conforming to the 
expectations of the typicality effect.  There was a significant simple effect of age group 
for typical items, t(63) = 2.58, p < .05.  In an unexpected finding, significantly more 
typical items were falsely recognized when presented for the young (M = .27, SD = .38), 
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as opposed to the old (M = .16, SD = .24), character.  Finally, there was also a significant 
simple effect of age group on the false recognition of unpresented atypical items, t(63) = 
2.31, p < .05.  Significantly more unpresented atypical items were falsely recognized for 
the old (M = .12, SD = .25), than the young (M = .04, SD = .14), character, contrary to the 
prediction that age group of the character would have no effect on false recognition..   
Remember, know, and infer judgments.  In addition to testing for the typicality 
effect using stated versus unstated questions in the recognition test, the effect of typicality 
on participants’ tendencies to make remember, know, and infer judgments was also 
tested.  Previous findings have demonstrated the relation of item script typicality to the 
reporting of remember, know, and infer judgments (Lampinen et al., 2000). To assess the 
effects of typicality, delay interval, and age of the character for which the item was 
presented on participants remember judgments, a 2(Typicality: Typical, Atypical) X 
2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) within-groups, repeated 
measures factorial ANOVA was performed on presented items.  Remember judgments 
are a high-threshold judgment, indicating the presence of details for the actual encoding 
experience.  Therefore, it is predicted that more remember judgments will be made for 
atypical than typical items because of the extra processing involved in their encoding 
beyond that occurring for typical items, which are already inferred as part of the 
activated, underlying script.  There was a significant main effect of typicality, F(1, 63) = 
29.31, MSE = .123, p < .001.  In accord with the expectations of the typicality effect, 
significantly more remember judgments were made for atypical (M = .67, SD = .29), than 
typical (M = .50, SD = .26), items.  There was also a significant main effect of delay, F(1, 
63) = 8.17, MSE = .36, p < .01.  Significantly more items were remembered at the 10 
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minute (M = .66, SD = .32), than the 24 hour (M = .51, SD = .33), delay interval.  The 
third main effect, that for age of the character, was also significant, F(1, 63) = 5.27, MSE 
= .196, p < .05.  Significantly more remember judgments were made for items presented 
for the young (M = .63, SD = .30), than for the old (M = .54, SD = .29), character, 
contrary to the expectation that age of the character would not have an effect.  None of 
the two-way interactions, or the three-way interaction were significant at the p < .05 
level.   
The same analysis was next performed for participants know judgments.  Know 
judgments are indicative of a more subjective sense of knowing, rather than possessing 
explicit memory traces for actual details of the encoding experience.  Therefore, it is 
expected that more know judgments would be made for typical than atypical items 
because of the relative lack of processing associated with the encoding of items that are 
already inferred by the activated script.  There was a significant main effect of item 
typicality, F(1, 63) = 5.61, MSE = .13, p < .05.  As would be expected with the typicality 
effect, significantly more know judgments were made for typical (M = .20, SD = ), than 
atypical (M = .13, SD ), items.  There were no other significant effects in this analysis (all 
p > .05).  One surprising aspect of this is that, contrary to the findings, one would expect 
more know judgments to be made as delay interval increases, reflecting the decay of 
explicit memory details.  Finally, an analysis was conducted to examine the effect of 
typicality, delay interval, and age of the character on participants’ infer judgments.  The 
2(Typicality: Typical, Atypical) X 2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: 
Young, Old) within-groups, repeated measures factorial ANOVA showed that, contrary 
to the expectations of the typicality effect, there was no significant main effect of 
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typicality.  However, considering that the findings regarding remember and know 
judgments confirmed the expectations of the typicality effect, this finding does not 
indicate the lack of a typicality effect.   There was, however, a significant main effect of 
delay, F(1, 63) = 4.85, MSE = .026, p < .05.  As would be expected, significantly more 
infer judgments were made at the 24 hour delay (M = .05, SD = ) than at the 10 minute 
delay (M = .02, SD = ).  The two-way interaction of typicality and age group approached 
significance, F(1, 63) = 3.71, MSE = . 03, p = .06.  Follow-up pairwise comparisons show 
that only one of the four simple effects was significant.  For items presented for the 
young character in the narrative, significantly more infer judgments were made for 
typical (M = .06, SD = .17), than atypical (M = .01, SD = .06) items, t(63) = 2.42, p < .05.  
No other interactions were significant. 
Memory details.  To investigate the effects of typicality, delay, and the age of the 
character the item was presented for on the reporting of memory details, a 2(Typicality; 
Typical, Atypical) X 2 (Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) X 
4(Detail Type: Perceptual, Thought, Emotion, Context) within-groups ANOVA was 
performed analyzing presented items and using data from all participants who made at 
least one remember response per each condition (presented/typical, presented/atypical, 
unpresented/typical, unpresented/atypical).  There were several significant effects.  First, 
there was a significant main effect of typicality, F(1, 63) = 17.86, MSE = .10, p < .001.  
As would be expected with the typicality effect, significantly more details were reported 
for atypical (M = .32, SD = .17), than typical (M = .24, SD = .11), items.  There was also 
a significant main effect of detail type, F(1, 63) = 3.56, MSE = .38, p < .05.  Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons show that there were significantly more emotion (M = .35, SD = 
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.21) than perception (M = .20, SD = .23) details reported, t(63) = 2.62, p < .05, 
significantly more context (M = .33, SD = .27) than perception details were reported, 
t(63) = 2.36, p < .05, and significantly more emotion than thought (M = .23, SD = .21) 
details were reported, t(63) = 2.45, p < .05.  No other effects in the factorial ANOVA 
were significant at the p < .05 level. 
True versus false memories.  The rate at which remember judgments were made 
for true and false memories at either 10 minutes or 24 hrs was examined using a 2(Item 
Type: Hit, False Alarm) X 2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) 
within-groups, repeated measures factorial ANOVA.  There was a significant main effect 
of item type, F(1, 63) = 259.37, MSE = .57, p < .001.  Significantly more hits (M = 1.17, 
SD = .49) were made than false alarms (M = .10, SD = .20).  The main effect of delay 
approached significance, F(1, 63) = 3.75, MSE = .41, p = .057.  More remember 
judgments were made at 10 minutes (M = .69, SD = .33) than at 24 hours (M = .58, SD = 
.37).  The main effect of age group was also significant, F(1, 63) = 8.26, MSE = .24, p < 
.01.  Significantly more remember judgments were made for items presented for the 
younger (M = .70, SD = .34), as opposed to the older (M = .57, SD = .30), character.  
Only one of the interaction effects was significant, item type by delay, F(1, 63) = 11.67, 
MSE = .42, p < .005.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests reveal that there was a significant simple 
effect of delay interval for hits, t(63) = 2.86, p < .01.  As would be expected, significantly 
more hits were made at the 10 minute delay interval (M = 1.32, SD = .65) than at the 24 
hour delay interval (M = 1.02, SD = .66).  Conversely, significantly more false alarms 
were made at 24 hours (M = .14, SD = .32) than at 10 minutes (M = .06, SD = .18), as 
would be expected.  There were also significant simple effects of item type for both delay 
124 
 
intervals.  There were significantly more hits (M = 1.32, SD = .65) than false alarms (M = 
. 06, SD = .18) made at the 10 minute interval, t(63) = 15.06, p < .001,  and there were 
significantly more hits (M = 1.02, SD = .66) than false alarms (M =  .14, SD = .32) made 
at the 24 hour interval, t(63) = 9.60, p < .001.  The 2 way interactions of item type by age 
group and delay by age group, as well as the three-way interaction, were not significant at 
the p < .05 convention. 
Next, the effect of item type, delay, and age of the character in which the item 
was presented on the reporting of memory details.  Therefore, a 2(Item type: Hit, False 
Alarm) X 2(Delay Interval: 10 min, 24 hr) X 2(Age Group: Young, Old) X 4(Detail 
Type: Perception, Thought, Emotion, Context) within-groups, repeated measures factorial 
ANOVA was performed utilizing all cases where participants had both a hit and false 
alarm in each delay condition.  There was a significant main effect of item type, F(1, 19) 
= 39.49, MSE = .52, p < .001, wherein significantly more details were reported for hits 
(M = .41, SD = .27) than false alarms (M = .07, SD = .09).  There was also a significant 
two way interaction of detail and item type, F(3, 57) = 3.40, MSE = .18, p < .05  Follow-
up pairwise t-test show that for all detail types, more were reported for hits than for false 
alarms.  There were significantly more perception details reported for hits (M = .30, SD 
=.33) than false alarms (M = 0.3, SD = .08), t(19) = 3.69, p < .005.  There were 
significantly more thought details reported for hits (M = .31, SD = .36) than for false 
alarms (M = .08, SD = .14), t(19) = 3.05, p < .01.  There were significantly more emotion 
details reported for hits (M = .58, SD = .40) than for false alarms (M = .06, SD = .11), 
t(19) = 6.25, p < .001.  Finally, there were more context details reported for hits (M = .45, 
SD = .52) than for false alarms (M = .10, SD = .24), t(19) = 3.99, p < .005.  There was a 
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significant simple effect of detail for hits in which significantly more emotion details (M 
= .58, SD = .40) were reported than perception details (M = .30, SD = .33), t(19) = 3.40, p 
< .005.  There was also a significant simple effect of detail for hits in which significantly 
more emotion details were reported for hits than thought (M = .31, SD = .36) details, 
t(19) = 2.99, p < .01.  No other pairwise comparisons were significant (p > .05).  The 
two-way  interaction of detail by delay approached significance, F(3, 57) = 2.56, MSE = 
.17, p = .06.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests show that only three significant simple effects 
could be found.  There was a significant simple effect of detail type for the 24-hour delay 
interval in which significantly more emotion (M = ..38, SD = .33) than perception (M = 
.10, SD = .17), details were reported, t(19) = 3.58, p < .005.  Another significant simple 
effect of detail type occurred for the 24 hour delay condition in which significantly more 
context (M = .31, SD = .46), than perception, details were reported, t(19) = 2.10, p = .05.  
Finally, another simple effect of detail type for the 24 hour delay interval was found in 
which significantly more emotion details were reported than thought (M = .20, SD = .29) 
details, t(19) = 2.21, p < .05.  No other effects in the factorial ANOVA were significant. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings demonstrate that with regard to correct and false recognition, 
as well as effects on the phenomenological experience of remembering, the expectations 
of the typicality effect were observed,.  The results suggest that, as with other forms of 
scripted information, the typicality effect also occurs with biographical information, and 
that they are a script similar to those previously used to test the typicality effect. Life 
events that were not age appropriate, therefore constituting violations in the cultural life 
script, were correctly recognized significantly better than those that were script typical.  
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According to the attention elaboration and script pointer+tag hypotheses, these events 
attracted greater attention resulting in increased depth of processing and were stored 
explicitly as functionally separate from the cultural life script, respectively.  Life events 
that were typical on the other hand were recognized falsely significantly more than those 
that were atypical because, according to the script pointer + tag hypothesis, they are part 
of the activated script, and therefore indistinguishable from those events explicitly stated 
in the source material. 
 In accord with the expectations of the typicality effect for remember, know and 
infer judgments based on the Dynamic Memory Model (DMM), significantly more 
remember judgments were made for atypical, rather than typical items, and more know 
judgments for typical items.  Additionally, significantly more memory details were 
reported for atypical as opposed to typical events, as would be expected.  In attracting 
greater depth of processing from requiring additional attention to reconcile their out-of-
place occurrence, age inappropriate, cultural life script violating events generate more 
thought details than script typical events, which do not attract those processes. 
 One of the goals of the analyses was to demonstrate that age of the character did 
not contribute to the observed effects.  To that end, age of the character for which an item 
was presented was included as a factor in the analyses.  It was expected that the null 
hypothesis would be supported in all cases, i.e., there are no effects of age of the 
character.  Surprisingly, this was not the case in some instances, such as correct 
recognition, remember judgments, and hits versus false alarms.  With regard to correct 
recognition, significantly more items were correctly recognized for items presented for 
the young, than for the old, character.  In other cases, there was no significant main effect 
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of age group but there were significant two-way interactions involving age group, such as 
with the interaction of item typical and age group on infer judgments.  In several of the 
cases, the follow-up pairwise comparisons support the expectations of the typicality 
effect and involved examples where for either the young or the older character, the 
typicality effect was observed.  With regard to false recognition, the main effect of age 
group was not significant, but there was a significant interaction of typicality and age 
group.  One of the follow-up comparisons conforms to the expectations of the typicality 
effect, that for items presented for the young character, typical items were falsely 
recognized significantly more than atypical items.  Overall, when effects of age group 
were observed, they tended to demonstrate superior memory for items presented for the 
young, rather than the old, character.  For instance, correct recognition and remember 
judgments were significantly higher for items presented for the younger character.  One 
possibility is that this effect is related to the relatively young age of the sample, who are 
college undergraduates.   It may be that participants remembered better events occurring 
to a character to which they could relate more.  In addition to differences based on age of 
the character, it might also be the case that the observed effects were not the result of 
item typicality, but the emotional valence or importance of the events used as critical 
items, as these were not counterbalanced.  Potentially, emotionally positive events were 
better remembered than emotionally negative ones, or vice versa.   Similarly, it may also 
be the case that highly important events were remembered better than unimportant 
events.  No ratings of importance were obtained in the pretest condition for the critical 
items used.  As it stands, it is currently unclear as to whether the observed effects in 
Experiment 1 are truly a result of item typicality, or due to differential memorability of 
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items based on these factors.  Therefore, a second experiment in which these possibilities 
are examined is reported. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The findings from Experiment 1 demonstrated that the typicality effect, a highly 
robust effect that has been found to occur with scripted information, also occurs with 
cultural life script information.  When examining recognition memory for events varying 
in typicality as a function of whether or not they are age appropriate, correct recognition 
was better for atypical than typical, events.  In addition, false recognition was better for 
typical, than atypical, events, as would be expected by the predictions of the typicality 
effect.  In order to add support and present convergent evidence to the findings from 
Experiment 1 a second experiment was conducted.  The goal of Experiment 2 is to 
demonstrate that the observed effects in Experiment 1 are due to typicality, not confounds 
such as the differential memorability of events due to age at which they were presented, 
importance, or emotional valence.  In order to eliminate any potential confound with 
importance, that variable was held constant.  The non-scripted life events used as critical 
items were all rated highly important in a pretest condition.   Furthermore, the results of 
the pretest condition demonstrate that the critical items are unscripted life events.  The 
standard deviations for the estimated ages at which the events are expected to occur were 
all high compared to life script events in test of the life script (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; 
Rubin et al., 2009; Janssen & Rubin, 2011).   In the current experiment, participants 
listened to brief biographies of fictional characters in which non-scripted events (i.e., 
those that do not have prescribed timings of occurrence) varying in emotional valence 
were presented in youth and old age.  It is predicted that there will be no effect of age of 
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the character for which items are presented and emotional valence of the items.  There 
will be no differences in correct recognition, the conditional probabilities of making 
remember, know, and infer judgments, and the reporting of memory details.  Null effects 
should be observed across all of the analyses. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university participated 
in exchange for extra credit in psychology courses.  The sample consisted of 38 (59.4%) 
females and 26 (40.6%) males with a mean age of 20.11 (SD = 1.78, range = 18 to 29). 
MATERIALS 
The experimental materials consisted of a script outlining the lives of two 
individuals, one male and one female that covered their lives from childhood to old age.  
The script was presented as an audio file that participants listened to on headphones.  In 
addition to listening to the recordings, participants completed a word search puzzle (as a 
distracter task) and the recognition questionnaire.  The entire procedure was implemented 
on  a personal computer using Media Lab software.  The order in which the character’s 
stories were presented was counterbalanced, so that 50% of participants heard them in 
one order and 50% heard them in the other order.  The study used 16 critical items, all of 
which were unscripted life events.  As opposed to life script events, which have strongly 
agreed upon timings, unscripted life events are ones that do not have agreed upon 
timings.  The lack of agreement on the timings of the critical items was established in the 
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pretest condition using the same measure of agreement used in script generations 
procedures (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin et al., 2009; Janssen & Rubin, 2011).  The 
high standard deviations for age estimates demonstrate the lack of agreement on the 
timings of the unscripted life events used as critical items.  Of these 16 unscripted events, 
eight were emotionally positive and eight were emotionally negative.  A 
counterbalancing scheme was utilized to so that each item presented, unpresented, 
presented in youth, and presented in old age.  In addition, half of the participants received 
the narrative with  the male character first and half received the narrative with the female 
character first.  In total, 16 versions of the script were used.  Participants always heard 
eight items presented in the narratives, and were subsequently tested for their recognition 
of all 16 of the critical items in study in the recognition test. 
Manipulation Check  
Study 2 tests to make sure that no differences in the recognition of unscripted life 
events occurs as a function of emotional valence and age of the character the item is 
presented for.  To that end, a pretest condition was run to obtain unscripted life events for 
the critical items.  Unscripted life events are those whose timings of occurrence are 
poorly agreed upon as demonstrated by high standard deviations for their age estimates.  
Studies such as those by Berntsen and Rubin (2004), Erdoğan  et al. (2008), Rubin et al., 
(2009), and Janssen and Rubin (2011) employed script generation procedures in which  
participants nominated the seven events most likely to happen in a hypothetical person’s 
life to test the presence of a shared script.  For the present study, participants provide the 
same ratings as participants in those previous studies, but instead of generating seven 
items on their own, they provided ratings on specific life events.  From those events, 
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those with high standard deviations for their age estimates, which could reasonably be fit 
into the biography of a fictional character, were used as critical items.  Ratings of 
emotional valence were made on a 7-point scale (-3 = very negative, 0 = neither, +3 = 
very positive).  Events rated -1 through -3 were classified as negative and event rated 1 
through 3 were classified as positive.  Emotionally positive events with high standard 
deviations for their age estimates chosen for critical items were “settle on a career,” “go 
on a trip,” “go to a wedding,” “move,” “get a promotion,” “have a major 
accomplishment,” “get a raise,” and “have a life changing experience.” Emotionally 
negative events with high standard deviations for their age estimates chosen for critical 
items were “car accident,” “divorce,” “lose one’s job,” “miss a major opportunity,” “end 
a friendship,” “have a big fight,” “have legal problems,” and “problems at work.”  A one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that there was no difference in the expected 
age of occurrence for emotionally positive (M = 22.59, SD = 5.68) and negative (M = 
23.80, SD = 7.15) events, p < .05.  The mean standard deviation for the age estimates of 
these items was 8.03, which indicates that, on average, the timings of occurrence for 
these items are not strongly agreed upon.  A one-way ANOVA shows that there is no 
significant difference in the scriptedness (standard deviations of the age estimates) of 
items between the emotionally positive (M = 8.08, SD = 1.72) and emotionally negative 
(M = 7.98, SD = 3.03) events, F(1, 14) = .01, MSE = 6.06, p = .93, p = . 05, 
demonstrating that the critical items from each group are equally unscripted.   
PROCEDURE 
Participants were told that they would be participating in an impression formation 
experiment and that they would listen to stories about people’s lives then subsequently 
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answer questions about the material to which they listened.  Participants were seated 
individually at personal computers in rooms that could accommodate up to three people, 
so one to three people completed the procedure at a time.  Participants began the study by 
completing a brief demographics questionnaire in which they reported their age and 
gender.  Next, they were presented the instructions for the audio portion.  Participants  
were instructed to put on their headphones and the narratives were played.  After the 
narratives ended, the instructions on the computer screen indicated that the participants 
would engage in a timed task.  A computer-based word search puzzle was then presented 
which required participants to find as many hidden words as possible.  The word search 
task lasted 15 minutes, at the end of which the recognition test instructions were 
presented.  After reading the instructions, participants completed the recognition test.  
After completing the recognition test, the procedure was over. 
RESULTS 
Correct recognition. As the findings from Study 1 demonstrated that the typicality 
effect occurred for cultural life script information, the goal of the current study is to 
demonstrate that those effects were not due to confounds with emotion and age of the 
character.  To that end, it is expected that the present experiment will demonstrate that 
the typicality effect does not occur with unscripted events varying in emotional valence 
and presented occurring to characters of different ages. To examines this, a series of 
within groups, repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted using 
the factors of Age of Character: (Young, Old) and Emotional Valence (Positive, 
Negative) to examine correct recognition, the reporting of remember, know, and infer 
judgments, memory details, and hits versus false alarms.  It is expected that for all of 
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these analyses, the null hypothesis will not be rejected, i.e., there will be no effects of age 
of the character or emotional valence of the event.  Note that age can only be assigned to 
presented items based on their placement in the narrative.  Likewise, it is not possible to 
include age of the character in examinations of hits versus false alarms.  Therefore, it is 
not possible to test false recognition of unpresented items with age as a factor.   
First, a 2(Age of Character: Young, Old) X 2(Emotional Valence: Positive, 
Negative) within-groups, repeated measures factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine 
correct recognition of presented items.  As expected, there was no significant main effect 
of emotion, F(1, 63) = .73, MSE = .26, p = .40, observed power = .13.  In addition, as 
expected, there was no significant main effect of age of the character, F(1, 63) = .69, 
MSE = .28, p = .41, observed power = .13.  However, an unexpected finding was 
observed in that there was a significant two way interaction of emotion and age group, 
F(1, 63) = 10.05, MSE = .24, p < .005.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests reveal that there was a 
significant simple effect of emotion for items presented for the old character, t(63) = 
2.65, p < .05.  Significantly more positive (M = 1.75, SD = .47) items were correctly 
recognized than negative ones (M = 1.50, SD = .64) when presented for the older 
character.  There was also a significant simple effect of age for negative items, t(63) = 
2.65, p < .05.  Significantly more negative items were correctly recognized when 
presented for the young (M = 1.75, SD = .47), as opposed to the old (M = 1.50, SD = .64), 
character.   
Remember, know, and infer judgments.  Next, the effects of emotional valence of 
items and the age of the character on participants’ tendencies to make remember, know, 
and infer judgments is examined.  First, the 2(Age of Character: Young, Old) X 
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2(Emotional Valence: Positive, Negative) within-groups, repeated measures factorial 
ANOVA was conducted to examine remember judgments.  As expected, neither the main 
effect of emotion, F(1, 63) = .16, MSE = .39, p = .69, observed power = .07, nor the main 
effect of age, F(1, 63) = .32, MSE = .43, p = .57, observed power = .09, were significant.  
Similar to what was observed with correct recognition, there was a significant two way 
interaction of emotion and age of the character, F(1, 63) = 4.29, MSE = .36, p < .05.  
However, none of the pairwise follow-up t-tests were significant.  The same analysis was 
next conducted to examine know judgments.  Neither the main effects of emotion, F(1, 
63) = .90, MSE = .16, p = .35, observed power = .15, nor age of the character, F(1, 63) = 
.09, MSE = .17, p = .77, observed power = .06, were statistically significant, as was the 
two-way interaction of emotion and age of the character, F(1, 63) = 1.47, MSE = .17, p = 
.23, observed power = .22.  A similar pattern was observed for participants infer 
judgments.  The 2(Age of Character: Young, Old) X 2(Emotional Valence: Positive, 
Negative) within-groups, repeated measures factorial ANOVA showed that there was no 
significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 63) = 2.32, MSE = .04, p = .13, observed power = 
.32, no significant main effect of age of the character, F(1, 63) = .60, MSE = .06, p = .44, 
observed power = .12, and no significant two way interaction of emotion and age of the 
character, F(1, 63) = .82, MSE = .04, p = .370, observed power = .14. 
Memory details.  To investigate the effects of emotion and age of the character on 
the reporting of memory details, a 2(Emotion: Positive, Young) X 2 (Character Age: 
Young, Old) X 4(Detail Type: Perceptual, Thought, Emotion, Context) within-groups 
ANOVA was performed analyzing presented items and using data from all participants 
who made at least one remember response per each condition (positive/young, 
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negative/young, positive/old, and negative/old).  As expected, the main effects of 
emotion, F(1, 12) = 2.51, MSE = .07, p =.14, observed power = .31, and age of the 
character, F(1, 12) = .19, MSE = .10, p = .67, observed power = .07, were not significant.  
The main effect of detail was significant, however, F(3, 26) = 53.97, MSE = .48, p < 
.001.  Follow-up pairwise t-tests show that there was significantly more perceptual details 
reported than all other detail types (thought, emotion, and context).  Examples of 
perceptual details presented to participants in the instructions include remembering the 
intonation of the speaker’s voice, remembering the loudness or softness of the speaker’s 
voice, remembering that the speaker mispronounced something, or hearing the statement 
again in one’s mind.  Significantly more perceptual (M = 1.63, SD = .28) details were 
reported than thought details (M = .29, SD = .32), t(12) = 10.49, p < .001, emotion details 
(M = .17, SD = .24), t(12) = 13.88, p < .001, and contextual details (M = .21, SD = .50).  
No other simple effects were significant in the follow-up pairwise comparisons.  There 
were no other significant effects in the factorial ANOVA.  However, the two-way 
interaction of emotion and detail approached significance, F(3, 36) = 2.71, MSE = .22, p 
= .06.  Follow-up pairwise comparisons reveal that all significant simple effects were 
instances of significantly more perceptual details being reported than other detail types, 
mirroring the main effect of details.  For events that were emotionally positive, 
significantly more perceptual (M = 1.54, SD = .38) were reported than thought details (M 
= .39, SD = .42), t(12) = 6.65, p < .001, significantly more perceptual details were 
reported than emotion details (M = .04, SD = .14), t(12) = 11.85, p < .001, and contextual 
details (M = .23, SD = .48), t(12) = 6.28, p < .001.  For events that were emotionally 
positive, significantly more perceptual (M = 1.73, SD = .33) than thought (M = .19, SD = 
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.33) details, t(12) = 9.95, p < .001,  emotion (M = .31, SD = .48) details , t(12) = 8.97, p < 
.001, and  contextual (M = .19, SD = .33) details were reported, t(12) = 9.34, p <.001.  No 
other simple effects in the follow-up t-tests were significant at the p < .05 level.  
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings of Experiment 2 are mixed.  There were no significant main 
effects of age and emotion, as was predicted.  However, an unexpected finding was the 
occurrence of a significant interaction effect of correct recognition between age and 
emotion.  Follow-up analyses revealed that correct recognition for emotionally negative 
events presented in youth was significantly better than for those presented in old age, and 
that correct recognition was significantly better for emotionally positive events presented 
in old age than for emotionally negative events.  There are potentially two interpretations 
of these findings.  One is that they support the cultural life script account in that cultural 
life scripts, which tend to cluster emotionally positive events in adolescence and young 
adulthood and place emotionally negative events after age 30 (Janssen & Rubin, 2011), 
are being activated and the occurrence of emotionally negative events in youth or positive 
events in old age registered as script violations, thus making them more memorable.  The 
other is that this type of violation does not require a life script entailing prescribed slots 
and timings for specific events.  Instead, the effect could be driven by a general 
impression of the tendency for events of one emotional valence to be more closely 
associated with one lifetime period than another, i.e., emotionally positive events with 
youth and emotionally negative events with old age.  However, this general impression 
could be related to life script knowledge. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A substantial body of research has demonstrated that the typicality effect occurs 
with memory for scripted information.  Ostensibly, the typicality effect should be elicited 
with all forms of script-based information.  One particular form of scripted information, 
life-scripts—those delineating the normative timing and order for the occurrence of life 
events—have come into prominence recently because evidence shows they provide a 
parsimonious and well-supported account of the reminiscence bump in distributions of 
recalled emotional autobiographical memories.   However, as it stands, several alternative 
accounts of the reminiscence effect have merit, such as the narrative/identity account 
(Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and cognitive account 
(Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998).  In this account narrative identity account,  memories 
from adolescence have  a privileged status because they occur during a time in which one 
develops a stable sense of identity.  The cognitive account (Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 
1998) attributed the reminiscence effect to the retention of memories for the positive 
events of adolescence and young adulthood  that benefit from the stable period that 
follows them.  During this stable period,  memories of positive events from adolescence 
are rehearsed more than normal or negative events, which are minimally, or not at all 
rehearsed.  With these viable alternative hypotheses available, the contention is present 
among some that there are better accounts of the occurrence of the “bump” than that of 
life-scripts and one line of argument is that perhaps life-scripts do not exist at all, 
illustrating the need for added evidence.  Support for the existence of life-scripts derived 
from the study of the bump in distributions of recalled emotional memories has been 
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obtained, but direct support for the existence of life-scripts independent of said evidence, 
has not, thus far. 
Through two experiments, the current research attempts to provide novel evidence 
for the existence of life script.  However, the findings only offer mild support for the 
premise that life scripts are a fundamentally similar form of script as other, previously 
tested scripts, such as those examined by Bower et al. (1979) and Graesser et al. (1979).  
Utilizing narratives chronicling the events of the lives of either a young person or an old 
person and critical items that varied in typicality as a function of their likelihood of 
occurring to a person of a certain age, the findings from Experiment 1 replicate previous 
experiments testing the typicality effect  with life scripts.   Participants in Experiment 1 
demonstrated superior correct recognition of atypical presented items compared to typical 
ones, superior correct rejection of atypical  unpresented items compared to typical ones, 
and a tendency to recognize falsely typical unpresented items more than atypical ones.  In 
doing so, the findings fully support  all of the predictions of the typicality effect (Bower, 
et al., 1979, Graesser et al., 1979).  The Script Pointer + Tag (SP+T) hypothesis  asserts 
that atypical information is explicitly stored as a functionally separate unit from the 
underlying script,  of which it is not a part, whereas typical items need not be explicitly 
stored, because of their inclusion in the script.  This results in a virtual “privileged” status 
for atypical information, whereby it is better recalled.  As applied to a life-script, this 
would mean that a normally occurring event, such as high school graduation for a 
teenager of 17 or 18 years of age, would not elicit deep processing and would not have to 
be separately stored, because, as a normally occurring part of the activated script, its 
occurrence is inferred automatically.    Alternatively, encountering the statement that 
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someone developed cancer in adolescence or young adulthood would not be part of the 
underlying script for young life, constituting a script violation,  and it would be stored 
separately and explicitly, thus facilitating its future ease of retrieval.  Similar effects 
could be found using a script for old age, where an event such as retirement would be 
typical and part of an underlying script, and an event such as falling in love for the first 
time would constitute a script violation.   
In addition to the replication of the typicality effect, another class of evidence 
supporting the existence of life-scripts in memory was obtained in Experiment 1: The 
replication of findings regarding differences in the subjective experience of remembering 
scripted information as a function of item typicality and delay.  The results of the current 
study show that participants are more likely to make remember judgments for atypical, 
rather than typical, life-script events, as was the case in previous studies using other types 
of scripted information, and that the findings regarding participants’ know judgments for 
life-script events also replicate those previously obtained with other types of scripted 
information:  Over all, there were significantly more know judgments made for typical, 
rather than atypical, events.  Surprisingly, contrary to expectations, there were not 
significantly more infer judgments made for typical than atypical items, as has been 
observed in previous research.  However, on the basis that both know and infer 
judgments represent a lack of explicit details for the encoding experience, they can 
reasonably be combined, in which case they are collectively made significantly more 
often for typical life-script events than atypical ones.  
Experiment 1 also replicates findings regarding the reporting of memory details as 
a function of item typicality.  The results show that as with other types of scripted 
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information, more memory details are reported more often for atypical, than typical, 
items.  The Dynamic Memory Model (DMM) (Schank, 1982) accounts for differences in 
the subjective experience of remembering scripted information as a function of typicality.  
The DMM states that when atypical items are encountered in scripted information, they 
require greater processing resources to reconcile their unexpected occurrence in the 
activated scripts, resulting in more experientially vivid memories that entail information 
about the encounter with the script-violation.   In fact, the results of the current study 
show that, in accord with the predictions of the DMM, more memory details were 
reported for atypical, rather than typical, items, replicating previous findings, and 
demonstrating further the similarities between life scripts and other scripts.  Additionally,  
and as predicted, significantly more perceptual details were reported at the 10 minute, 
than at the 24 hour, interval, reflecting the expected decrease in memory traces from the 
actual encoding experience as retention interval increases.  In addition, there were 
significantly more reports of all other detail types than perceptual ones after 24 hours, 
indicative of the decay of memory traces of the actual encoding experience represented 
by perceptual details over time.   
In terms of the findings regarding the differential reporting of memory detail 
types, there was one unique consequence of the investigation of life-scripts information 
not found with other types of scripted information.  This distinction was the inclusion of 
material that is of a significantly more emotional nature than that in previous script based 
experiments.  This resulted in distinct patterns of reports of emotional details relative to 
prior research.  Whereas previous studies utilized scripts with relatively non-emotion 
evoking events such as the activities of a young man named Jack as he goes though fairly 
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mundane daily routines (Graesser, et al., 1980, Lampinen et al., 2000), the current 
research employs such emotional life events as births, deaths, serious illness, etc.  
Moreover, these effects were frequently compounded by the script atypical placement of 
the events.  The resulting effect was that emotion details were reported more than all 
other detail types—a stark contrast to the findings of Lampinen et al. (2000) in which 
emotion  details were reported the least (p. 549). Emotion details would likely be a salient 
aspect of the “encounter” with an item within a script, and therefore could be stored as a 
trace of the encoding experience, in which case they would decay at a faster rate than 
inferential information, which would supplant actual memory traces as time elapses since 
encoding.  However, there is also the potential for an emotional response to the 
recognition test item as well.   Emotion details should more likely be reported for 
atypical, rather than typical, emotionally evocative events, because of the explicit 
processing of them at encoding, which is more common with atypical items.  
Additionally, more emotional details should be reported for atypical items because of 
their increased emotional impact, especially when they are negative, as in such cases as 
the occurrence of cancer in youth, which may be seen as more tragic than when occurring 
in old age.  Conforming to this prediction, there were more emotion details reported for 
atypical than typical items, though this follow-up pairwise comparison was not presented 
because the 2-way interaction of typicality by detail was not significant at conventional p 
< .05 levels.   
While the research hypotheses in Experiment 1were supported, and the typicality 
effect was observed, there exists some potential caveats to those findings.  It may be the 
case that the observed effects were attributable to the confounding of typicality with the 
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emotional valence and importance of items.  In order to address these concerns, 
Experiment 2 was conducted.  In Experiment 2, we tested recognition memory for 
unscripted life events varying in emotion and presented as occurring to both old and 
young characters.  In addition, importance was held constant, as pre-test data 
demonstrated a consistent tendency for participants to rate all tested life events as 
relatively high in importance.  It was predicted that there would be no significant 
differences as a function of emotional valence of the items or the age of the character for 
which it was presented.  While there was no significant main effect of emotion or 
character age, as predicted, there was however, a significant interaction effect of emotion 
and character age.  Follow-up analyses revealed that, for the older character, significantly 
more positive items were correctly recognized than negative ones, while significantly 
more negative items were correctly recognized when presented for the younger, than for 
the older, character. 
The observed pattern of superior correct recognition is similar to what one would 
expect to occur with the typicality effect based on life scripts.  Two of the key properties 
of the life script are that it favors the period of adolescence to young adulthood (ages 10 
to 30), and is biased towards emotionally positive events, therefore representing an 
idealized life. Alternatively, most negative events are expected to occur after age 30.  
Superior correct recognition of emotionally positive events for an older character seems 
to indicate an effect of atypicality that reflects the relation between emotional valence 
and lifetime periods in the life script.  So too does superior recognition of emotionally 
negative items for a younger character.  However, these findings occurred with 
unscripted events, for which the typicality effect is not expected to occur.  That such 
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associations between age and emotional valence are made without prescribed event 
timings suggests the possibility that, instead of the typicality effect occurring based on 
scripts, the typicality effect occurred based these associations.  Moreover, the possibility 
that the typicality effect occurred based on such association rather than from scripts may 
extend to the findings from  Experiment 1 as well.  Such associations may be a form of 
knowledge in semantic memory, possibly a schema, which associates youth with 
emotionally positive events and old age with emotionally negative ones.  Extensive 
research has demonstrated that schemas provide generic representations that indicate 
closely related items or concepts that are its constituents (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  
Ostensibly, such a schema may be derived from the life script, and result in a more 
abstract representation of the lifecourse.  However, if the findings of Experiment 2 are 
due to such knowledge, this finding does not preclude the possibility that the typicality 
effect can occur with life scripts.  For instance, additional testing might reveal that the 
typicality effect occurs with violations of the order of events in a procedure in which 
emotion is held constant.   
While the findings of Experiment 1 mostly demonstrated a tendency for the 
typicality effect to occur, their interpretability is affected by the mixed findings of 
Experiment 2.   Overall, the findings of the present study failed to provide clear evidence 
that the life script is represented in memory in the same way as other types of scripts 
previously examined in tests of the typicality effect.  Further research is required to 
determine if the claims in the cultural life script account about the manner in which life 
scripts are represented in memory are supported, as the findings from the current research 
neither conclusively support, nor contradict, them. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIFE STORY EVENTS COMPOSE THE REMINISCENCE BUMP IN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHCIAL MEMORY RECALL
4
 
ABSTRACT 
A sample of 111 undergraduates reported 3,670 autobiographical memories occurring 
between the ages of 8 and 18.  Participants rated their memories on qualities indicative of 
life-story-event status, such as emotional valence, importance to identity development, 
perceived control and importance.  Consistent with the cultural life script and life story 
accounts of the reminiscence effect, the upward-sloping component of the reminiscence 
bump up to age 18 was evident in the distribution of positive, but not negative, emotional 
memories.   In accordance with the expectations of the life story account, the upward-
sloping component of the bump was evident for life story events, but not for non-life 
story events.  Dissociations were clearly evident, wherein the distributions of life story 
events increased linearly across the examined period, peaking at age 18, whereas the 
distributions of non-life story events were relatively flat.  Furthermore, it was shown that 
an event’s being emotionally positive in and of itself is not sufficient to produce a 
reminiscence bump—the bump was only evident for memories of events that were both 
emotionally positive and met other life story event criteria.  The findings support the life 
story account of the reminiscence effect, as described by Glück and Bluck (2007). 
                                                 
4
 Coleman, J. T. (2012). Life story events compose the reminiscence bump in 
autobiographical memory recall.  Manuscript invited for resubmission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In autobiographical memory research, a primary focus is to examine what 
memories are most likely to be recalled in a given situation, task, or when using certain 
autobiographical cues.  Research has examined a temporal component, wherein it can be 
predicted from which lifetime period certain memories mostly come, and a qualitative 
component, in that predictions can be made about the types of memories that will be 
remembered based on factors such as their emotional valence and cultural and personal 
significance.  Interest in the temporal distribution of autobiographical recall increased 
after the discovery of the reminiscence effect by Rubin, Wetzler, and Nebes in 1986.  It 
was previously assumed that individuals simply recalled most memories from the recent 
past and fewer from the remote past, a pattern characterized by a monotonically 
decreasing retention function.  Contrary to that belief, Rubin et al. observed that there 
was a reminiscence effect or “bump” in the distribution of memories across the lifespan, 
in which individuals over age 40 recall disproportionately more memories from between 
ages 10 and 30 than from adjacent lifetime periods.  Numerous subsequent studies over 
the last several decades have replicated that finding across a variety of situations, 
including investigations with different populations (e.g., cultures) and using various 
cueing techniques.   
The reminiscence effect has been observed in samples from disparate cultures 
including Bangladesh (Conway & Haque, 1999; Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 
2005), China (Conway et al., 2005), Japan (Conway et al., 2005; Kawasaki, Janssen, & 
Inoue, 2011), England (Conway et al., 2005), the United States (Conway et al., 2005; 
Collins, Pillemer, Ivcevic, & Gooze, 2007), Denmark (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Rubin & 
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Berntsen, 2003), Austria (Glück & Bluck, 2007), Turkey (Demiray, Gülgöz, & Bluck, 
2009), and the Netherlands (Janssen, Rubin, & Conway, 2011; Janssen, Rubin, & St. 
Jacques).  The effect has been elicited using word-cue techniques (Jansari & Parkin, 
1996; Conway & Haque, 1999; Janssen et al., 2011; Kawasaki et al., 2011) cues to 
general affective states (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Collins et al., 
2007), requests for specific memories (Conway et al., 2005), requests for individuals’ 
most important personal memories (Glück & Bluck, 2007), and unrestricted free recall 
(Demiray et al., 2009).  The presence of reminiscence bumps has even  been found in 
lifespan distributions of when participants encountered their favorite books, movies, and 
records (Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2007), and for the timing of the careers of 
individuals’ favorite football (soccer) players relative to their lives (Janssen, Rubin, & 
Conway, 2011).  The reminiscence effect has also been observed in the distributions of 
recalled memories from young adults when employing a technique for removing the 
recency effect (Kawasaki et al., 2011).  In addition to findings regarding the 
preponderance of memories from between adolescence and young adulthood, findings 
have also shown that memory for public events and names from the bump period is better 
than that from other lifetime periods (Belli, Schuman, & Jackson, 1997).  Currently, the 
reminiscence effect is considered, along with childhood amnesia and the recency effect, 
to be one of the most robust effects in autobiographical memory (Conway & Rubin, 
1993), and to constitute one of the key characteristics of the lifespan retrieval curve, 
which is characterized by the combination of those three effects (Conway et al., 2005).   
More recently, findings by Berntsen and Rubin (2002) regarding the qualities of 
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memories comprising the reminiscence bump have led to the development of prominent 
accounts of the reminiscence effect that are gaining substantial support for their claims. 
 Berntsen and Rubin (2002) found that a dissociation occurs in the lifespan 
distributions of recalled emotional memories as a function of emotional valence wherein 
the reminiscence effect occurs for highly positive, but not highly negative, emotional 
memories.  These findings were replicated with similar procedures by Rubin and 
Berntsen (2003) and Collins et al. (2007), who examined separately the autobiographical 
recall of both college students and adults.  Subsequently, current prominent accounts of 
the reminiscence effect, such as the cultural life scripts (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) and the 
life story (Glück & Bluck, 2007) accounts have been developed to explain this 
dissociation.  These complimentary accounts predict the timing across the lifespan of 
recalled emotional memories, based on their cultural and personal significance, 
respectively.  As they are complementary, tests of the life story account have also 
replicated the findings obtained by Berntsen and Rubin (2002).  In this paper, the life 
story account of the reminiscence effect is tested.   
The current study examines the autobiographical recall of U.S. undergraduate 
students to determine if a dissociation is evident between the temporal distributions of 
life story and non-life story events using an indicators of life story event status life story 
event qualities not previously examined in existing tests of the life story account of 
reminiscence.  Glück and Bluck (2007) demonstrated that when memories are identified 
as being for life story events based on level of perceived control, the reminiscence effect 
occurred for high, but not low, perceived control events, and that emotionally positive 
events only produced a bump when rated high on perceived control.  However, perceived 
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control is just one quality of life story events.  Life story events are also highly important 
to identity development.  Demiray et al. (2009) demonstrated that bump memories are 
rated significantly more important to identity development than non-bump memories.  
However, they did not demonstrate either a dissociation as a function of importance to 
identity development or a dissociation as a function of combinations of importance to 
identity development and emotional valence.  The current study seeks to determine if 
these dissociations do in fact occur for life story events when using importance to identity 
development as their indicator.  In addition, the present study also reports the first test of 
the life story account conducted with a U.S. sample.  Findings have demonstrated that the 
reminiscence effect is a highly robust effect.  An important aspect of that demonstration 
has been showing that it does not vary cross-culturally. Prior tests of the life story 
account of reminiscence have only been carried out in Austria (Glück & Bluck, 2007), 
Turkey (Demiray et al., 2009), and Denmark (Bohn, 2010; Thomsen, Pillemer, & 
Ivcevic, 2011) (Thomsen, Olesen, Schnieber, Jensen, and Tønnesvang (2012) tested the 
life story account in a Danish sample, but that study did not test the reminiscence effect 
per se).  Based on this limited body of research, the cross-cultural stability of the life 
story account is substantially less well supported than the cross-cultural stability of the 
reminiscence effect.  By investigating the same lifetime period used by Collins et al. 
(2007) to test the cultural life scripts account of reminiscence with a college-aged sample, 
age 8 to 18, it is predicted that the findings obtained by Glück and Bluck will generalize 
to other life story event qualities, such as importance to identity development and 
importance as well as a novel population. 
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THE LIFE STORY ACCOUNT OF THE REMINISCENCE EFFECT 
 The life story account of the reminiscence effect (Glück & Bluck, 2007) draws 
upon lifespan developmental psychology and uses the idea of the life story (McAdams, 
1993; 2001) as an organizational mechanism in autobiographical memory.  The life story 
is considered to constitute the highest level of organization in autobiographical memory 
in a hierarchically structured autobiographical knowledge information base in which 
subordinate levels such as lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge 
are nested (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  The life story instills coherence to the 
memories in one’s life based on their emotional and/or motivational significance and 
provides temporal, thematic, and causal coherence to events that places them in context 
relative to other life events (Bluck & Habermas, 2000; 2001).  A fourth type of 
coherence, the cultural concept of biography, places emphasis on significant events in the 
normative life and prescribes or proscribes what culturally-sanctioned life events are fit 
for inclusion, or what undesirable events are to be omitted from the one’s life story, 
respectively. 
Recently, several studies have found evidence in support of the life story account.  
Glück and Bluck (2007) conducted a test of the life story account with 650 Austrian 
adults in which each participant reported up to 15 events they viewed as most personally 
important in their life, resulting in 3,541 reported memories.  The findings showed that 
that only emotionally positive life story events – as indicated by high ratings of perceived 
control -- produced a reminiscence bump, while emotionally positive memories rated low 
on perceived control, and all emotionally negative memories failed to produce a 
reminiscence effect.  In addition, it was found that high-perceived-control events were 
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rated as being more important to one’s development and that among scripted events, i.e., 
those commonly found in cultural life scripts, only those that were emotionally positive 
and high-perceived control produced a bump.  All other scripted events produced a 
relatively flat distribution across the lifespan.  The findings indicate that life story events 
can be reliably identified based on level of perceived control and that high-perceived 
control is associated with the life story event quality of importance to development,  as 
predicted by Glück and Bluck.  However, the reminiscence effect and the dissociation 
between distributions of life story and non-life story events was only demonstrated for 
events identified based on perceived control, and no other life story event qualities.   
In another test of the life story account of the reminiscence effect, Demiray et al. 
(2009) had 72 Turkish adults report memories in an unconstrained timed task in which 
they had 7 minutes to report as many memories as possible from each five-year period 
from their lives, resulting in 6,373 reported memories.  Afterwards, participants rated the 
novelty, distinctiveness and importance to identity development of each reported 
memory.  The authors also identified which among the reported events were transitional 
events.   In addition to testing the life story account, Demiray et al. were also able to test 
the predictions of several other existing accounts of the reminiscence effect.  These 
included the maturational (for a review, see Berntsen & Rubin, 2002), cognitive (for a 
review, see Berntsen & Rubin, 2002), self-narrative (Fitzgerald, 1988; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and life scripts (Rubin & Bertnsen, 2003) accounts.   Overall, 
their findings demonstrated that the reminiscence effect was replicated with a Turkish 
sample.  Inferential tests indicated that memories occurring within the reminiscence 
bump were rated as significantly more important to identity development and novel than 
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those outside the bump were, and more first time and one-time events occurred inside the 
bump than outside.  Inasmuch as the memories that comprised the bump in their findings 
are likely to be for life story, and not non-life story events, then Demiray et al.’s findings 
that bump memories were rated as significantly more important to identity development 
than out-bump memories converges with Glück and Bluck’s findings.  In their study, 
Glück and Bluck found that high perceived control events were rated as being 
significantly more important to one’s development than low-perceived control  events.   
More recently, a study by Thomsen, Olesen, Schnieber, Jensen, and Tønnesvang 
(2012) examined the characteristics of life story memories by having new college 
students keep diaries of their first term.  Their findings showed that event characteristics 
such as goal relevance, emotional intensity, importance and rehearsal contribute to the 
selection of life story memories.  A more recent development in tests of the life story 
account is the focus on larger lifetime periods called life story chapters.  Life story 
chapters may cover periods lasting anywhere from months to years, with longer chapters 
nesting multiple shorter chapters within them and the beginnings and ends of some 
overlapping with others.  Examples may include descriptions of lifetime periods such as 
“When I worked at the University of X,” “When I dated my ex-girlfriend,” or “When I 
lived in Los Angeles.”  Thomsen and Berntsen (2008) examined the relationship between 
specific memories and life story chapters in a study in which 59 older Danish adults 
reported life story memories.  The findings indicated that life story memories tended to 
be both cultural life script events and beginnings or endings of life story chapters.  
Moreover, life story chapters produced a reminiscence bump, as many of them tended to 
occur in young adulthood.  The findings also indicated that the average length of a life 
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story chapter was approximately 9 years.  Thomsen (2009) found that when 30 elderly 
Danes reported their life stories, chapters were reported more often than other 
components of life stories, such as specific memories, categorical memories, facts, and 
other components, and that the reporting of chapters more often coincided with reasoning 
processes than reports of specific memories.  Further demonstrating the way in which life 
story chapters mirror specific memories in their distribution across the lifespan, it has 
also been shown that a dissociation exists between the distributions of life story chapter 
beginnings as a function of emotional valence.  Thomsen et al. (2011) observed that a 
reminiscence bump occurs for specific events that mark the beginnings of emotionally 
positive chapters, while a reminiscence bump does not occur for memories marking the 
beginnings of emotionally negative chapters. 
Based on the above-mentioned research it is clear that, while still in its nascent 
stages, the life story account of reminiscence is slowly accumulating a body of strong 
evidence in its support.  However, because of the somewhat limited amount of extant 
research on the topic, little work exists confirming prior findings and/or extending them 
into new situations, or to other pertinent variables.  Moreover, the totality of 
autobiographical recall studies testing the life story account of the reminiscence effect is 
currently limited to a small handful conducted with Austrian (Glück & Bluck, 2007), 
Turkish (Demiray et al., 2009), and Danish (Bohn, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2011) samples. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
In the present study, U.S. undergraduate participants were asked to report 
separately as many memories as possible in seven minutes from two different lifetime 
periods, ages 8 to 13 and 14 to 18, and the ages at which they occurred, with the only 
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constraint being that they report specific memories.  After reporting their memories, 
participants provided ratings of emotional valence, perceived control, importance to 
identity development, and importance for each memory.  Based on prior research by 
Glück and Bluck that the reminiscence effect occurs for life story events, but not non-life 
story events, when their life story event status is indicated by level of perceived control, it 
is predicted that in the current study, the reminiscence effect will be also only be 
observed with life story events.  However, the recall distributions under examination will 
vary as a function of other life story event qualities not previously used to demonstrate 
the reminiscence effect.  As reported above, life story events are characterized by several 
qualities, including importance to identity development.  Glück and Bluck found that 
high perceived control events were rated significantly more important to one’s 
development than low perceived control events, and Demiray et al. found that bump 
events which, ostensibly, are life story events, are rated significantly more important to 
identity development than non-bump events.  The current study seeks to determine if the 
reminiscence bump occurs for high, but not low, importance to identity development 
events and if, in accord with the expectations of the life story events, emotionally positive 
events will not produce a bump if rated low on importance to identity development.  In 
addition, present studies seeks to determine the extent to which importance to identity 
development is correlated with importance and if high, but not low, importance events 
form a bump as well.  Demiray et al. found that bump memories were not rated as being 
significantly more important that non-bump memories, indicating a distinction between 
importance to identity development and importance.  Finally, the present study also 
replicates Glück and Bluck’s finding that the reminiscence effect occurs for high-
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perceived control, but not low perceived control, events, in a novel paradigm that entails 
a different cueing procedure, a novel population, and the examination of a briefer lifetime 
period than that covered in their study.  In their test of the cultural life script account of 
reminiscence in which they sought to determine if the dissociation between distributions 
of memories of opposing emotional valences would be observed, Collins et al. (2007) had 
undergraduates report emotional memories occurring up to age 18, demonstrating that the 
upward sloping component of the bump occurs for emotionally positive, but not 
emotionally negative, memories.  Following that precedent, the present test of the life 
story account also asks college-aged adults to recall autobiographical memories from this 
lifetime period. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and eleven participants completed the study, consisting of 34 
(30.6%) males and 77 (69.4%) females (Mage = 19.57, SD = 2.14, range = 18 to 33).  Of 
these, 93 (83.8%) were White/Caucasian, 5 (4.5%) were Black/African American, 5 
(4.5%) were Hispanic/Latino/Latina, and 8 (7.2%) were Asian. 
MATERIALS 
The experimental materials consisted of paper questionnaires on which memories 
were recorded and a computer-based questionnaire on which the reported memories were 
rated.  The paper questionnaires included two, three-page forms labeled Form A and 
Form B.  Form A was always to be completed first and Form B second. The lifetime 
period to be reported on each (8 to 13 or 14 to 18) was assigned during the procedure, 
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according to the counterbalancing scheme.   The forms contained a table with two 
columns, one large, in which memories were reported, and one small, in which the ages 
of the corresponding memories were reported, with 60 numbered rows in which to report 
memories. Participants were instructed to report one memory per row.  Additional pages 
were available in the event that any participants exceeded 60 memories per lifetime 
period.   
The computer-based, memory-rating questionnaire was implemented using 
MediaLab software on Microsoft Windows-based personal computers.  The memory 
rating questionnaire consisted two identical sections, one for each lifetime period (8 to 13 
and 14 to 18) which included a series of five questions to be answered in relation to each 
memory reported in the written condition.  For each memory, participants reported the 
age at which it occurred and provided four, 7-point Likert scale ratings.  The questions 
were as follows: 
(1) Age: At what age did this event occur? 
(2) Emotional Valence: Was the event emotionally positive or negative? (-3 = very 
negative; 0 = neither; +3 = very positive) 
(3) Importance: How important was this event? (1 = unimportant; 7 = of greatest 
importance) 
(4) Perceived Control: How much control do you feel you had over this event? (1 = 
none at all; 7 = total) 
(5) Importance to Identity Development: How much did this event influence who you 
have become in life or who you will become in life? (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
strongly) 
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PROCEDURE 
Participants completed the procedure individually while seated at personal 
computers in a computer lab.  The procedure required participants to provide both written 
responses and to complete a computer-based questionnaire.  Before beginning the study, 
participants were told that they would be reporting personal memories then answering a 
series of questions in relation to each memory reported.  However, they were not told 
before reporting memories what those questions would be.  The memory reporting 
procedure was based on that used by Demiray et al. (2009), which they referred to as a 
modified timeline methodology.  In their study, participants reported as many memories 
in seven minutes from each 5-year period in their lives, excluding birth to five years old.  
As with Demiray et al., participants in the current study were instructed to report specific 
memories.  Specific memories were described as memories for one-moment-in-time 
events that should have occurred in a time span of seconds, minutes, or hours, but not 
longer than one day.  Participants began the study by first completing a computer-based 
demographics questionnaire, which asked them to report their age, gender, and 
race/ethnicity.  Next, instructions for completing the memory-reporting task were 
presented on the computer, which indicated which lifetime period they would be 
reporting from first, 8 to 13 or 14 to 18.  The order in which the lifetime periods were 
reported from was counterbalanced so that equal numbers of participants completed each 
of the lifetime periods (8 to 13 or 14 to 18) first.  The instructions directed them to write 
the lifetime period that they were reporting from on a provided blank form labeled Form 
A.  The provided forms were lined and numbered and participants were instructed to 
write one memory per line.   Additionally, they were told to try to describe the memory in 
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as few words as possible, ideally between 3 to 5 words, and that they should give each 
memory a brief descriptive title that would allow them to recognize to which memory 
they were referring, as they would have to refer back to this form later in the study.  By 
pressing the continue button, the timed memory reporting task began and a timer 
appeared on the computer screen counting down from 7 minutes.  An alarm sounded at 
the end of 7 minutes indicating that they should stop writing.  An instruction screen then 
notified them that they would repeat this task with the other lifetime period and that they 
should write that lifetime period at the top of the other provided blank form, Form B.  
Once again, a timer counting down from 7 minutes appeared and emitted an alarm when 
finished, ending the memory reporting task for the second lifetime period.  Next, the 
instructions for the memory rating condition were presented.   
In the memory rating condition, participants completed a computer-based 
questionnaire that included five questions per each memory reported in the previous task.   
The questions included entering the age at which the event occurred (which was already 
written in the memory reporting task), and 7-point Likert scale ratings for emotional 
valence, importance to identity development, perceived control, and importance.  A 
masking feature was used for age to ensure participants only entered valid ages from the 
correct lifetime period.  The order in which the memories from the lifetime periods were 
rated was counterbalanced, so that equal numbers of participants rated memories from the 
8 to 13 and 14 to 18 lifetime periods first.  Participants were instructed to rate their 
memories in the order in which they were reported on their forms and that they must 
provide ratings for every memory reported.  Furthermore, it was recommended that they 
check off each rated memory on their form to ensure that they did not lose track of their 
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place.  To help participants keep track of which memory they were rating and to make 
sure those ratings corresponded to the correct memories, each series of five questions was 
numbered to indicate to which memory on their forms they corresponded.  After 
completing the memory rating condition for the first lifetime period, an instruction screen 
directed participants to complete the same procedure for the other lifetime period.  After 
all memories were rated for the second lifetime period, the experiment was complete and 
participants were debriefed. 
RESULTS 
The experiment was completed by 115 participants.  However, data for 4 (3.48%) 
participants were excluded because the number of reported memories and rated memories 
did not match.  The remaining 111 participants who provided complete data reported 
3,670 memories, with 1,587 (43.24%) of those being reported from the lifetime period of 
8 to 13 and 2,083 (56.76%) reported from the lifetime period of 14 to 18.  The mean 
number of memories reported per participant was 33.06 (SD = 10.37, range = 15 to 68).  
A within-groups, repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that 
significantly more memories were reported from between the ages of 14 to 18 (M = 
18.77, SD = 5.60) than from between the ages of 8 to 13 (M = 14.30, SD = 5.76), F(1, 
110) = 103.06, MSE = 10.75, p < .001. 
 
EXAMINING THE LIFE STORY ACCOUNT OF REMINISCENCE 
 The main goal of the present study is to replicate findings regarding the 
dissociation between the distributions of high and low perceived control, i.e., life story 
and non-life story, events, observed by Glück and Bluck and to extend it to distributions 
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of memories varying in respect to other life story event qualities, such as importance to 
identity development and importance.  Table 1 shows the correlations between the life 
story event qualities.  As would be expected because the collected variables represent  
Table 1.  
Correlations for Life Story Event Qualities of Memories From Between Ages 8 to 13 
and 14 to 18 
  Emotion Importance Perceived Control ID Importance 
Emotion 
 
.10** .43** .15** 
     Importance .18** 
 
.06* .68** 
     Perceived Control .46** .18** 
 
.20** 
     ID Importance .15** .71** .22**   
*p < .05, **p < .01 
    Correlations for qualities from ages 8 to 13 and 14 to 18 are presented on the top and 
bottom halves of the table, respectively. 
 
qualities of life story events as described by Glück and Bluck, all of the life story event 
qualities are significantly positively correlated with one another, and this holds true for 
memories from both ages 8 to 13 and 14 to 18.  Notably, importance and importance to 
identity development were the two most strongly correlated variables in both age groups, 
suggesting that to a large of extent, participants did not discriminate strongly between 
them.  However, the fact that for both lifetime periods, importance to identity 
development is more strongly correlated with perceived control than importance,  
suggests that importance to identity development was more often associated with life 
story events, than importance.   
In order to test the life story account of reminiscence, the distributions of 
memories separated by whether they do or do not meet life story event criteria are 
examined, as well as distributions of memories that meet some, but not all, of the criteria  
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necessary to produce a reminiscence bump according to the life story account of 
reminiscence.  For all examined distributions in which life story and non-life story events  
were identified based on their ratings on provided variables (importance; importance to 
identity development; perceived control; emotional valence), high and low rated groups 
were created by recoding scale data into dichotomous, categorical variables. Importance 
to identity development, importance, and perceived control, which were rated on scales 
of 1 to 7, were broken into low (1 to 4) and high (5 to 7) groups, while emotion, which 
was rated on a scale of -3 to 3, was recoded into emotionally negative (-3 to -1), neutral 
(zero), and positive (+1 to +3).  Comparisons of high versus low importance to identity 
development, importance, and perceived control, events included all emotional 
memories.  However, comparisons involving the factor of emotional valence only 
compared emotionally positive and negative events.  Table 2 shows the number of 
recalled memories based on levels of life story qualities and lifetime period.   
The first distributions examined are emotionally positive and negative memories.  
Figure 1 shows the distributions of emotionally positive and emotionally negative 
memories across the 8 to 18 lifetime period.  Emotionally positive memories increase  
linearly across the examined period, peaking at age 18, which prior research suggests is  
the peak of the reminiscence bump.  Conversely, and as expected by both the life story  
and cultural life scripts accounts of reminiscence, negative emotional memories are  
relatively flatly distributed across this period, and do not produce the upward sloping 
component of the reminiscence bump.  The remainder of the distributions under 
examination test memory qualities predictive of life story event status with the prediction 
that: (1) the reminiscence bump occurs for memories that meet life story event criteria,  
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but not for those that do not, and (2) being emotionally positive or rated highly on a life 
story event quality in and of itself does not predict a memory’s inclusion in the 
reminiscence bump; instead, memories must be both emotionally positive and meet other 
life story event criteria to produce a bump.  Figure 2 depicts the distributions of high and  
low importance memories and memories varying on levels of importance and valence.    
In accord with the predictions of the life story account, a reminiscence bump occurs for 
high importance, but not low importance, memories, with the latter displaying a relatively 
flat distribution across the lifespan.  Further in accord with the predictions of the life 
story account, and illustrating the distinction between the life story and cultural life script 
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accounts, emotionally positive, high importance memories produce a reminiscence effect, 
while emotionally positive, low importance memories do not.  Also conforming to the  
expectations of the life story account, all emotionally negative memories, even those that 
are rated high in importance, fail to produce a reminiscence effect.  Similar results occur 
with regard to perceived control.  
Figure 3 shows the distributions of high and low perceived control memories and 
memories varying on levels of perceived control and valence.  Memories rated high in  
perceived control form a bump while those rated low in perceived control do not.  Among 
the various combinations of perceived control and emotional valence, only emotionally 
positive, high-perceived control memories produce a reminiscence bump, while those that  
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are emotionally positive and low perceived control, emotionally negative and high-
perceived control, and emotionally negative and low perceived control, do not. Lastly, the  
distributions of memories by levels of importance to identity development and  
combinations with emotional valence thereof are examined.  Figure 4 shows the 
distributions of high and low importance to identity development memories and 
memories varying on levels of importance to identity development and valence.   
Conforming to the expectations of the life story account of reminiscence, a dissociation 
occurs wherein high importance to identity development memories form a bump, while 
low importance to identity development memories do not.  As seen with the previous  
distributions, only those memories that are rated high on the life story event quality in 
question and are emotionally positive form a bump.  All memories with all other 
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combinations of importance to identity development and valence have relatively flat 
distributions.  
To examine further the life story account of reminiscence, mean differences in 
ratings of memory qualities indicating life story event status were compared between the 
lifetime period of 8 to 13, an age bin not commonly part of the reminiscence bump, and 
the period of 14 to 18, which is commonly included in the bump range.  The life story 
account predicts that memories from the lifetime period of 14 to 18, which prior research 
has shown to include several common life story events, will be rated more positive, more 
important, higher in perceived control, and more important to identity development, than 
those from the non-bump period of 8 to 13.  Prior research has indicated that few, if any, 
life story events occur in the 8 to 13 lifetime period.  To examine these effects, a 
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multivariate test of within-participants repeated measures (MANOVA) was conducted, 
revealing that memories from ages 8 to 13 were significantly different from those from 
ages 14 to 18, Pillai’s Trace = .51, F(4, 107) = 27.47, p < .001.  Memories from the bump 
period of 14 to 18 were rated higher than memories from between ages 8 to 13 on all life 
story event qualities: Memories from between ages 14 to 18 (M = 5.17, SD = .83) were 
rated significantly more emotionally positive than those from between ages 8 to 13 (M = 
4.75, SD = .92), F(1, 110) = 21.41, MSE = .46, p < .001;  memories from 14 to 18 (M = 
5.12, SD = .78) were rated significantly more important than those from 8 to 13 (M = 
4.47, SD = 1.01), F(1, 110) = 58.88, MSE = .42, p < .001; memories from 14 to 18 (M = 
4.57, SD = .83) were rated significantly higher in perceived control than those from 8 to 
13 (M = 3.67, SD = .97), F(1, 110) = 79.67, MSE = .57, p < .001; and memories from 14 
to 18 (M = 4.62, SD = .98) were rated as significantly more important to identity 
development than those from 8 to 13 (M =3.87, SD = 1.17), F(1, 110) = 31.59, MSE = 
.50, p < .001.   Overall, the observed pattern fully fits the expectations of the life  story 
account, in that memories occurring within the reminiscence bump, i.e., those from 
between 14 to 18, are rated significantly higher on life story event qualities than those 
from an out-bump period. 
DISCUSSION 
Four main findings support the life story account of the reminiscence effect: (1) 
Dissociations were evident between distributions of life story and non-life story events 
when they were identified based on variables not previously used to examine recall 
distributions in which the reminiscence bump only occurred for life story events; (2) the 
upward-sloping component of the bump was only evident for memories of events that 
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met other life story event criteria and were emotionally positive; (3) memories for events 
from the bump period were rated significantly higher on all life-story-event qualities than 
those from the non-bump period; (4) significant positive correlations further demonstrate 
that the qualities of life story events described by Glück and Bluck (2007) are in fact 
related.  The findings that the upward- sloping component of the reminiscence bump is 
evident for emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative, memories, is in accord 
with the predictions of both the cultural life scripts (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) and life 
story (Glück &  Bluck, 2007) accounts of the reminiscence effect. The findings that the 
bump is evident for highly-important-to-identity-development, high-perceived-control, 
and high-importance events, but not for memories of events rated low on those qualities, 
supports and extends the life story account of the reminiscence effect.  The life story 
accounts is further supported by the findings that the bump only occurs in distributions of 
memories for events that are both emotionally positive and meet other life story event 
criteria. 
The results of the present study conform to what one would expect based on the 
autobiographical cue employed.  The procedure used in the current study is based on that 
utilized by Demiray et al. (2009), which they refer to as a “modified version” of a variety 
of different, previously employed timeline procedures.  Demiray et al. had their 
participants report as many memories as possible in 7 minutes from each five-year period 
from their lives, with the order of the lifetime periods randomized to avoid order effects 
(birth to 5 years old was omitted because of childhood amnesia).  Similarly, the current 
study required participants to report as many memories as possible in 7 minutes from the 
two lifetime periods comprising the lifetime period previously examined by Collins et al. 
168 
 
(2007), age 8 to 18.  Ostensibly, when participants are faced with procedures using 
autobiographical cues to just one memory or a relatively small amount of memories, they 
are more likely only to retrieve life story memories, resulting in a highly pronounced 
reminiscence bump for life story events, but also potentially leading to too few non-life 
story events being reported, thus precluding an examination of the kind reported here.  
The procedure utilized in the present study has the advantage of eliciting a large amount 
of memories with relatively few participants and producing a sufficient amount of non-
life story events to make a reliably interpretable comparison with life story events, and, 
possibly even more non-life story than life-story events, as the latter are relatively rare in 
life.  However, despite a large proportion of reported memories not meeting life story 
event qualities, the distributions of those memories still conformed to the expectations of 
the life story account by not possessing reminiscence bumps.  
 When considering the findings from the current study, it is important to 
distinguish between evidence of the reminiscence effect and evidence of the recency 
effect since, in the current study, the commonly observed peak of the reminiscence bump, 
age 18,  coincides with the most recent year in the examined lifetime period.  First, and of 
critical importance, is the observation that the upward-sloping component of the bump 
occurs for life story events, and not for non-life story events.  If a recency effect were 
responsible for the current findings, then one would expect that recency would have been 
observed  in the distributions of non-life story events.  In addition, the procedure used 
inherently minimizes the recency effect in that it forces participants to report memories 
from the period of ages 8 to 13 and participants have equal opportunity (i.e., the same 
amount of time) to recall events from that period as from between ages 14 and 18.  
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Moreover, the order in which memories were reported from the two lifetime periods was 
counterbalanced.  Because of these facts, the results of the present study indicate that the 
greater number of recalled memories from ages 14 to 18 is a result of the abundance of 
life story events occurring in that lifetime period.  Additionally, this issue was address by 
Collins et al.  
In their examination of autobiographical recall from the 8 to 18 lifetime period, 
Collins et al. demonstrated through a series of studies that the peak in recalled memories 
at age 18 for emotionally positive memories was not due to the recency effect.  Instead, 
they concluded that it was due to the occurrence of “age-linked cultural milestones,” or 
transitional events, which are events that tend to be instances of individuals facing 
developmental tasks and taking control of their lives, i.e. life story events.  In their study, 
Collins et al. found that many of the recalled memories occurring around age 18 were 
related to common, transitional life events, especially the experience of starting college.  
Moreover, through a series of studies, they presented evidence ruling out both the 
recency effect and the likelihood that participants were biased toward the recollection of 
positive, recent events and distanced themselves from negative, self-evaluating episodes.  
To accomplish this, Collins et al. also examined autobiographical memories from periods 
lacking major transitional events in samples of college students and middle-aged adults.  
In one study, undergraduates  reported memories from between ages 10 to 15, while in 
another, middle-aged adults with a mean age of approximately 46 reported memories 
from between ages 34 to 44.  The findings from the middle-aged adults show that there is 
no recency effect and that there is no dissociation between the distributions of positive 
and negative memories, indicating the lack of a bias towards favoring recent positive 
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events and distancing oneself from negative events.  The findings from the college-aged 
group reporting memories from 10 to 15 fit the same pattern.  The most recalled 
memories do however, come from the two most recent years of the period for both 
emotionally positive and negative events.  However,  relative to their findings with the 
reminiscence bump, the difference in the percentage of recalled memories between the 
most recent and the most remote age is negligible, and does not rise to the level of a 
recency effect.  In addition, while Collins et al. did not collect variables that provide good 
indicators of milestone events, the findings of the present study support their claim that 
the peak at age 18 is due to a preponderance of milestone events.  In the present study, 
events that are high importance to identity development, high importance, and high-
perceived control, which are characteristics of milestone events match the distributions 
observed by Collins et al., especially in their Study 2, in which a highly pronounced 
upward sloping component of the reminiscence bump was observed. 
One finding from the current study that was somewhat incongruent with the 
findings from prior research was that, while in the current study there was a strong 
positive correlation between importance to identity development and importance in both 
lifetime periods and the bump occurred for high, but not low, importance, events, 
Demiray et al. found that bump memories were rated as being significantly more 
important that non-bump memories.  This apparent discrepancy is likely due to the 
differences in the age range of the samples and the ranges of the lifetime periods being 
examined in the two studies.  While participants in the current study only reported 
memories from two lifetime periods or five-year age bins, which also happened to be the 
most recent decade of their life, Demiray et al. had participants between ages 52 and 66 
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(M = 58.25, SD = 3.86) reporting memories from 11 five-year age bins (5 to 60).  It is 
likely that when including seven non-bump five-year bins as opposed to one the average 
rating of importance for remembered events will decline substantially relative to just the 
single five-year bin of 8 to 13 examined in the present study.   This would be especially 
true when they include six five-year bins after age 30, which have been shown to contain 
few important, transitional events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Erdoğan et al., 2008; Janssen 
& Rubin, 2011).  Moreover, as older adults gain additional perspective on life, they are 
more likely to have a clearer view on what constitutes a highly important event than 
young adults who lack a greater context for considering the events they have experienced.  
Therefore, the difference may be an artifact of the paradigm employed in the current 
study, and not an indication of contradictory findings. 
 The results of the current study support and extend the life story account of the 
reminiscence effect.  They support the assertion of the life story account that in 
autobiographical recall, the reminiscence effect is caused by the differential sampling of 
life story events, i.e., emotionally positive events of personal significance that provide 
coherence to one’s life story or narrative.  These events, which often entail positively 
overcoming developmental tasks, provide causal coherence to the life story/narrative, are 
retrospectively viewed as being highly consequential, and have a strong influence on who 
an individual becomes in life.  When these events are age-normative transitional events, 
which they mostly tend to be, they produce a reminiscence bump, as important 
transitional life events tend to cluster between the ages of 10 to 30, i.e., adolescence to 
young adulthood.  Research indicates that there is significant overlap between cultural 
life script events and life story events (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008), and life story events 
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that produce a reminiscence bump also tend to be cultural life script events.  Evidence 
suggests that retrospective assessments that an event is a life story event and the influence 
of cultural life scripts both contribute to the occurrence of the reminiscence effect. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The main goal of the current dissertation is to contribute novel tests and evidence 
for accounts of the reminiscence effect, thereby strengthening those accounts and, more 
generally, contributing to our understanding of autobiographical memory and the 
reminiscence effect.  The four articles presented cover several issues in reminiscence 
effect research with two, Chapters 2 and 4, focusing on life scripts and the other two, 
Chapters 3 and 5, focusing on the reminiscence effect.  The findings from Chapters 2 and 
4 explore the cultural life script account in different ways.  The test of the life script with 
an African American sample, like previous, similar studies with Danish (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2004; Bohn, 2010), Turkish (Erdoğan et al., 2008), Dutch (Janssen & Rubin, 
2011), and U.S. undergrad (Rubin et al., 2009) samples, demonstrates the cross-cultural 
generality of the life script, and, potentially, entails the most stringent test of its stability 
as it examines what is arguably the most unique population out of existing tests of the life 
script.  The experiments in Chapter 4 directly test the typicality effect with life script 
information.  The findings from Experiment 1 that the typicality effect occurs similarly 
with life scripts as it does with other types of scripted information suggest their existence 
and that they are in fact represented in memory.  Failure to observe the typicality effect 
would bring into question whether life scripts are part of semantic memory as it has been 
reliably shown to be a consequence of script knowledge (Bower, et al., 1979, Graesser et 
al., 1979).  In doing so, the findings support the cultural life script account, as described 
by Rubin and Berntsen (2003).  However, that the potential exists that the effects in 
Experiment 1 were driven by confounds with other factors, and that mixed results were 
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obtained in Experiment 2, limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the findings.  
The unexpected findings in Experiment 2 suggest the existence of knowledge, possibly in 
the form of a schema, associating youth with emotionally positive affect and old age with 
emotionally negative affect that is independent of a life script.  The implications for these 
unexpected results, which potentially do not preclude the existence of the life script, are 
discussed below. 
The tests of the reminiscence effect reported in Chapters 3 and 5 unambiguously 
supported the predictions of the cultural life script and life story accounts.  In Chapter 3, 
African Americans’ memories of unfair treatment across the lifespan were examined to 
determine the presence of the reminiscence effect.  In accord with the predictions of the 
cultural life script and life story accounts, the reminiscence effect did not occur with this 
emotionally negative event.  Furthermore, analyses with additional distributions in which 
we examined separately memories of unfair treatment in various situations and attributed 
to various reasons also failed to display reminiscence bumps.  However, it should be 
noted that, while the findings from Chapter 3 failed to contradict the expectations of 
cultural life script and life story accounts, they do not provide any definitive conclusions 
about the effect of minority status on the reminiscence effect and those accounts.  A  
procedure more comparable to prior research is required to provide the best evidence of 
that nature.   
The findings from Chapter 5 provide unequivocal support for the cultural life 
scripts and life story accounts.  The findings demonstrated that all of the  predictions of 
those accounts were supported.   In distributions of autobiographical memories up to age 
18, the upward sloping component of the reminiscence effect occurred for emotionally 
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positive, but not emotionally negative, events, as expected by both accounts.  When 
examining distributions of memories rated high and low on life story event qualities such 
as importance, importance to identity development, and perceived control, the upward 
sloping component of the bump occurred only for memories rated high on those qualities.  
The bump did not occur for memories rated low on those qualities, as they are not life 
story events.  
1: THE STATUS OF THE LIFE SCRIPT 
 The intent of the research reported in Chapters 2 and 4 was to contribute to our 
understanding of life scripts, and in turn, the cultural life script account of reminiscence.  
The findings of Chapter 2 provide clear support for the cultural life script account in the 
form of a replication of prior research, while the findings from Chapter 4 provide novel, 
albeit mixed, evidence regarding life scripts.    
As previously mentioned, an important property of the life script is the manner in 
which it distributes emotionally positive and negative events across the lifespan and has 
strongly prescribed timings for the former but not the latter, as these contribute to the 
structuring of recall distributions.  The results of Chapter 2 showed that the predictions of 
the cultural life script account regarding the distribution of emotionally positive events 
were fulfilled.  Emotionally positive events, which were overwhelmingly mentioned 
more than negative ones, mostly occurred before age 30, with more than half of them 
occurring in the bump period.  As such, the findings from prior tests of the life script 
were replicated.  The results also demonstrated that, with the exception of the 
emotionally negative event, experiencing discrimination, the ages of occurrence for 
emotionally positive events were strongly agreed upon, but those for emotionally 
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negative events were not (the interpretability of results regarding experiencing 
discrimination is limited because of the fact that half of all mentions of that event were 
from a single participant).  Unique findings were obtained, however, with the distribution 
of emotionally negative and neutral events and the mean valences of lifetime periods.  
With regard to the distribution of emotionally negative and neutral events, approximately 
63% of those events were expected to occur before age 30, whereas that percentage in 
prior research with a Dutch sample (Janssen & Rubin, 2011) was 50%.  However, there is 
not much of an implication for this finding on the current formulation of the cultural life 
script account.  Because a combination of the shapes of the lifespan distributions of 
emotional events and prescribed timings are required to structure autobiographical recall, 
these findings do not suggest that the observed life script would lead to differences in the 
reminiscence effect for African Americans.  Similarly, the finding that lifetime periods 
after age 30 tend to be emotionally positive while those periods tend to be emotionally 
negative in prior research does not indicate differences in the way that the observed life 
script would structure autobiographical recall differently either.  Overall, one should 
expect that, based on the predictions of the cultural life script account and the findings of 
the current study, African Americans would produce similar reminiscence effects in the 
autobiographical recall as other, previously examined populations.  In summation, the 
findings of Chapter 2 support the stability of the properties of the life script and 
strengthen the life script account as described by Rubin and Berntsen (2003).  
Importantly, the findings demonstrate that the key properties of the life script necessary 
for structuring the recall of highly emotional autobiographical memories were found to 
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generalize to an unfairly treated minority population and suggest that the cultural life 
script account’s predictions regarding the reminiscence remain unchanged as well.   
 While the findings of Chapter 2 strengthen the cultural life script account of 
reminiscence, the implications for the findings of Chapter 4 on that account are mixed.  
In it, research was reported which was intended to provide additional evidence for the 
existence of life scripts.  Specifically, the goal of Chapter 2 was to demonstrate that the 
typicality effect, which happens with other forms of scripted information, happens with 
life script information, thereby suggesting that (1) they are a script, similar to other types 
of scripts, and (2) that they are represented in semantic memory.   The findings of 
Experiment 1 show that, as predicted, the typicality effect did occur.  Using life events 
varying in typicality as a function of age appropriateness, recognition memory was better 
for atypical than typical life script events and more typical than atypical life script events 
were recognized falsely.  However, there exists the potential that the observed effects 
were driven not by typicality, but by differential memorability of items due to the 
emotional valence and importance of the life script events used as critical items, as well 
as the age of the character for which they were presented.  First, the numbers of 
emotionally positive and negative events used as critical items in Experiment 1were not 
equal and their presentation was not counterbalanced.  Second, the perceived importance 
of critical items was unknown, as that variable was not collected in the pretest condition.  
Therefore, Experiment 2 was conducted to attempt to address concerns over those 
potential confounds.  By testing recognition memory for unscripted items for which 
importance was held constant, that varied as a function of emotion and were presented as 
occurring to characters of varying ages, it was expected that no differences in recognition 
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would be observed based on emotion and age of the character.  However, this was not the 
case.  Despite the use of unscripted items, recognition memory varied as a function of 
emotional valence and the age of the character suggesting that there was an effect of 
typicality without the activation of a script, in the sense described by Schank and Abelson 
(1977).  Rather, it seems that knowledge associating youth with positive emotional 
valence and old age with negative emotional valence, a pattern similar to the relation 
between emotional events and age in the life script was activated.  Possibly, this 
knowledge is in the form of a schema rather than a script, in which certain general 
affective states are more associated with one lifetime period than another.  Extensive 
research has demonstrated the tendency for schemas to exert an effect in associating 
items or concepts with one another (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  The existence of a life 
schema associating age and emotion does not necessarily preclude the existence of life 
scripts but does allude to the possibility that life scripts may have related similar 
knowledge, even possibly derived from the life script itself, that is activated 
simultaneously with it.    
It should be made clear what the implications of these findings are for the cultural 
life script account.  They do not suggest any changes to the structure of life scripts, the 
way they distribute emotional events and the way in which the timings of emotionally 
positive events are highly prescribed, while those for emotionally negative events are not.  
They do not contradict any of the claims of the cultural life script account regarding the 
ability of the life script to structure autobiographical recall and produce the reminiscence 
effect for emotionally positive, but not emotionally negative events.  What they do bring 
into question is the form in which the life script is represented in memory and the 
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possibility that highly similar, related information is present which may be involved in 
the processing of information about emotional life events.  However, further research 
directly examining this issue will be required to draw stronger conclusions about the 
existence of schemas relating youth with positive emotion and old age with negative 
emotion.  A paradigm specifically designed for that purpose would likely be necessary  to 
disentangle the relative effects of that knowledge/schema and life scripts in the 
processing of information about emotional life events, or at the very least, causing the 
typicality effect with such information. 
 Overall, the cultural life script account of the reminiscence effect (Rubin & 
Berntsen, 2003) continues to be a strongly supported, highly effective account of the 
reminiscence effect and the recall of highly emotional autobiographical memories.  In 
light of the findings from the current dissertation, it is clear that the properties of the life 
script are stable across a variety of situations including across majority and minority 
populations.  While it seems clear that they are a form of script, based on the findings 
from Chapter 4 it remains unclear if they are similar to forms of scripts previously 
examined in tests of the typicality effect, or if they differ in key ways, and are 
supplemented by additional knowledge. 
2: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMINISCENCE EFFECT 
 The findings of the current dissertation have several implications for accounts of 
the reminiscence effect.  Two tests of the reminiscence effect were reported: One in 
which the distribution of African Americans’ memories of unfair treatment across the 
lifespan was investigated (Chapter 3); and one in which the life story account of the 
reminiscence effect was tested (Chapter 5).  The findings from Chapter 2, the test of 
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African Americans’ life script, also have implications for the status of the reminiscence 
effect.   
While the results of Chapter 3 show that a reminiscence effect was not observed, 
the goal of the study—to present a test of the reminiscence effect with an African 
American sample--is important in that such a study constitutes an important contribution 
to our understanding of the reminiscence effect.  As it stands, this study is the only 
reported investigation of the reminiscence effect with African Americans or any unfairly 
treated minority sample.  In light of the findings of Chapter 3, the predictions of the 
cultural life script and life story account remain unchallenged.  Save for the exception of 
history-graded events, the recall of which does not entail a special cognitive mechanism, 
or findings regarding memories of when one was most jealous (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003), 
no study has yet to demonstrate a reminiscence bump for emotionally negative events.  
Furthermore, the reminiscence effect for memories of when one was most jealous could 
be attributed to a confounding of those memories with when one was most in love. 
Overall, the findings of Chapter 2 do not support the likelihood that the autobiographical 
recall of African Americans would entail a reminiscence effect for emotionally negative 
memories as well.   
The cultural life script and life story accounts of reminiscence are also 
strengthened by the findings of Chapter 5.  In Chapter 5, prior findings that the bump 
occurs for life story, but not non-life story events were extended to include other 
variables that are indicators of life story events, supporting the predictions of the life 
story account.  In addition, the life story account was further supported by demonstrating 
that its predictions extend to a sample varying from those of prior research in several 
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ways.  The current study presented the first test of the life story account with a U.S. 
sample, as well as the first test of the life story account with a sample of young adults, 
i.e., college undergraduates. 
For the most part, the findings of the current dissertation bolster the cultural life 
scripts and life story accounts of the reminiscence effect.  Chapters 2  and 5 do so by 
presenting support for their predictions whereas Chapter 3 does so by failing to find 
evidence contradicting the claims of those accounts that the reminiscence effect only 
occurs for highly positive, and not highly negative, emotional memories.  However, while 
Chapter 3 failed to find support for its hypothesis that the reminiscence effect occurs in 
distributions of memories for unfair treatment.  However, this finding does not rule out 
the possibility that differences might be observed in the reminiscence effect between 
African Americans and previously examined populations.  Only by testing the 
reminiscence effect with an African American sample and procedures similar to existing 
tests can that be determined.  Ultimately, further research needs to be done to draw more 
definitive conclusions about the role of minority status in autobiographical recall. 
3: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Since being introduced, numerous studies have supported the cultural life script 
and life story accounts of the reminiscence effect.  The research presented in the current 
dissertation represents only a few of the experimental paradigms available to test the 
predictions of these accounts.  Recent research has demonstrated several new avenues for 
examining the cultural life scripts and life story accounts that can lead to innovative 
research.  For instance, beyond tests of the bump and life script generation procedures, 
support for the cultural life script account has also been demonstrated by examining very 
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young children’s prospective life stories, which findings show conform to the structure of 
cultural life scripts (Bohn & Berntsen, 2010).  Research has also recently focused on the 
relationship between life story chapters (similar to Conway’s lifetime periods) and 
cultural life script events (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008; Thomsen et al., 2011), as the latter 
usually represent beginnings and endings of the former.   Other recent research includes 
an investigation to determine further the qualities of life story memories and their role in 
memory.  However, rather than looking at memories across the lifespan,  they were able 
to examine the qualities of life story memories by looking at undergraduates’ memories 
of their first year at college (Thomsen et al., 2012).  Together, these studies indicate the 
variety of potential lines of inquiry that can follow from the cultural life script and life 
story accounts.   
However, the potential for new research is not exclusive to such alternative 
investigations of the cultural life script and life story accounts.  There is still great 
potential for learning more about the cultural life script and life story accounts with tests 
of the reminiscence effect and life script generation procedures, such as those reported in 
the current dissertation.  One avenue of inquiry that has not been fully investigated is the 
possibility that special populations, such as clinical populations or individuals that have 
experienced off-script lives, may produce differential results with regard to their recall of 
highly emotional autobiographical memories.  To date, tests of these effects have almost 
exclusively been confined to healthy populations.  Moreover, the majority of them have 
utilized undergraduate samples that, ostensibly, are living very “on-script” lives, meeting 
all of their important milestones at the culturally expected time.  Possible candidate 
clinical populations include those with clinical depression, recovering alcoholics, or drug 
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addicts, who may display differential results due to their psychological condition, or 
because such lives inherently lead to experiencing off-script events or having different 
expectations of life events.   One recent study is among the first to examine the effect of a 
psychiatric condition on autobiographical memory and life scripts.  Findings show that 
patients with borderline personality disorder tended to report emotionally negative rather 
than emotionally positive, memories, and that their life scripts contain less mentions of 
normative life script events (Jørgensen, Berntsen, Bech, Kjølbye, Bennedsen, & 
Ramsgaard, 2012).  As suggested earlier, it was unclear whether these differences 
reflected genuine identity disturbances or if these subjects actually had substantially 
different life experiences.  With regard to non-clinical populations living “off-script” 
lives, potential candidate populations could include “non-traditional” college students, 
such as adult or middle-aged undergraduates or low SES groups who may have 
expectations about education and employment that are not adequately captured in college 
undergraduate samples.   
However, observed differences in such groups might not contradict current 
accounts of the reminiscence effect.  In their current iterations, these accounts can explain 
such differences.  Reminiscence bumps may occur for emotionally negative events, but 
the events recalled would likely represent failures to fulfill life script events that are 
usually emotionally positive, such as failing to graduate high school at the appropriate 
time.  Conversely, bumps for emotionally positive events may shift and distort as 
individuals ultimately fulfill those same cultural life script events at “off-script” times.  
For instance, an individual may graduate high school late, the consequence of which 
would be a chain reaction in which several life script events become delayed.  As highly 
184 
 
emotional events representing the successful completion of culturally sanctioned, 
desirable events or developmental tasks, they are likely to be differentially recalled.  
Moreover, ultimately surpassing these milestones would make them even more 
personally salient, and the off-script nature of the individual’s life would be an integral 
component of her or his life story or identity. 
4: CLOSING REMARKS 
 The goal of the current dissertation was to investigate a variety of previously 
unexamined issues pertaining to the cultural life script and life story accounts.  One of 
those previously unexamined issues was the effect of minority status on the life script and 
the reminiscence effect.  Contrary to expectations, the predictions of the cultural life 
script and life story accounts were not contradicted.  Rather than contributing 
demonstrations of novel effects, those studies contribute to our understanding of 
autobiographical memory by lending further support to those accounts and their claims 
that they do not vary cross-culturally.  The goal of Chapter 4 was to demonstrate the 
typicality effect with life scripts, thereby lending support to the premise that they are 
represented in semantic memory.  While the mixed results that were obtained partially 
support that claim, they also suggest the possibility that knowledge about the relationship 
between emotion and age is represented in another form, possibly a schema that 
supplements life script knowledge, since the findings of Experiment 2 demonstrated the 
typicality effect without scripted information.  Consequently, additional research is 
required to understand better the effect of typicality on memory for life script information 
and the potential presence of schemas relating emotion and age in semantic memory.  
One possibility is that alternative paradigms may be employed to test further the 
185 
 
typicality effect with life scripts by changing the testing stimuli or the memory task.  The 
goal of Chapter 5 was to examine previously untested predictions of the life story 
account.  By fully supporting those predictions, the findings from Chapter 5 lend further 
support to that account.  The cultural life script and life story accounts of reminiscence 
continue to be strongly supported.  They provide valuable frameworks for the 
investigation of autobiographical memory and understanding the processing of life story 
information.  Undoubtedly, they will play important roles in future discoveries in the 
field of autobiographical memory research. 
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